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Abstract 
 
The University of Manchester 
Adriana Vilella Nilsson 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Telling stories about…Business representation of giant corporations 
2010 
 
 
 
 
 
This project explores the role narratives play in helping giant corporations to achieve 
their political and economic goals in democratic capitalism. Using a framework in 
which political science and cultural economy insights about business representation 
are taken into account, it claims that stories bring arenas and actors together in a 
public negotiation of power. While actors’ interests and beliefs are in constant 
evolution, it is through narratives that they legitimate their demands and decisions, 
creating new sets of interests and structures in the process. The substantive part of this 
analysis looks at a set of public interactions between corporations and different groups 
of external actors, both in governance arenas and in the stock market. It finds that 
effective stories of business representation are not structured plots with a beginning, 
middle and end but are rather a set of arguments developed in different directions that 
depend on the narratives told by other actors: in a nutshell, stories provide elements 
that can be combined and reassembled to intersect with other narratives. The overall 
conclusion is that stories have become a structural feature of public spheres. 
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Introduction: Storytelling as strategy 
 
American pollster Frank Luntz, a former Republican Party communications 
guru, is credited to have penned the term ‘climate change’ to replace ‘global 
warming’, incorporating his less scientific words to the fierce environmental debate of 
the early 2000s. His company, The Word Doctors, has advised politicians, executives 
working for almost one third of the Fortune 100 corporations, including GM and 
McDonalds, as well as a diverse range of associations, from the American Chemistry 
Council to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. In a (leaked) memorandum about 
environment policies, back in 2002, Luntz told George W. Bush’s team: “it can be 
helpful to think of environmental (and other) issues in terms of ‘story’. A compelling 
story, even if factually inaccurate, can be more emotionally compelling than a dry 
recitation of the truth”. 
 This thesis makes a similar proposition: it can be useful to think about 
business representation, particularly the representation of giant corporations, in terms 
of stories. This does not mean reducing business representation to narratives or 
assuming a deterministic link between stories and results, but uprooting and 
acknowledging their function. The exercise here, if I may borrow still more from 
Luntz, is to probe how dry facts and numbers, accurate or inaccurate, can be turned 
into compelling narratives able to convince a diverse and frequently sceptical 
audience to grant corporate actors their wishes. In a nutshell, the question asked is 
how stories can help firms to achieve their political and economic goals in a world 
increasingly wary of corporate power. 
  A recapitulation of the last decades shows the task has become daunting. The 
Harris Poll, an American index measuring the confidence in the leaders of major 
institutions, found in 1966, its first year, that 55% of the respondents had a ‘great deal 
of confidence’ in major companies; in 2010, giant firms inspired a great deal of 
confidence only in 15% of participants, a decline already visible in 1971, when 
confidence in corporate leaders dropped to 27%. During the 1980s, figures were 
below 21%, with the bottom reached in 1990, at 9%. In Britain, a similar trend is 
identified, with the damage in big business’ image reflected in opinion polls pointing 
at a declining trust in giant corporations and their contribution to the common good 
(Moran 2009).  
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The starting point of this research is therefore the moment when business 
misconduct and underperformance are uncovered and punished by lawmakers, courts, 
civil society groups, shareholders and media alike, with pointed questions being asked 
about the position of giant corporations as a privileged interest and their 
disproportionate power vis-à-vis other societal actors. Advertisement and blunt 
political lobbying, two traditional business representation tools kept in motion by 
significant financial expenditure, reach their limits when they are exposed by counter 
lobbies as deceitful, undemocratic and illegitimate. A more subtle involvement, thus, 
becomes necessary. If we go back to stories now, a first assumption may easily 
follow: corporate narratives attempt to convince by projecting accountability and 
social worth. Stories will only be helpful if they counteract negative impressions, 
offering an opportunity for business to convey accountability instead of self-interest. 
It is reasonable to assume, thus, that good stories must engage with broader concerns 
to fulfil their main mission and that successful firms, consequently, are the ones able 
to find aspects of their own goals that can be endorsed by groups external to the 
corporation. 
An immediate problem with this is right in the second and third lines of the 
previous paragraph: while one can reasonably assume the existence of overlapping 
interests among some of the actors named there (e.g. civil society, law makers/courts 
and media or shareholders, law makers and media), it is less reasonable to believe 
they would often interact in great harmony. The diverse and frequently incompatible 
nature of their interests poses a real problem in the building of stories, which is how 
to take these different expectations on board without inevitably displeasing 
interlocutors. The addressing of environmental problems by an oil company, for 
instance, will certainly please green non-governmental organisations (NGOs) but is 
very likely to dishearten shareholders analysing the effects that costly new technology 
might have on the company’s bottom line. On the other hand, if the move is 
constructed as a sound business case (Vogel 2006), such as Cadbury’s voluntary 
involvement with farmers in Africa to support communities on the verge of a 
agricultural failure that would affect the corporation (Croft 2010), criticism is again 
likely, as Shell discovered in its operations in Nigeria.   
Considering the difficulties of conciliating expectations leads us to another 
assumption: corporate narratives take into account not only the audience but the arena 
where the interaction happen. This is important because, while the idea of stories as a 
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tool leading to legitimacy still holds here, the structure of the arena changes the 
function that stories perform since there is a difference in what is in need of 
legitimacy. Political struggles within and among democratic states are supposed to 
happen in a pluralistic environment where different interests are heard so that results 
are representative of society’s interests. In this scenario, stories are part and parcel of 
the process of legitimating business particular interests and demands, depicting them 
as enmeshed in broader societal concerns. Economic arenas such as the money 
markets, on the other hand, have the opposite point of departure: actors share a main 
interest, which is maximising profits. Disagreements here arise because of different 
views on how to achieve them. Stories, in this setting, provide the link between 
management decisions and financial results, legitimating management decisions vis-à-
vis alternative views. In sum, stories in political arenas intend to provide credibility to 
business’ claims, reinforcing its legitimacy as a relevant and accountable player, while 
in economic arenas they help to legitimate management decisions as competent and 
accountable. Trying to perform both jobs with the same story would generally not 
work, opening a chink for the challenging of narratives and, ultimately, of players. 
A third proposition follows from this last point: a breakdown of stories can 
lead to crisis and impair the construction of new narratives.  If stories are intrinsically 
linked to credibility and accountability, anything that exposes them as inaccurate or 
deceiving is very likely to start a crisis. Accordingly, building stories once a 
corporation is under attack is more difficult than in non-crisis moments: firstly, actors 
are less willing to give the corporation the benefit of the doubt because trust, 
previously reinforced by stories, is breached; secondly, a crisis exposes the improper 
behaviour of a firm as well as the function of stories as a tool of persuasion, making 
the ‘dry recitation of the truth’ preferable to ‘emotionally compelling’ narratives. As a 
consequence, stories put together under fire are more likely to allow larger 
concessions to other actors’ interests, in detriment of the corporation’s own. Once the 
crisis is over, firms may be able to restart the process of story building on their own 
terms, incorporating the external challenge and corporate responses to the narrative in 
a bid to restore credibility. 
As the ideas developed so far suggest, building stories is a complex exercise. 
This complexity is in fact central to explanations about why communications 
executives like Frank Luntz have been particularly valued and handsomely paid in the 
past decade. The amount of effort and money spent by corporations, however, has 
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little relationship to results. Whilst some giant firms (and sectors) have competently 
used stories to achieve credibility, other very wealthy corporations have been visibly 
less successful, a sign that, at least regarding storytelling, economic might does not 
predetermine outcomes. Part of the complexity of building stories perhaps stems from 
its incongruity with established institutional trouble-shooting mechanisms in which “a 
technocratic appraisal to find a simple technical solution is the general rule”, as David 
Croft, head of Sustainable Sourcing at Cadbury’s, put it  (2010). Moreover, there is a 
sudden need to cooperate with a variety of actors that were virtually off giant firms’ 
radars until recently, with part of the problem being not the building of the narrative 
per se but its interface with other actors’ narratives. There is, thus, a significant shift 
from messages tailored to particular types of consumers whose responses are 
primarily measured through focus groups and sales volumes, as in marketing and 
advertisement. On the other hand, traditional lobbying attempts to hard sell the firm’s 
view on a subject to particular actors, an activity usually accompanied by generous 
‘donations’, might result in the support of key decision makers and desirable results 
but still will not shield corporations, and their stories, from exposure by competing 
actors and narratives. 
With this unevenness of results in mind, a central precondition for 
understanding how stories can help giant firms to achieve their goals has to be to 
explore why some stories have managed to avoid sharp criticism while others have 
not. Therefore, probing the reasons behind different outcomes is at the core of the 
empirical work conducted here. It is only by comparing and contrasting business 
stories that have enjoyed different degrees of success that one can better understand 
and explain the dynamics at play. The words ‘different degrees’ are used here 
deliberately. The acknowledgment of a significant grey area between winning and 
losing is important because, more often than not, a sweeping victory is not essential 
for business purposes. Stories can have a noteworthy role even when they fail to 
completely counter rival narratives since their use is fundamentally instrumental.  
Selecting cases with stories that display different levels of effectiveness, thus, allows 
for the recognition of desirable and undesirable traits of stories as well as their 
interaction with other traditional tools of business representation.  
 Episodes under scrutiny should also involve industries that have struggled 
with the management of their stories and the new arrivals that are credited to be 
partially responsible for the changes in their business environment, namely the 
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representatives of the so-called civil society and investors. Their different interests 
and individual narratives are considered here to be at the same time part of the 
problem and of the solution: while their clashing concerns and stories challenge 
business interests and force firms to respond, they are also the material business has to 
relate to in order to build its own improved narratives. Examining cases where 
dissimilar actors interact is fundamental to shed light on how stories influence each 
other and whether proficiency at addressing broader concerns is in fact at the core of a 
successful corporate story, as the first proposition suggests.         
Considering the different actors named above automatically brings different 
institutional arenas to the empirical test. Civil society, represented by environmental, 
consumers, animal welfare, patient groups etc., operates in a variety of spheres at 
national, transnational and global levels, from traditional political spaces to the 
European lawmaking system and hybrid quasi-governmental bodies. Investors, on the 
other hand, are usually confined to the world of equity markets, even though 
associated activities such as financial regulation and policy making embody other 
actors and more political issues. Taking arenas into account, on the other hand, allows 
us to examine the relationship between actors and structures and the role of the latter 
in empowering or disempowering particular groups. This is important for the analysis 
of narratives and their effectiveness because it highlights not only the desirable 
features of stories and their limits in relation to other actors and their narratives but 
also in relation to where they are told, which is in turn directly linked to the second 
assumption of this thesis that stories perform different functions in different settings.  
Also somewhat related to ‘where’ stories are told is the role of the media, as 
discursive interactions have increasingly taken place in the public eye, channelled via 
news outlets in the real and virtual worlds. Since the early 1990s, two different trends 
seems to have developed: on the one hand, mainstream media have increasingly 
opened its pages to news involving non-conventional sources such as NGOs and other 
interest groups; on the other hand, a growing business media, fuelled by regulators’ 
disclosure requirements and massive corporate advertisement, has created a more 
hospitable environment to economic interests. Stories, however, are not self-contained 
but migrate within sections and across media types, bringing a high level of 
contingency to the involvement of the media both as an arena and an actor. 
Consequently, stories are bound to be received and interpreted in different 
ways depending on which type of media is leading the coverage, at the same time that 
 16 
the media stories themselves will influence key audiences. The inclusion of empirical 
cases displaying different exposures to media attention is thus an important 
thermometer for measuring which kind of stories can be told under this type of 
surveillance and how they are changed, helped or hindered by them. The analysis of 
the media is particularly pertinent in relation to the third proposition about story 
breakdowns and attempts of reconstruction, given that crises are usually highly 
mediated events.  
The focus on mass communication here, however, is not informed by any 
theoretical preoccupation with the power of the media as such. The importance of the 
media in this work, which is in its core an inquiry about public narratives, is its 
simultaneous role as a key source of information about the development of a public 
dispute and a key indicator of how stories are being responded to. While some 
reflexion about the use of the media as a separate arena or their co-authorship (and 
therefore active participation) of stories may be inevitable, the theoretical ambition of 
this thesis lies elsewhere, more precisely on a attempt to bring together contemporary 
scholarship on business representation produced in political science and in more 
cultural niches of political economy and add to their findings, since there is more 
common ground between these two lines of research than might be apparent at first 
sight. 
Both approaches are concerned with the relationships between actors and 
structures and seek to understand how structural changes of capitalism in the past 
three decades have affected business power, as well as its responses to this fast 
moving environment. A common conclusion is that new actors and arenas have 
created a need to respond publicly and in a bespoke way to direct challenges, a task 
that is better performed by the corporation itself rather than through collective action. 
The main divergence relates to the extent that corporate agency has been negatively 
affected by the changes, with conclusions varying substantially. These sometimes 
contradictory diagnoses are partially linked to ontological beliefs about the nature of 
power but also reveal an analytical process that tends to lose sight of agency when 
structures are on focus and vice-versa. This, in turn, means that the arrival of new 
actors may be overlooked as sources of threat for business influence when compared 
with structural biases understood to favour business in parts of the political science 
literature. In contrast, cultural approaches recognise the arrival of actors as shifting 
the balance inside structures but tend to consider just a few actors in the analysis, 
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partially because of their obvious ‘power’ to change events when consciously 
exercising their agency.  
The proposition made here is that the measurement of power as a finite, zero 
sum property, implying that the gain of power by other actors necessarily implies the 
loss of power by business or the other way around, may not be the best way of 
looking at the problem. While structures, populated by particular combinations of 
actors, beliefs and interests, surely display biases in favour of certain participants, 
power is not ‘trapped’ within them. The nature of power is more fluid and malleable 
than is being considered precisely because actors, beliefs and interests are also in 
constant motion. The starting point of this thesis is exactly the evolving and dialectic 
relationship between structures and actors in the past 30 years that has thrown 
business in uncharted waters of public contestation. Coordinating alliance formation 
in new governance arenas or telling stories about past achievements and future 
performance to shareholders, two of the main business practices highlighted by these 
literatures, are essentially cultural and cooperation-dependent activities that are at 
odds with straightforward and self-reproducing victories determined by structures.  
Stories, I propose, are one of the threads that can bring these fragmented 
pictures of business representation together because they are a tool with which 
corporations are able to justify their interests and decisions in relation to other actors’ 
interests and decisions in political and economic settings. By making reference to 
what French sociologists Boltanski and Thévenot (1999) called ‘principles of 
equivalence’, something that is mutually understood by all actors and, as a 
consequence, measurable and comparable, corporate stories convey the social, 
political and economic accountability lost in lobbying and advertisement. Stories are a 
conscious effort to reach outside the firm and build a common ground of overlapping 
issues and consensus. As a consequence, corporate demands, and indirectly its power, 
become legitimate as a result of a bargaining process rather than a top down flexing of 
corporate muscles. This discursive struggle can indeed be helped or hindered by 
structures but is not determined by them, hence the variability of results. The use of 
stories as a common currency through which actors can trade, publicly confronting 
and negotiating the paradox between capitalism and democracy that is made visible 
by the operation of multinational corporations, is therefore the preliminary answer to 
the question of how stories can help business to achieve its goals. The main task is 
then to define what makes the stories to be perceived as strong or weak.  
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Contents 
 
The thesis is organised in seven chapters, with the first part tackling the 
historical and theoretical aspects of business representation and a second part 
dedicated to the each of the case studies, followed by a discussion chapter.  
The first chapter revisits the structural changes of capitalism in the past 30 
years, identifying the new challenges for the political representation of giant firms and 
the way corporations have reacted to them according to a dominant view of business 
and its power within political science. The main thread running through this chapter is 
that the changes in the institutional environment which resulted in a shift to individual 
representation of giant corporations has been maintained even after policy making 
practices started to reward more encompassing processes legitimating the input of 
new (e.g. NGOs) and old (e.g. business confederations, trade unions) actors. In a 
nutshell, chapter one is a portrait of how business practices and influence started to be 
challenged and business’ main responses to criticism.  
Chapter two considers how the changes have impacted business as a key 
economic actor using the analytical lenses of scholars operating under the broad 
intellectual umbrella of cultural economy. Fast forwarding to the 1990s, the height of 
a so-called financialisation process, these accounts expose the cultural aspects of 
capitalism and of financial markets interactions. The argument is that cultural 
practices have become central to giant firm strategy, with corporate storytelling 
turning into a way of managing the expectations of the City, whose ‘circuit’ includes 
analysts, journalists and institutional investors. The latter, a relatively new arrival in 
the arena, is in fact the main audience of this process because their decisions can 
impact management’s legitimacy and the firm’s capitalisation.  
A link between the two sets of literature reviewing the changes in the political 
and economic representation of giant firms, and the proposed empirical cases, is 
provided by chapter III. Its main focus is to reconcile these two quite distinct 
approaches by proposing a framework in which the new actors identified by both 
literatures, as well as corporate strategies centred on managing narratives, play an 
important role in business representation. The argument is that, when power ceases to 
be seen as a static and finite good and structures are considered capable of both 
constraining and enabling agency, narratives have a clear role in helping firms to 
achieve their goals at the same time that they enhance the legitimacy of individual 
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players, their sectors and even the policy making arena itself. This chapter also makes 
clear the ontological and epistemological assumptions of this work and explains the 
reasoning behind the choice of case studies. 
Chapter IV, the first empirical case, analyses the building of the European 
chemical legislation. It is by far the most complex story, bringing together most of the 
changes alluded in the previous chapters. Firstly, it is staged in a very relevant new 
arena, the European Commission, in a substantial measure the creation of the 
capitalist changes of the past decades. Secondly, the arena is structurally and even 
geographically positioned in a way that giant corporations are privileged vis-à-vis 
other societal actors, given the costs of operating outside national settings and the 
complexity and scope of the issues in the agenda. Thirdly, as a consequence of this 
perceived gap of representation, it is a sphere in which actors other than business are 
encouraged to contribute and build consensus. The story of REACH (Registration, 
Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals)  bring interesting insights 
about the importance of sharing ideas, the combination of old and new strategies at 
national and supranational levels, as well as the perils of relying on established 
advantages in a fast moving world.  
Chapter V displays a very different combination of actors and arenas 
compared to REACH: the approval of Herceptin, a cancer drug manufactured by 
Swiss giant Roche, was a British and highly mediated scandal pitching patient groups 
against the quasi-governmental technical body NICE (National Institute for Health 
and Clinical Excellence) and primary trusts across the country. There is a clear 
combination of old and new actors, with national government and its technocrats, 
NICE and patient groups, and a different dynamic at work, with much stronger media 
attention. The quick approval of Herceptin is linked to the framing of the problem not 
as a fight for the drug itself but as an example of a system of drug approval that is 
unequal and inefficient, leading to the penalisation of patients and the perpetuation of 
postcode lottery.  
The last empirical investigation involves the oil giant Shell and the downgrade 
of its oil reserves that would lead to the worst public relations crisis in the history of 
the corporation. The arena is the stock market and a new group of actors, institutional 
investors, plays an important role in the episode. Media presence is as intense as in 
Herceptin but, in this case, detrimental to the firm: under public pressure, Shell’s 
inability to provide a convincing story about the reserves not only paved the way for a 
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rival narrative to prevail but also gave ammunition to some of their underlying 
assumptions. The episode, however, is a valuable snapshot of the difficulties of 
building and managing stories whilst under attack and reveals the existence of a much 
larger range of actors and interests operating in what is commonly seen as ‘mono-
interests’ arena of money markets.  
Chapter VII compares and contrasts the cases, with a strong focus on the 
stories told in each of them, to answer the question of why some narratives helped 
actors to reach their goals and others didn’t. The analysis examines not only the 
ingredients that make these stories valuable as ‘stand-alone’ narratives but also their 
relationship with other stories and the arenas in which the dispute is taking place, the 
intersections between actors and structures that have been discussed throughout the 
theoretical and empirical chapters. Its final ambition is to make a case for stories as a 
missing piece in the current analyses of business representation and power because 
they shed light not only on how particular disputes are won or lost but also on how the 
broader narratives that inform institutional arenas and, ultimately capitalism, are to 
some extent a result of smaller scale negotiations among stories seeking legitimacy. 
A short conclusion summarises the work done in the thesis, discusses the 
limits of stories as an analytical tool and bring to the fore the possible avenues for 
research that these findings open. 
 21 
Chapter I: Business representation in a post-Keynesian capitalism 
 
Introduction 
 
The historical starting point of this thesis is the changing political environment 
confronting giant corporations as a result of a capitalist restructuring set in motion 
after the break down of the Bretton Woods agreement in the early 1970s. A necessary 
first step, therefore, is to chart these structural changes and the reactions they have 
triggered from different actors. Given the purpose, the main focus here is not on how 
processes such as capital liberalisation and regionalisation have affected states and 
their sovereignty1 but how they have impacted multinational corporations, their 
representation and power. This, in turn, means that a sample of the most influential 
and/or recent contributions that scrutinise the power of business as a key political 
actor is at the centre of the chapter.  
The direct effects of this selection are in themselves worth pointing out from 
the start: one is the admission that a specific way of examining business, its 
representation and power in contemporary capitalism will be referred to as the 
‘political science’ view henceforth in this thesis; the other is that this particular skew 
is a finding in itself, a pillar upon which a framework for a different understanding of 
business power and representation can be built. As it will be discussed in chapter III, 
while different ontological and epistemological approaches within political science 
have indeed taken into account ideas, culture and norms to examine how interests and 
power are constructed discursively, the emphasis has been primarily on the processes 
of constructing the normative narratives that establish the parameters for what is 
politically and economically possible – in effect the broader frameworks in which 
actors and institutions are embedded and refer to in their own narratives (Lukes 1974; 
Hajer 1993; Schmidt 2000 ; Rosamond 2002; Rosamond and Hay 2002; Watson and 
Hay 2002; Smismans 2006).   
On the other hand, while the role of business as active actors in these 
interactions is recognised, particularly in Gramscian and Marxist scholarship (Cox 
                                                 
1
 This is an undoubtedly related issue addressed by a significant part of the political science literature. 
For a selection of different approaches in various sub-fields see:  (Ohmae 1990; Underhill 1991; 
Overbeek 1993; Helleiner 1994; Kapstein 1994; Cable 1995; Helleiner 1995; Panitch 1996; Strange 
1996; Watson 1999; Cammack 2003) 
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1983; Sklair 2000; Von Apeldorn 2000; Carroll and Carson 2003), attempts to 
develop theoretical frameworks that bring out the contribution of discourses to 
business power are still few (Risse 2000; Arts 2003; Fuchs 2005), with empirical 
work mostly confined to particular areas of governance such as the environment 
(Levy and Newell 2002; Levy and Newell 2005; Kantz 2007). At the same time,  
systematic probing of how discourses can be strategically used by business to achieve 
narrower outcomes remains virtually non-existent, which is even more puzzling given 
their acknowledged importance when the power of NGOs and civil society is the 
object of analysis (McAdam, D. et al. 1996; Holzscheiter 2005; Scharper 2007). In 
short, the so-called cultural turn has clearly reached political science, gathering pace 
since the turn of the millennium, but the understanding of business power and 
business representation within the field is still dominated by the particular optic 
reviewed in this chapter.   
This literature identifies two major structural changes that happened in the last 
three decades as key events because of their effect on giant corporations and their 
capability to represent their interests: the first, rooted in the economic slowdown of 
the 1970s, is the drastic policy change in Britain that would create a regulatory state 
built on top of privatisations and welfare retrenchment; the second, starting in the end 
of the 1980s, is the fast process of regionalisation in Europe and the creation of a 
supranational governance platform with growing powers. Each of these required 
strategic adaptations to allow corporations to deal with different levels of governance 
and new interlocutors, as governments were joined by regulators, supranational 
institutions, institutional investors and organised civil society.  
The chapter will be divided into two sections that match these changes. 
Section one will look at the weakening of traditional forms of business organisation in 
Britain and the turn to individual representation, a shift in business strategy noticeable 
from the mid-1970s. In this first stage of individual political representation, problems 
related to the slowing down of the productive sector, general tightening of 
competition and growing regulation started to be tackled via direct attempts to 
influence policy/actors at national level, and performed increasingly through 
professional public relations and government affairs departments instead of the elite 
networks of the past.  
Section two focuses on the mid-1980s onwards, when a general mistrust about 
giant firms from the part of civil society and the increasing importance of 
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supranational governance arenas such as the European Union started to highlight the 
legitimacy deficit of the DIY approach. At this point, the need to acquire credibility in 
the product market had been firmly joined by the need to build political legitimacy in 
order to represent business interests at both national and supranational arenas, forcing 
corporations to look for a new mix of tactics to influence policy making. Having 
established how giant firm strategies of political representation have evolved in the 
past 30 years, a brief discussion about how these accounts influence our 
understanding about business power will take place, followed by a conclusion. 
 
1. The British system of business power: mid -1970s as the turning point  
 
The second half of the 1970s brought significant changes to the global 
political economy with the slowing down of the long boom established in the 
developed capitalist world since the end of the World War II. In Britain, a wave of 
economic failure exposed the fragility of the economic performance and the election 
of Margaret Thatcher as the leader of the Conservative Party was a clear response to a 
sense of instability in British politics, aggravated by high rates of inflation. As prime 
minister between 1979 and 1990, Thatcher set in motion a series of reforms that 
would drastically change the business environment. If capitalist solidarity has never 
been an easy task, in Britain or anywhere else, the deep changes in government policy 
aggravated the problems of collective action and propelled firms to deal with 
governments, regulators, society and competitors as individual actors.  
It did so by irremediably damaging structural and ideological advantages that 
used to compensate for the weakness of business class mobilisation (Grant 1984; 
Moran 2006). To understand how this particular system of business power was 
undone, however, it is necessary to quickly address how it was put together. In this 
specific case, the story is about a successful marriage of convenience: having spent 
most of modern history indifferent, if not hostile, to one another, the two protagonists 
– the City of London and the British industrial elite – were brought together by a 
threatening circumstance, the recession of the early 1920s and, from this time on, built 
a symbiotic relationship that would last more than half a century. 
The importance of the City of London for the British economy has been 
widely acknowledged and described (Longstreth 1979; Ingham 1984; Kynaston 1994; 
Kynaston 1996; Kynaston 1999; Kynaston 2001). Its role in convincing the public 
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opinion and political arena of the central importance of a world order based on free 
trade and the gold standard in which the City was the focus of economic power and 
prestige dates back to Pax Britannica. The British capacity to manage power in the 
fragmented Europe of the 17th Century and keep its role as a hegemonic force 
depended on the gaining of a widespread acceptance of the norms of liberal 
economics as common goods administrated and regulated by the City (Cox 1983), as 
well as on the combination of manufacturing capitalism and sea power.  Together 
with merchant banks, which by 1870 were the second source of British foreign 
income after shipping profits, the City was of great importance for the British 
economy as a whole and its influence reached out to the political sphere, with its 
connections with government and state administration (Scott 2003), particularly the 
Bank of England and the Treasury. 
The British industrial sector, in contrast with the outward looking finance 
system, was comprised of a large number of small, family-owned businesses with 
mainly local or regional interests from the industrial revolution to the end of the 19th 
century.  A series of mergers and acquisitions in the mid-1890s would start to alter 
this scenario, concentrating the economy in a few large corporations, but the changes 
in size and scale did not immediately affect the nature of the relationship with finance 
and government actors. Industrial relations of the City and the state with these firms 
were minimal at that time: the former did not take a significant part in the new forms 
of corporate-finance that allowed the large scale amalgam while the latter stressed 
firm autonomy and favoured self-regulation when possible or consensual/cooperative 
regulation when strictly necessary (Hunt 1936; Carson 1970; Gamble and Kelly 
2001).  
The end of the Great War was a turning point for business, with the collapse of 
the economy in the early 1920s forcing banks to become directly involved in the 
ownership and financing of industry as a direct response to the official government 
policy of reconstruction and rationalisation. The interlocking became even stronger 
during the depression and even though financial agents sought to return to pre-war 
distance after the economic recovery of the late 1930s, the connections remained. The 
aftermath of the war also transformed radically the role of the Bank of England, which 
became an ‘intermediate’ between the City and central government, particularly the 
Treasury (Moran 2009, p.25). By 1938, the British economy was dominated by 
corporate elite of directors with their primary base or most significant interests in the 
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City of London. By World War II, “the inter-corporate network had become truly 
national in scope and, though organised around the City financials, it incorporated 
both financial and non-financial enterprises” (Scott 1997, p.119).  
During the long boom initiated after WWII, interlocked networks in Britain 
expanded further and became denser. A time-series data compiled by Useem (1984) 
on 85 large manufacturing and financial companies in the UK from 1906 to 1970 
shows that, at the start of the period, fewer than half of the firms shared directorships 
while, by the end, more than four-fifths did. He also found that links between large 
manufacturing firms and banks increased nearly seven-fold in the period. But 
networking was based not only on economic interchange between companies but also 
on the exchange of information related to the broader business and political 
environments, which created channels of communication that led to class 
mobilisation. “The inclusive and diffusely structured economic and social foundations 
have created a special form of social organisation within the business communities of 
both America and Britain, an inner circle whose unique qualities equip corporate 
leaders to enter politics on behalf of consensually arrived at class wide interests rather 
than narrow, individual corporate interests” (Ibidem, p.58) . Maintenance and 
reinforcement of this inner circle happened mainly through social mechanisms like 
club membership, same school attendance and kinship ties, bringing finance, 
government and industrial elites to the same boat. 
 But at the same time that links between industrial, financial and governmental 
elites were strengthened, the collective representation of business envisaged by the 
Federation of British Industries (FBI) never quite happened (Davenport-Hines 1984). 
Created in 1916, the FBI encountered the expected and already considerably severe 
problems linked to the coordination of diverse interests, as well as institutional rivalry 
with employers associations (Wigham 1973) and the culture of individualism 
mentioned above.  
 In sum, from the 1920s depression to the end of the long economic boom in 
the 1970s business representation was exercised through networks of interconnected 
political, financial and industrial elites in Britain. This, however, was about to be 
altered by the changes in capitalism itself, palpable from the late 1970s. We turn to 
these next. 
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1.2 Deconstructing networks and ideologies 
 
The implicit recognition of the autonomy of the individual firm and its right to 
a minimum of interference from external actors, as well as the interlocked nature of 
the British power system, both hindered and substituted the need for collective 
representation for half a century in Britain. These two characteristics, however, were 
directly damaged by the financial deregulation and globalisation/regionalisation 
processes that gained momentum from 1970s onwards (Moran 2006). Margaret 
Thatcher’s reforms and privatisation, despite their business-friendly nature, created 
paradoxical results (Gamble 1994): after a brief governmental retreat, as the 
ownership of key industries ceased to exist, state duties as regulator have swiftly 
increased in importance, as privatised public utilities had to be supervised by specially 
created bodies and environmental regulation has grown in importance (Grant 1993, 
p.46). This increasing regulatory role is accompanied by also increasing legislation, 
with a trebling in numbers recorded between the 1960s and 1990s (Harris 2002). A 
similar trend took place in America where, from the late 1960s to the late 1980s, the 
Congress imposed more restrictions on corporate conduct than in the entire history of 
the United States (Vogel 1987).  
The internationalisation of ownership, on the other hand, started to undermine 
the interlocked directorships and the social cohesion of the inner circle. With the 
diffusion of the national structures, family owned firms central to the old system were 
slowly replaced by financial conglomerates, many of them foreign owned and with 
world-wide operations. In some activities like office machinery, computer 
manufacturing and motoring, foreign owned enterprises accounted for 56% of 
employment by the mid-1990s (Hirst and Thompson 2000, p.343). For many of the 
inner circle participants, the mid-1970s was the time the decline of their social 
network was first felt. “There was also a realisation that the club-land establishment 
of the 1950s no longer existed: as one respondent commented, “twenty years ago all 
that a major chairman needed to do was to meet the Chancellor at his club, have a 
word in his ear and say ‘this isn’t on’” (Grant 1984, p.5).  
At once, business was not only facing a massive and unprecedented 
interference in its affairs via legislation/regulation but had also lost a discrete and 
effective way of managing it. For most firms, particularly large enterprises, the 
answer was the formation of government affairs and/or public relations divisions to 
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deal, individually, with state actors: in other words, a replacement of informal ties of 
the inner circle with formal political contacts (Grant 1984). This first moment was 
what Coen and Willman (1998)called an “ad hoc approach”, characterised by a “high 
level of regulatory mistrust” and aiming mostly at stopping or amending the 
increasing amount of regulation issued by governments. This would soon change as 
firms started to realised that a “regulatory relationship could be established with the 
regulator and that those positions could be negotiated and exchanged for 
goodwill”(Ibidem, p.34). More than to respond effectively to regulators, corporations 
started to attempt to influence the debate before it amounted to any legal requirement.  
Unsurprisingly, sectors with closer ties with governments, highly exposed to 
regulation or dependent on their custom, were quicker in establishing formal channels. 
A survey of the 100 largest British corporations in terms of total sales revealed that 
42% of these companies established government relations divisions from the mid-
1970s, with firms in the extractive sector (i.e. oil companies) as the most likely to 
have them: six out of the seven corporations in the study had an active government 
affairs department (Mitchell 1990). In the US, a survey with 163 firms of the Fortune 
500 in 1980 showed that 80% had a formal, recognised government-relations function 
(Baysinger and Woodman 1982) and, out of a list of 17 high-tech firms with a 
Washington office in 1980, eleven had important defence contracts, appearing on the 
Defence Department’s list of the top 100 contractors (Hart 2001). The retail sector, on 
the other hand, was not nearly as involved with direct representation at the political 
level, since it was generally not the target of heavy government regulation.  
Timing was also crucial for success. Large firms that tried to hang on to the 
old system of influence, like IBM in America, paid a dire price. Deeply dependent on 
government policy and purchases, the blue chip company insisted in keeping the 
“IBM doesn’t lobby” mantra of its founder until the 1970s and was caught completely 
off guard by the Department of Justice antirust suit that would turn into a decade long 
battle – a war collectively supported by IBM’s competitors behind the scenes in 
Washington (Hart 2007). As soon as the Watson family left the control of the big 
blue, in 1971, the company set up a Washington office, but it would take another five 
years until a significant presence in the American capital was established via a 
Governmental Programs Office whose tasks were learning the substance of every 
policy debate affecting the multinational, coordinating and developing the company’s 
position on it and following the process through. By the end of the 1980s, IBM had 
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nearly 100 staff working for its government affairs’ office in the US, with a further 
hundred employed in its foreign subsidiaries.  
The reaction against excessive regulation at national level has also led to 
another important development: instead of struggling locally, some giant companies 
entered the supranational lobbying scenario by exerting influence on the European 
Economic Community even before the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987. While the 
majority of business still favoured to influence national governments and federations 
because of the structure of European decision making and the policy areas covered 
(Mazey and Richardson 1993), the very co-existence of European and national 
systems was used by a few giant corporations to resist national corporatism (Streeck 
and Schmitter 1991) and, at the same time, play the two political markets against each 
other, taking advantage of the lack of regulatory controls of the EU.  
From the late 1970s to the early 1980s, firms raised the agenda of deregulation 
at national level and the building of a single market in Europe – the creation of the 
European Round Table of Industrialists, in 1983, was a visible sign of this strategy, 
considered broadly successful (Cowles 1995; Von Apeldorn 2000). This niche, 
however, would not remain unchallenged for too long: after the Single European Act, 
and subsequent crowding up of the business lobbying world in Brussels, European 
officials moved to close the gap by compelling individual firms to establish broader 
coalitions. These events marked the beginning of a second phase of business political 
representation in which having legitimacy to play the policy-making game, or at least 
appearing to have it, has become sine qua non. The second part of the chapter reviews 
these changes and business’ responses to them. 
 
2.  Lobbying overload and the search for legitimacy 
 
With the decline of the inner circle and turn to DIY representation, collective 
action also dwindled: with trade union power dismantled, bargaining was shifted 
away from the industry, knocking down employers associations during the 1980s 
(Millward, Stevens et al. 1992). A sign of the weak nature of the political 
representation was the delicate situation of the Confederation of British Industry, 
which spent most of the 1970s in war with Labour (Grant and Marsh 1975), but also 
most of the 1980s in collision with Margaret Thatcher’s handling of the economy: 
even though the CBI was happy to see union power diminished and public 
 29 
expenditure brought under strict control, policies towards the appreciation of 
exchange rates, for instance, were controversial. Other alternatives did little to revive 
the faith on collective bodies: while the Institute of the Directors had better fortune, 
enjoying the support of the prime minister for being ideologically acceptable, 
particularly during the 1990s, it was always seen as the representative of  ‘capital’ 
rather than of the productive sector; the chambers of commerce, on the other hand, 
suffered from a lack of public law status and obligatory membership (Grant 1993). 
Membership in national interest business associations in the early 1980s was 
seen as desirable for three reasons: it provided a voice in the national questions that 
required an industry view; presence in consultative bodies of a technical nature in 
Whitehall; and representation at European level (Grant 1984). After the Single 
European Act of 1987, only the first reason remained pressing, marking what Coen 
(1997) called a watershed for European businesses and the nature of lobbying. The 
move towards a single internal market and legal framework for business, 
standardization of technical requirements, harmonization of taxes and free movement 
for labour added to the increasing regulatory competency of the European 
Commission in environmental policy, R&D, merger regulation and industrial policy. 
This, in turn, transformed Brussels into a main target not only for large firms but also 
non-EC groups and governments like Japan and the US. Overloaded with the new 
functions and a ‘adolescent bureaucracy’ dependent on technical, legislative and 
organizational information from outside, the Commission largely welcomed private 
interests actors (Mazey and Richardson 1993, p.10). 
The immediate result of the changes was a soaring number of businesses 
migrating directly or indirectly to the European policy making level, aiming 
particularly at the Commission and the European Parliament. The latter became more 
powerful in the second half of the 1980s, when the SEA granted it the right to a 
second reading of Community legislation. The European Court of Justice also turned 
into a growing target for lobbyists from the early 1990s. Between 1987 and 1997, 
more than 350 firms established direct lobbying facilities in Brussels, joining forces 
with 3000 public interest and 1600 pressure groups (Coen and Grant 2001). With a 
much higher demand for monitoring, counselling and lobbying services, consultancy 
services started to thrive as well: a large number of European consultancies were 
founded between 1986 and 1994.  Political consultancies and law firms experienced a 
growth of more then five times between 1986 and 1995 in comparison with the 
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previous decade, a reflection of the need to “speak” the correct legal and 
administrative language (Lahusen 2002, p.699-700). The access for business, in this 
phase, was intrinsically linked with the provision of expert knowledge to the 
development of effective EU legislation, as governments alone were not able to 
provide the information needed (Bowen 1997; Pappi and Henning 1999). 
It would not take long until the Commission started to face a double problem: 
on one side, the overcrowding of the lobbying world was becoming more a hindrance 
than a facilitator; on the other, the sensitive issue of democratic deficit and 
accountability surrounding the supranational governance structure had to be addressed 
if it were to keep its own legitimacy (Goehring 2002). The debate around these issues 
intensified in the last years of the 1990s, with a White Paper on governance explicitly 
invoking the links between legitimacy and civil society participation (including 
employers’ associations and trade unions) released in 2001 (COM (2001) 428). In a 
move to kill two birds with one stone, the Commission began to restrict access to the 
policy process through new policy committees and industrial forums.  
A the same time, its ties with civil society organisations were strengthened 
with the creation of a Civil Dialogue, a initiative analysed by Smismans as “a 
normative discourse on the role of these organisations”, and the sponsoring of 
networks like the Social Policy Forum, a permanent framework for cooperation and 
integration of NGOs with European institutions (2006, p.476). This would be 
extended to other policy making areas such as Trade, developed into different ad hoc 
structures and reach implementation policies by the turn of the millennium (Ibidem). 
In 2000, a discussion paper about the relationship between the Commission and 
NGOs and the best framework for funding and consultation was released, aiming at 
the unification of the framework for cooperation that was by then mainly organised on 
a sector by sector basis. At that point, over a € 1.000 million a year was being 
allocated to NGO projects directly by the Commission (COM(2000) 11 final)  
The changes, however, did not mean the exclusion of individual business 
enterprises from the process. The interdependency situation that started the 
relationship between the EU and business still existed and EU institutions continued 
to demand crucial resources to its own functioning that were better provided by 
private actors. However, the ‘access goods’ of expert knowledge had been joined by 
two other kinds of information: information about the European Encompassing 
Interest (IEEI) and about the Domestic Encompassing Interest (IDEI)  (Bouwen 2002, 
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p.369). The former relates to the needs and interests of sectors operating in the 
European Union, requiring coordination at European level and rekindling the role of 
European Federations; the latter requires information of sectors in the domestic 
market, revitalising the role of national associations. This way, the EC could claim 
both in-put and out-put legitimacy: information about encompassing and 
representative data involving different levels of participation of citizens and interest 
groups increased the Commission in-put legitimacy, while expert knowledge received 
from large firms, allowing the European authority to deal efficiently with problems, 
improved its output legitimacy (Ibidem, p.371).   
In a clever move, the European Commission permitted that even issues that 
could be considered as high politics, such as nuclear deterrence, energy policy or 
environment, to be dismantled in more manageable and bargaining pieces subjected to 
group influence (Mazey and Richardson 1993). A good example concerns the EC 
environment policy, an area of widespread public interest. To achieve its objectives, 
the EC broke down the issues of “high political salience into more technical issues 
around which is possible to construct a more cohesive policy community” (Ibidem, 
p.18-19). Within DG XI, an ad hoc consultative group on CFCs was established 
comprising actors with a direct interest on it – representatives from chemicals industry 
and refrigerator, foam-rubber, plastics, aerosol manufactures and users. While this 
group resembled more the ‘policy community’ model of national policy-making, 
other matters are structured around the ‘issue network’ model, which is widely used in 
the field of social policy.  
As a consequence, the rapid growth of collective forums allowing the direct 
participation of firms brought about by this new phase in EU policy-making had a 
direct impact on the organisational forms of lobbying activities for giant corporations. 
While the shift has not meant a retreat from direct lobbying through a Brussels office 
or third-part representation via consultancies, as the demand for expert knowledge and 
individual’s business opinion was still high, many of the access routes were now 
linked to the firm’s ability to establish an “European identity through pan-European 
alliances with rival firms and/or solidaristic links with societal interests” (Coen 1998, 
p.78). Successful European lobbying, from the mid-1990s onwards, had less to do 
with monitoring and defensive action and more with having organisational capacity to 
form political alliances and to create/reinforce collective representation via traditional 
political channels, which meant a need to coordinate a multilevel lobbying strategy 
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involving national and supranational actors. As the firm’s ability to influence policy 
has been definitely linked to a positive image as a provider of reliable encompassing 
information, the ‘do it yourself’ approach alone was not an option anymore.  
These developments are described here because the increasing importance of 
the European Union as a policy making arena and the shift in its dealings with 
external stakeholders from the 1990s onwards have influenced the strategies of 
representation chosen by corporations. As these are particularly relevant to this work, 
the next section will highlight the most important changes.  
 
2.1 Multilevel game and the return of collective action 
 
 A mix of strategies was developed for the creation of pan-European links 
from the 1990s but their efficacy is understood to be linked to the previous move 
towards the individualisation of business representation (Coen 1998). Even though 
having a government affairs office is not a crucial pre-requisite to succeed in the new 
environment, firms that have established these departments2 have proved more 
efficient in identifying suitable lobbying partners and opening political channels. “The 
establishment of government affairs provided the potential for political economies of 
scale3, the creation of political ‘alliances of convenience’ and the development of new 
functions for existing political channels” (Ibidem, p.80). Government affairs divisions 
were also important for the strategic decision of which areas to prioritise according to 
Coen and Willman. They cite the example of British Petroleum who, despite being an 
important producer of Ethanol, did not lobby for a policy favouring the sector 
because, with a new programme in the traditional extraction sector being launched, 
the firm believed that lobbying for fossil fuels was more important. Siemens has also 
repeatedly opted to monitor and influence EU policy issues in the electrical and high 
tech sectors, leaving the environmental directives impacting its furniture division 
aside (Ibidem, p.83).   
                                                 
2
 Mitchell, in his study about the British business representation, has found a strong correlation 
between the establishment of government relations divisions and the use of direct government contact 
in a way that “the politically active firms establish these divisions and the divisions increase their 
activity”. They also tend to make more use of trade associations contacts. See (Mitchell 1990) 
3
 After the fixed costs of setting their government programmes office up, IBM could reap economies of 
scope across issue areas. The unit proved particularly useful in the identification and pursuing of 
opportunities, with the convergence of computing and communications, the core of the warfare with 
AT&T in the US, being the major one. See (Hart 2007) 
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The most popular strategy to guarantee access is the formation of ‘alliances of 
convenience’(Coen 1997) or ad hoc coalitions. Vertical alliances with small and 
medium business, which can and usually do incorporate consumers and public 
interests groups, help giant firms to establish political legitimacy with the EU 
institutions and reinforce their role as mediators; ad hoc alliances formed around 
particular issues bring together groups traditionally in opposite sides. Here again, the 
idea is to build legitimacy by taking on board broader interests that the ones of 
business alone. Some of the ad hoc alliances, however, are more litigious and trade 
oriented in nature: the recent clash between South-European based auto industries 
Peugeot, Renault and Fiat and the German car makers over carbon emission 
regulation in the EU is a pertinent example (Reuters, 21st of November 2007). 
Another case is the alliance created by Bull, Unisys, Amstrad, Olivetti, ICL and NRC 
against IBM and Phillips around the issue of software copyright, which evolved into 
other issues (Pijnenburg 1998).  
Ad hoc alliances have also turned into issue-specific business clubs: 
multinational companies operating in high-tech areas such as superhighways and 
telecommunications were particularly good at creating those clubs in the late 1980s, 
early 1990s (Sandholtz 1992), while some loose cross-border alliances turned into 
quasi-formal industrial forums. The latter included many of the original European 
Round Table committee members and the EU Committee of the American Chambers 
of Commerce (Amcham), which has become an efficient transmission belt for the 
interests of large American firms (Cowles 1996). While the original function of these 
groups was to provide the European Commission with quick and reliable (technical) 
information, some were gradually allowed to join ‘high politics’ horizontal forums 
about enlargement, environment, US and EU trade relations. The most visible of these 
were the Bangemann group, with eighteen leading European industrialists working on 
the European telecommunication policy agenda, and the Christophersen forum on 
energy and transport (Coen 1997, p.96).  
The Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), a European Commission and 
US State Department initiative set up in 1995 involving 112 top American and 
European chief executives, was turned into a policy-making body as well, despite 
questions raised about the accountability and legitimacy of big business forums. This 
problem became visible in episodes such as the TABD neglect of the European 
Generic Association (EGA), an ad hoc alliance of 400 small and medium size 
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enterprises, on the discussions related to intellectual property rights and patent expiry 
times (Coen and Grant 2001). Arguing that the EGA represented a marginal part of 
the market, the EC, big pharma companies and the European Federation of 
Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) excluded the Association from 
DG Enterprise, while corporations like SmithKline and Glaxo kept their insider status. 
The problem was reversed by the EGA with a vertical alliance with the US National 
Pharmaceutical Association which, in turn, convinced the FDA not to attend TABD 
discussions on the subject and threatened to advance anti-trust proceedings.  
Another part of big business’ strategy in this second phase of European policy 
making was directed to the traditional forms of collective representation, namely the 
revitalisation of the European federations – and, to a lower extent, the national 
associations as well. The idea was to restructure membership and decision-making 
systems to allow the influence of individual firms, following an Amcham style 
(Cowles 1998). The argument was that direct membership allowed Federations to be a 
platform in which core issues are distributed among members, facilitating the 
monitoring of a greater number of areas with greater level of expertise and low cost. 
Some sectors,  usually the ones dominated by few big players or concentrated 
geographically, are particularly suitable for firm-driven European federations, as 
interests tend to overlap and the transaction cost of reaching consensus is much lower 
(Bennet 1997). Besides the domination of few players and the capacity of direct 
influence by firms, Grant (2000) also links the effectiveness of federations to the 
importance of the sector, the extent of its exposure to EU regulation and its 
organisational maturity. Chemicals, oil and pharmaceuticals fit the description, and 
the strength and efficacy of the European Federation of Pharmaceuticals Industry 
Association (EFPIA) and the European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC) seem to 
confirm this assumption. Their structures also hint at a certain tendency of 
colonisation by giant firms’ interests, even though the representation of small and 
medium size enterprises is also in their job description.  
The same principle applies for national associations, as the most successful 
ones tend to represent industries with high concentration or major clout. An example 
is the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI), strategically located 
at Whitehall and with a permanent 60 people staff. Here, again, a great deal of 
colonisation by big firms is observed, as full membership is only offered to companies 
providing prescription medicines to the NHS or researching and developing medicines 
 35 
for human use in the UK and, at the same time, only full members are allowed to 
“participate in committees, task forces and advisory groups as appropriate and so have 
a real influence on the future policy and direction of the industry”, with the other 
categories pending invitation to join specific committees4. In 2005, the ABPI’s board 
of management had 16 members, eleven of them representing the major corporations 
in the sector – Pfizer, Johnson and Johnson, Schering-Plough, GlaxoSmithKline, 
Merck Sharp & Dohme, Bristol-Myers Squib, Astra Zeneca, Novartis, Roche, Eli 
Lilly and Bayer. Despite their primarily national interests, this kind of association has 
also evolved into multilevel players, pursuing various strategies of representation. The 
ABPI, for instance, deals with the European Federation of Pharmaceuticals Industry 
Association and the European Union authorities directly, at the same time that it keeps 
a close relationship with domestic politicians, universities and government agencies 
and bodies5.  According to Eising (2004),  22% of French, German and British 
associations operate this dual strategy, with some 15% regularly in touch with 
political institutions in the member states and 41.8% with offices in Brussels.  
But the role of the national association has also been rekindled for the less 
powerful sectors and mostly because of the supranational structural changes (Coen 
1997; Wilts 2001; Bouwen 2002). Since the European Commission encouragement to 
the harmonisation of technical standards, firms are encouraged to monitor 
implementation and infringements by rivals – an activity that, given the intense and 
broad level of competition, is best performed by national institutions. Moreover, a few 
of the standard setting bodies like the European Committee for Co-ordination of 
Standards (CEN) offer membership only to national standard bodies. This has meant 
that, particularly regarding technical issues and implementation, firms are more likely 
to lobby at national level even if the final target is the European Commission. Another 
targets usually cultivated domestically are the national representatives working on the 
Council of Ministers. For the less wealthy association, multilevel strategies are 
usually too expensive and, as an alternative, most of the associations wishing to 
establish a Brussels office have tried unorthodox arrangements like sharing a space or 
using the address of a powerful association, such as the Confederation of British 
                                                 
4
 See ABPI’s website on http://www.abpi.org.uk/members/benefits.asp#voice.  
5
 At the time of the writing, the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry is intensifying 
domestic lobbying against the proposals by the Office of Fair Trading to overhaul the pharmaceutical 
price regulation scheme, which would mean that companies will have to justify their prices against the 
benefit their product brings to patients and the NHS. See (Allen 2003) 
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Industry, or even of a major corporation. The majority, however, operates at national 
level, taking advantage of the EC rights to check domestic transposition of EU 
regulations into national laws to expand and reinforce their power domestically.  
Large firms lobbying at European level have, therefore, experienced two 
different environments since the early 1980s: in a first moment, direct input was not 
only accepted but welcomed by an European Commission dependent on expert 
knowledge better found within corporations; after the second half of the 1990s, 
however, the Commission changed its modus operandi for consultation, seeking a 
larger input from civil society and prioritising encompassing interests at European and 
national levels, rekindling the role of European federations and national associations 
in the process. 
In other words, this section brought to the fore not only the importance of new 
governance structures but also the arrival of new actors able and willing to exercise 
their power. Central to these new strategies of business representation are the direct 
interaction and negotiation among actors that are not traditional interlocutors of 
business and whose interests often clash with corporations’ goals. This relationship is, 
thus, a key concern for this work. The way this particular literature portrays the 
interaction between old and new actors, however, leads to an understanding of 
business representation and power that leave out of the picture important aspects. This 
will be discussed in the next section.  
 
3. Business representation in the 21st Century 
 
The two previous sections outlined a shift in the way business, particularly big 
business, has managed the political representation of its interests in the past 30 years. 
From a system of interlocked directorships working as a clubland, in which business 
and political actors operated in a discreet and symbiotic way, relying on a socially 
accepted culture of self-regulation and independence of business actors, to a much 
more hostile environment of stricter regulation and external challenges. Business 
responses to these have been two-fold. In the first stage, a turn to a direct and 
individual lobbying coordinated by government affairs and public relations 
departments took place, with the main goal of monitoring and trying to influence or 
change decisions affecting unfavourably the corporation; the second phase marked a 
move to a more complex strategy in which direct representation had to be mingled 
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with previously neglected collective arenas like European federations and national 
associations, as interests and conflicts of interest needed to be curbed in the name of 
political legitimacy. 
Examining the dynamics of business representation, Streeck (1989) argued 
that collective bodies have to achieve a balance between the logic of membership, as 
the values and interest perceptions of groups and individuals they represent, and the 
logic of influence, which reflects constraints and opportunities offered by the 
institutional environment, if they are to succeed in their roles. Even though firms are 
not collective bodies6 - on the contrary, most of this chapter is about an 
individualisation of business representation that allows firms to advance their own 
interests - these ideas are useful for the analysis of the changes of the past three 
decades and their consequences because they highlight the relationship between 
agents and structures. While both ‘logics’ are undoubtedly underlying political 
science’s understanding of the representation of individual firms since the 1970s,  the 
dominance of one logic over the other in each of the two stages described in the 
chapter is clear. As a consequence, a particular take on business power in the 
beginning of the 21st Century is conveyed. 
The decrease of the interlocked directorships and the weakening of the 
ideology that socially legitimated the role of firms as autonomous entities are, in 
Moran’s view (2006), the two main reasons behind the individualisation of business 
representation that would directly impact the problem of collective action in the UK. 
When big business turned to the defence of its own interests in an increasingly 
regulated and hostile environment, it placed much less emphasis on collective bodies 
of representation and, by doing so, contributed to a sharp decline in institutional 
solidarity. This view takes into account both the logic of membership and the logic of 
influence, but there is a clear emphasis on the latter as the main reason behind the 
shift: it is the domestic structural changes brought about by processes of 
globalisation/regionalisation and deregulation of finance that have destroyed the basis 
upon which British business solidarity had been able to stand for more than half a 
century.  
In this version, it is implicit that firms would have happily continued to rely on 
the system of elite networks and self-regulation if allowed to but were thrown into 
                                                 
6
 For a discussion about the logics of membership and influence for the political geography of business 
representation in the UK, see (Wood, Valler et al. 2005) 
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individual representation by external circumstances. In other words, business did not 
premeditatedly decide to be in its own interest to change the previous arrangement but 
was forced to do so as a defensive reaction from structural/environmental changes. On 
the other hand, it is also assumed that, once the shift became institutionalised via 
government affairs and public relations departments inside big corporations, 
individual behaviour has become the strategic tool perceived to be more effective and 
suitable for defending business interests in the new scenario, a sign of the ‘logic of 
membership’ at work. This leads us to what we called the second shift of business 
representation. 
By the end of the 1980s, beginning of 1990s, business had established secure 
routes of individual representation, generally via internal government affairs 
departments or through external lobbyists. For almost a decade, collective bodies of 
representation were used in very few occasions and lacked actual power, particularly 
at supranational level, a policy arena getting up to speed with the imminent signature 
of the Single European Act. By the end of the decade, overwhelmed with a huge 
stream of individual business lobbying and struggling to beat the legitimacy deficit 
accusation hanging above its head, the European Commission started to restrict access 
to its forums for individual corporations while expanding it to non-governmental 
groups. The changes forced firms to diversify their lobbying strategies by including 
collective bodies of representation and consensus building in their syllabus in order to 
establish a legitimate status in policy making. As a consequence, an unexpected 
growth of European collective forums in the 1990s, particularly European federations, 
is recorded. 
Here again, the logic of interest is obvious: structural changes initiated by the 
European Commission altered once more the rules and firms had to adapt. However, 
unlikely the first shift, this structural reshuffle has never required the abandonment of 
the direct representation strategy. In fact, the revitalisation of collective action has 
become viable only because giant corporations started to legitimate their position 
inside collective bodies by restructuring membership and decision-making systems to 
increase their own direct participation. Paradoxically, it is the logic of membership – 
of what firms perceive to be in their interests and are allowed to do by themselves – 
that is the drive behind the rekindling of collective action and alliance building. Firms 
are endorsed to proceed with their individual representation, retaining their influence 
intact, as long as the results are seen to contribute to the common good.  
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The picture of business power in the beginning of the 21st Century is, 
therefore, one in which agency occupies centre stage: on the one hand, sophisticated 
strategies involving alliances and subtle domination of collective channels become 
key tools for achieving corporate goals, compensating the loss of informal routes 
based on elite interactions; on the other, agency is also seen as able to circumvent 
structural constraints, which in turn seems to imply a certain degree of inbuilt 
structural bias toward business. In other words, at the same time that business’ agency 
has been able to enhance its power, structural changes initiated by other actors have 
not been enough to constrain business influence, fostering a smooth reproduction of 
the clout of big corporations and their interests. Grant’s conclusion that “big business 
is on the winning side more often than not, so that even if multinational companies do 
not control the policy game, it produces outcomes which are acceptable to business 
interests most of the time” (2000, p.82) mirrors much of the work on the field. The 
problems with these ideas, which to a significant extent underplay the role of other 
actors, their interests and power, are going to be further explored in chapter III.  
 
Conclusion   
  
This chapter tracked the main changes of business representation in the past 30 
years according to a dominant literature in political science. In this picture, giant firms 
have increasingly entered policy making as individual actors in their own right, a 
result of structural changes of the past three decades. The first stage marks the turn to 
DIY representation, a strategy reinforced in a second phase characterised by the 
growing importance of the European Union as a policy maker.  
In a nutshell, the picture painted here is one of interaction between external 
changes and institutional strategy, resulting in different tactics of representation being 
developed throughout the last three decades: from informal and discreet persuasion to 
blatant attempts to influence, and back again to subtler mechanisms of representation. 
Both structure and agency are at play but there is an implicit assumption of the 
supremacy of one over the other in different moments in time: while the first shift is 
seen as weakening agency and influence, the second seem to have strengthened them. 
This, in turn, has consequences for how we understand business power and its 
reproduction. 
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One of these consequences is the framing of the issues as one of either/or - 
business power is shrinking or growing - rather than considering changes on its nature 
and the impact of different actors and structures on it. Other disciplinary approaches, 
therefore, are useful here. The next chapter will use the general framework of cultural 
economy, as well as the particular account of these scholars about the economic 
representation of giant firms (i.e. stock market interactions), to search for an 
additional/complimentary view of business representation and power in the past 
decades.  
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Chapter II - Financialisation and the turn to narratives 
 
 
The previous chapter reviewed how changes in capitalism and its governance 
in the past 30 years have impacted business, its representation and power as a key 
political actor. The main task of this chapter is to consider the other side of the coin: 
the focus is on how these environmental changes have impact business, its 
representation and power as a key economic actor. Highlighting these processes is 
therefore one of this chapter’s functions; the other is to consider the different account 
of business representation offered by a group of scholars operating under the broad 
intellectual umbrella of cultural economy, a field that has attracted researchers from a 
variety of disciplines and grown in profile since the late 1990s.  
The links between big business and modern capitalism have to a great extent 
informed the debate within political economy in the past four decades. On the one 
hand, the work of scholars like Galbraith (1967/1972) and Chandler (1977) 
highlighted the role of big business as a crucial institution of American capitalism, 
with the business enterprise credited with taking “the place of market mechanisms in 
coordinating the activities of the economy and allocating its resources” (Chandler 
1977, p. I); on the other, the recognition that capitalism has national variations, 
meaning the American setting is not universal, has started another stream of research 
since the release of Shonfield’s essay Modern Capitalism (1965).  
The most substantive attempts to analyse the impact of capitalist changes on 
corporations, particularly the scrutiny of the so-called financialisation of capitalism, 
come from political economists based in economics departments or business schools 
(Boyer 2000; Lazonick and O'Sullivan 2000; Duménil and Lévy 2001; Crotty 2003; 
Stockhammer 2004; Krippner 2005). These authors analyse how the structural 
adjustments within capitalism have altered competition models and productive 
activities, with the growing importance of finance bringing further constraints to firm 
agency and strategic adaptation. The focus, thus, is on a post-Fordist capitalism in 
which investors, particularly institutional investors, have acquired substantial power 
to influence managerial decisions and, ultimately, accumulation patterns.   
Two ‘schools’ have been particularly active in this research agenda: the 
regulationists, in particular the French school, that understand capitalism as a series of 
phases defined by structures, meaning institutions and conventions regulate and 
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reproduce a particular accumulation pattern; and the institutionalists, that subscribe to 
the idea that institutions and the hierarchy among them define capitalism, but with the 
conviction that they should be studied at national rather than global level. Since the 
1990s, they have been joined by cultural economists, a group sceptical of this neat 
representation of capitalism, preferring instead to consider capitalism as constantly 
‘under construction’. This incompleteness, on the other hand, is linked to the role that 
discourses and performativity play in the framing of economic spheres. In other 
words, cultural economy brings in issues usually absent from the explanations 
presented by political economists.  
Unsurprisingly, the work of cultural economists on business representation 
also takes into account discourses and performativity to argue that, rather than 
succumbing under the crushing weight of finance-led capitalism, corporations have 
used stories as a strategic tool to manage the City.  In this cultural account, ‘the firm’ 
or ‘the market’ are deconstructed through  the analysis of the roles different actors 
have played (actively or unintentionally) in shaping the economic system and how 
giant firms have contributed and responded to the changes.   
For the purposes of this thesis, therefore, a brief recapitulation of the political 
economy accounts of capitalism is in order. This approach provides a valuable 
description of the events of the past decades, this time with lenses firmed on the 
economic (firms and markets) rather than the political (the state and policy making) 
side of the equation, which is a suitable complement to chapter I. An essential part of 
the work of cultural economists is based upon the questioning of some of these 
mainstream political economy ideas, even thought there is overlapping between the 
groups too. The first section of the chapter, therefore, reviews how the last decades 
have been portrayed by the political economy literature before moving on to the 
cultural economy contribution on the wider debate about business and capitalism. 
The second part comes closer to the core interest of this work, business 
representation, by considering different but interconnected views on the importance of 
culture for the functioning of financial markets. Here, the cultural economy account of 
business representation is taken as a very useful framework for understanding 
communication between corporations and their new and old stakeholders. Part three 
considers how these changes have been perceived and institutionalised by giant firms 
according to a business and management scholarship, as well as their view of the 
importance of narratives both to wider audiences and stock market players. 
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1. Capitalist restructuring and firms: political economy and cultural economy 
approaches 
 
The debate about whether the changes in capitalism in the past three decades 
represent a radical break with the past or are a reshuffle of old patterns has attracted 
interest from a diverse scholarship across social sciences (Amin 1994; Kitschelt, 
Lange et al. 1999; Streeck and Thelen 2005). On one side of the spectrum are the 
regulationists (Aglietta 1979; Aglietta 1982; Lipietz 1982; Boyer 1991; Boyer 2001; 
Jessop 2002), proponents of the former and more generally interested on the 
identification of the successor(s) of Fordism; on the other, cultural economists 
sceptical of epochal shifts and more interested in questioning coherence than looking 
for its maintenance or restoration (Williams, Cutler et al. 1987; Sayer 1989; Thrift 
1989; Thrift 2005). In between are the institutionalists, also a long continuum ranging 
from approaches that prescribe rational choice as the appropriate analytical tool 
(Iversen 1999; Soskice 1999; Aoki 2001; Hall and Gingerich 2004) to scholars who 
acknowledge social construction and place institutional development within historical 
contingencies (Jenson 1989; Weir 1992; Martin 2000; Crouch 2001). 
Regulationist approaches, particularly the French school, consider the history 
of capitalism as a series of phases defined by institutions and structural forms that 
give rise to particular economic trends and patterns (Aglietta 1979). In this view, there 
are institutions and conventions that regulate and reproduce a particular accumulation 
regime as long as coherence lasts. In the particular case of the establishment and 
demise of Fordism, wage/labour relations were seen as occupying a predominant 
institutional position because mass production and mass consumption were 
fundamental for the coherence of the system. A capital/labour compromise meant 
taylorist methods were established in exchange for productivity gains and 
employment stability overseen by the welfare state. When this coherence ceased to 
exist, the system collapsed, setting in motion a structural crisis that would remain 
unresolved until a new driving institutional form is established. Developed in the late 
1970s, early 1980s, the theory’s ambition is to present a generic portrait of advanced 
capitalist countries within a given period of time. With the ‘end of Fordism’, the 
natural move was to identify the new mode of regulation likely to replace it. 
For regulationists, the changes in the past three decades led to a new regime of 
accumulation that Aglietta calls patrimonial growth, where the mode of management 
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and of corporate governance is linked to the management of individual patrimony or 
wealth (Aglietta and Cobbaut 2003). Central to this process is the financialisation of 
the economy, understood as both the growing power of market finance vis-à-vis 
classical finance intermediation by banks and the conversion of household incomes 
into financial assets (i.e. pensions). These are administered by institutional investors 
who, in turn, become significant shareholders able to influence the behaviour of 
decision makers.  Key to this mode of regulation, whose institutional make-up is led 
by the monetary regime and the financial system, is the notion of shareholder value 
(Ibidem, p.94).   
 While regulationists are looking for an unified macro model able to represent 
capitalism and explain its frequent crisis, a growing number of researchers are 
interested in what makes national cases different from each other: in other words, the 
assumption that there were different models of ‘fordism’ (and post-fordism) rather 
than one American way replicated around the developed world gained empirical 
support and theoretical distinctiveness by the end of 1980s7. Like the regulationists, 
these scholars consider that institutions matter and that coherent growth patterns are 
defined by the complementarities among them. For Amable, “understanding the 
diversity of institutional structures, and hence the diversity of capitalist societies, 
'national models' or what we will call social systems of innovation and production, 
requires the study of how different institutions are complementary to each other, in 
the sense that one institution functions all the better because some other particular 
institutions or forms of organization are present” (2000, p.647).  
Therefore, institutions can reinforce or weaken each other over time, which 
explains the emergence of a particular cluster of institutions and its demise, at the 
same time that the hierarchy among institutions can strongly influence the coherence 
of the system as a whole (Ibidem, p.659). In a nutshell, the argument is that modern 
economies perform differently because of the way their institutions combine. While 
the core of the varieties of capitalism research is still Western developed countries, 
particularly the US, UK, France and Germany (Hall and Soskice 2001; Streeck and 
                                                 
7
 As mentioned before, the interest in capitalism and its different institutional forms has a long tradition 
in comparative politics, with Shonfield’s book on models of European capitalism as one of the most 
prominent.  Subsequent approaches have focused on corporatism and state structures. From the 1980s 
onwards, inspired by the French regulationists, new institutionalists have turned to social systems of 
production, with a strong focus on institutional complementarities. For a discussion on the different 
strands of institutionalism and epistemological approaches see (Hall and Taylor 1996; Hay and Wincott 
1998; Thelen 1999; Martin 2005) 
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Thelen 2005), empirical analysis of other OECD countries have also been published 
by institutionalists accepting broader ‘models’ (Whitley 1999; Amable 2003).  
Authors like Colin Crouch, however, while acknowledging the importance of national 
variation and path dependence for the analysis of capitalism, are much more sceptical 
of rigid causal arrows, considering institutions as incomplete and very often 
incoherent players (2001; 2005)  
 On their specific analysis of the firm, institutionalists have emphasised the 
move away from mass production and technological change leading to production 
regimes that depend on multilevel coordination, focusing on different institutions 
(Piore and Sabel 1984; Schmitter and Streeck 1985; Lazonick 1991; Hollingsworth 
and Boyer 1997). The so-called ‘varieties of capitalism’, a particular approach among 
the scholarship, has made the corporation its key object of analysis to overcome what 
they see as a recurrent tendency to focus on states or trade unions. “By locating the 
firm at the centre of the analysis, we hope to build bridges between business studies 
and comparative political economy, two disciplines that are all too often disconnected.  
 By integrating game theoretical perspectives on the firm of the sort that are 
now central to microeconomics into an analysis of the macro-economy, we attempt to 
connect the new microeconomics to important issues in macroeconomics” (Hall and 
Soskice 2001, p.5). The aim is to bring agency to the picture by building a relational 
concept of the firm in which the development of core competencies is dependent on 
the relationships corporations are able to establish internally and externally (Ibidem, 
p.6). Using game theory to predict firm behaviour, nevertheless, partially clashes with 
accounts of other institutionalists such as Cathie-Jo Martin, whose work shows the 
firm as a collection of unstable and fragile internal coalitions where tactics and policy 
goals are complex and negotiated political processes open to contingency (Martin 
2000)   
The process of financialisation itself and its impact on firms has been also 
examined by a series of institutionalists and regulationists. James Crotty (2003) 
describes two structural changes affecting non-financial corporations in the past three 
decades: slow rates of global aggregate demand growth and intense competition in 
key product markets, prominent features of the 1970s and 1980s, and a shift from 
long-term growth to ‘impatient’ financial markets seeking short term liquidity, a 
phenomenon more visible in the late 1980s, early 1990s. These developments, in his 
view, led to a ‘neoliberal paradox’ in which intense product market competition 
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hinders profitability at the same time that financial markets demand higher earnings 
under the threat of falling stock prices and hostile takeovers. Lazonick and O’Sullivan 
(2000) found that a particular strategy to guarantee the distribution of earnings to 
shareholders has been a managerial shift from retaining corporate earnings and 
reinvesting in growth to downsizing of corporate labour forces and distribution of 
dividends, a short term approach affecting distribution of income and the already low 
level of American savings.  
Choosing financial performance over growth, on the other hand, is seen as 
playing a role in general patterns of accumulation. Stockhammer (2004) argues that 
the shift to financialisation has slowed down accumulation in France and the US, as 
firms have chosen not to invest in productive sectors. His argument is supported by 
Krippner’s (2005) findings about the US. Since the 1980s, upward surges in portfolio 
income of non-financial corporations were related more to increases in the interest 
component than to capital gains. In addition, corporate profits are increasingly coming 
from growing financial services, at the same time that manufacturing profits are 
declining. In other words, productive interests are seen as being crowded out by 
financial interests, creating a complex and unstable system.  
While regulationists and institutionalists have significantly contributed to the 
debate about capitalism, its developments in the past three decades and their impact 
on corporations, their version is not without problems. The regulationist school, 
striving towards a theoretical framework that can capture capitalism as one unified 
model dependent on institutional complementarities that sustain and reproduce the 
coherence of the mode of regulation, assumes the existence of irresistible top down 
forces driving the whole economy. This leaves little scope, or interest, for the analysis 
of agency. Institutionalists, by contrast, have tried to break this determinism by 
looking at how institutions shape social interests and create opportunities and 
constraints, bringing agency in with extensive empirical work. But part of this 
scholarship has fallen prey to an aspiration, as in regulationism, to classify 
capitalism(s) according to unifying characteristics, ending up with a dichotomy 
between coordinated and market-led models, at the same time that game-theory 
approaches have struggled to identify and explain change within the types, leading to 
the functionalism and determinism it has set up to avoid (Howell 2003; Coates 2005; 
Crouch 2005).  
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These problems, for cultural economists, stem not so much from the efforts to 
put together pieces of the puzzle, a commendable and necessary academic activity, 
but from the assumption that there is a self-contained and finished puzzle at all. For 
cultural economists, the analysis of capitalism, because of its complex nature, is one 
that also requires ‘real-time’ commentary. It is to their version of events that we turn 
next.      
 
1.1 Cultural Economy 
 
A crucial part of knowledge production is based on the deconstruction of past 
events to explain the functioning of a system, adding depth to the analysis. 
Unsurprisingly, most of the resulting accounts tend to provide neat explanations about 
what has happened and why, presenting theoretical schemes that will inform 
predictions to what might happen in the future. Cultural economists, as a general rule, 
are suspicious of this neatness. Or, more precisely, they are sceptical that phenomena 
such as contemporary capitalism can be captured by these viewpoints alone. For these 
scholars, capitalism is not a coherent project made of connecting jigsaw pieces but 
something that allows contingency, that could turn out differently, that is permanently 
unfinished, or ‘under construction’, as Nigel Thrift puts it (2005, p. 3-4). Keeping 
pace with the restlessness of capitalism is, therefore, the only way to avoid becoming 
disconnected from the object of critique, an exercise that calls for critical writing that 
pays “close attention to the present”, a genre of commentary positioned between 
academia and journalism rather than in-depth ex-post analysis (Ibidem, p.11).  
  Cultural economists are particularly interested in the role two elements play 
in the construction of capitalism: discourses and performativity. In their view, 
economic narratives format the economy and help to rekindle ‘spirits of capitalism’ in 
constant adaptation (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005). Discourses “frame markets and 
economic and organizational relations, ‘making them up’ rather than simply observing 
and describing them from a God’s-eye vantage point” (du Gay and Pryke 2002, p.2). 
On the other hand, the continuous responses to new drivers, adaptations and mutations 
are the performative side, with actors’ reactions to events being about following 
existing rules and establishing new rules.  
Under this light, what is new is not financialisation or new technologies per se 
but how a discursive apparatus “has produced a process of continual critique of 
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capitalism, a feedback loop which is intended to keep capitalism surfing along the 
edge of its own contradictions” (Thrift 2005, p.6). This ‘cultural circuit of capitalism’ 
involving business schools, management consultants, management gurus and the 
media, is what Thrift considers the main creation of capitalism in the post -1960s 
period. At the same time, performativity never leaves the picture, since part of the 
analysis is to understand the way in which the construction of economic realities is 
achieved, how a number of activities and objects that we seen as the economy are in 
fact assembled from a number of parts, some from economics but also from other 
sources including cultural practices (Miller 2002). The idea of cultural economy is 
hence to act “on the assumption that economics are performed and enacted by the 
very discourses of which they are supposedly the cause” (du Gay and Pryke 2002, 
p.6). 
A growing literature exploring these ideas of discourses and performativity in 
economics has been produced since the late 1990s, many of them linked to rational 
and ‘self-correcting’ environments such as the stock markets. MacKenzie and Milo 
(2003), through a historical analysis of the origins of the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange, show how the collective action of implementing the Black and Scholes 
pricing theory has changed future prices in accordance to the model for 11 years 
(1976-87) and how the stock market crash of 1987 changed this verisimilitude by 
inserting a factor – the possibility of crashes – that was not in the model. In his study 
about portfolio insurance, MacKenzie (2004) has argued that discrepancy can also be 
due to “counter performativity”, when “its (the model) widespread adoption can 
undermine the preconditions of its own empirical validity” (Ibidem, p.306). 
Paul Langley (2006; 2007) looks at  the assembly of everyday investors’ 
identity in Anglo-American capitalism, highlighting how the discursive representation 
of investments as essential to the production and reproduction of individual security is 
central to this process. Discourses, in this case, are built around the idea of 
responsible investors ready to embrace financial market risks, with investment 
shortfalls being responded to by policy makers through literacy campaigns and 
attempts to bring in ‘excluded’ subjects. Part of this naturalisation of finance and the 
reinforcement of the idea of individuals as bearers of the risk associated with long-
term wealth and retirement is made through the media, whose changing relationship 
with the industry is captured by Clark et al.(2004).  
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Contemporary capitalism for cultural economists is, thus, an open ended and 
socially constructed project based on discourses and performance of different actors, 
with contingency playing a more explicit role than in the accounts of regulationists 
and institutionalists in search for categorisation of types of capitalism. The next 
section will focus on the essentially cultural changes involving stock markets and 
giant firms since the 1990s, as pointed out by academics and a practitioner, leading to 
a cultural economy depiction of giant firm representation in which stock market 
analysts, shareholders and journalists are involved in the construction of stories.    
 
2. Business representation as a cultural process 
 
Three interconnected views of the communication process, both within a 
group of financial actors and between them and others actors, will be reviewed in this 
section: one comes from a retired City practitioner interested in stories shared 
between the City and corporations; another version comes from media sociology 
studies and focuses on the ways in which City executives have been able to construct 
a particular version of reality and spread it to society; a third approach considers how 
corporations, finance analysts and journalists jointly construct narratives about 
strategic moves and business models that will deliver expected financial numbers.   
All three accounts have a common point: the recognition of the importance of 
narratives in the process of economic representation of giant firms and the role of the 
corporation as story teller. By focusing on different actors, they offer complementary 
parts of the puzzle. Golding’s (2003) stories in a box are institutional investors’ 
summaries of firms in response to their narratives and results, the way investors ‘read’ 
information about corporations they invest in. Davis’ (2002) work is a dissection of 
the other end of the process, a different account of how firm narratives are being 
produced and delivered through the media with the very clear purpose of influencing 
investors and other elites. In other words, Davis scrutinises the making of what will 
become a story in a box and the wider consequences of these for democracy. Froud et 
al. (2006) bring complexity to the story making process by adding context, numbers 
and co-authors to the process. Narratives are analysed, contested and responded to by 
external actors. 
Golding’s world is comprised of powerful City fund managers, listed 
companies and a second tier of journalists and analysts that, working for the delivery 
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of complete information, build a perfect market. Golding dismisses the criticisms of 
authors like Will Hutton (1996), who want a more patient capital and stricter 
regulation of financial actors; Davis’ reality is as enclosed as Golding’s, but power 
inequalities are put at the centre of the analysis when a small financial elite formed by 
companies and their respective public relations staff are trying to manipulate the 
market and, in the process, win the financial media over, creating a democratic deficit; 
Froud et al.’s account is about the encounter, and the inevitable clashes, of these 
different actors and interests. By adding social and political context to the picture, 
these authors, in different degrees, analyse the problem of the construction of 
information.  
 
2.1. An engine made of actors and information flows  
 
Why can share prices dive after good annual results are presented?  Tony 
Golding spent two of his 24 years as a City of London executive before he got to the 
answer: financial markets  are not only made of rational agents evaluating facts but 
also run on expectations: “shares are valued on what people think the future holds – 
not on what has happened”, he says on the preface of his book (2000). What people 
think the future holds, on the other hand, is constructed by a constant flow of 
communication involving a network of actors in one of the world’s most important 
financial centres. For Golding, there are two key actors in the City: fund managers, a 
small group of people8 responsible for choosing a rather restricted portfolio of 
companies in which to invest; and the companies themselves, represented by their 
CEOs and CFOs. Both sides are under strong pressure to perform according to index 
expectations. In between those main actors are important intermediaries: analysts, 
usually working for investment banks, and finance journalists.  
To make the task of keeping track of dozens of companies easier, fund 
managers reduce each firm to what Golding calls ‘stories in a box’: a set of two to five 
bullet points reminding them of why the stock was bought in the first place. Buy and 
sell decisions are usually based on how new information affects each of the bullet 
points, which makes managing communications to produce the right perception 
crucial to companies. Stories in a box are deemed as important as accountancy figures 
                                                 
8
 In the UK, the top 10 pension fund managers are responsible for 63% of all money invested in the 
British equity market (Golding, 2003, p.130)  
 51 
like ROCE, sales, earning per shares and other ‘factual’ issues, but cannot be 
substituted for these as fund managers are guided by instrumentality. In a way, both 
stories and numbers tell a version of the ‘truth’ and, therefore, are considered 
together.   
Golding argues that communications between actors happen through two 
channels. The first is direct contact with institutional investors: CEOs spend an 
increasing amount of time ‘talking to the City’, with  large companies’ senior 
executives meeting about 40 institutions on a one-to-one basis every year (Golding 
2003, p.173). These meetings are generally about long term strategy and are crucial to 
investors for asking not only about what the company plans to do but also about how 
it is going to deliver the promises. In other words, in these occasions companies 
provide the basic material from which the stories in a box are made. A CEO’s 
personal record also counts heavily to fund managers and the way they perform is 
evaluated at every opportunity. 
 A second channel of communication involves intermediary actors. The 
process consists of top executives talking to sell-side analysts and journalists on a 
regular basis, with the latter getting back to experts, most of the times investment 
analysts themselves, to triangulate information. When published, newspaper articles 
will in turn influence shareholders’ views about a particular company, creating 
expectations. Most of this exchange regards quarterly results or any 
updates/alterations of the story line, aiming to support a ‘no surprises’ environment 
and manage expectations. The ability to keep the news flowing and to ensure the best 
possible reactions from fund managers, analysts and journalists is what builds 
credibility in the City. Companies who know how to play the game are, as a 
consequence, rewarded with financial stability.  
Golding’s description of how information flows between City institutions and 
giant firms shape expectations and move the finance machine is an insightful starting 
point for the idea of communication as a social construct. Firstly, it breaks down what 
is usually referred to as a coherent institution – the City/the market - into a range of 
actors and groups. Secondly, it describes cultural interactions that are not only 
fundamental for the functioning of financial markets but also capable of changing the 
way actors behave. His version, however, takes for granted power relations and 
conflicts of interests. For Golding, information flows inside the City are the ultimate 
fulfilment of rational choice theory’s promises based on a power structure in which 
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institutional shareholders’ interests have priority, which is accepted by companies. 
Analysts and journalists, on the other hand, are the means to an end: complete 
information. The underlying assumption is that everybody benefits equally from a 
perfect market, further reinforcing what is portrayed as natural and desirable power 
structures.  
 
2.2 Narratives as strategy 
 
Questions about power, or rather about a shift in power relations, in contrast, 
are at the core of Davis’ analysis (2002) of the City engine. More specifically, he is 
worried about how disproportionate power exercised by small financial elites over a 
fraction of the media affects not only the City but society as a whole. For him, an 
increasingly strong lack of independence of the financial media is leading to a 
widespread crisis of public communications. In a nutshell, his argument is that a 
group of City executives is being allowed to construct its own version of reality and 
circulate this publicly via an uncritical sector of the media which, nonetheless, is 
perceived as a democratic, independent and pluralistic arena. 
Davis starting point is the growth of the public relations industry from the 
1980s and its changing nature from the mid-1990s onwards, marked by the growth of 
a specialised branch of finance public relations. This development happened in 
tandem with an unprecedented expansion in the production of business and financial 
news, turning both finance PR and finance journalism into premier employment 
sections of their industries. While a pluralistic account of the expansion argues that 
factors like growing public interest and information requirements of the stock market 
have raised the demand for business news and, as a response, finance PR has grown, 
Davis advances another explanation: what started as a reactive need to fulfil 
regulatory demands has been turned into a strategy to gain competitive advantage. 
Corporations, with the help of a proactive financial PR, have colonised financial news 
media by controlling the whole productive chain: from paying for the advertising that 
expanded the news coverage in the first place to functioning as the main sources and 
consumers of the information published. 
This adds a different spin to the communication process described by Golding. 
In Davis’ version, the main objective of corporate financial PR inside the City is not 
to create a perfect market but, on the contrary, to take advantage of the imperfections 
 53 
of the existing one. To sustain or raise shareholder interest and support, “impartial 
information is transformed into partial rhetoric at all levels and begins with the 
presentation of (accountancy) figures”(Davis 2002, p.68). With a clear intention of 
shaping business news and influencing investors, corporate elites have been able to 
succeed because of the domination of the news production process. By being the main 
advertisers, sources and consumers, firms occupy a strong position in relation to the 
financial media, which is no longer faced with the obligation to please a diverse 
audience and, therefore, may ignore information requirements of other actors, 
including regulators and the general public.     
The process consists in capturing business news within “closed discourse 
networks”, with the establishment of a multidirectional and exclusive communication 
between top corporate executives, public relations specialists, fund managers, 
analysts, merchant banks and financial journalists. PR departments feed journalists 
and analysts with information and these actors, in turn, communicate with fund 
managers and other actors in this elite circle to convey their views and follow their 
actions. As a consequence, financial articles are produced by the City for the City, 
excluding small investors, regulators and general public interests and concerns from 
main broadsheets. More important yet, it tends to legitimise a financial elite agenda as 
if it represented a widespread set of concerns. The media, instead of a ‘fourth estate’ 
guardian of democracy, becomes then a mere conduit of the ideas and beliefs of a 
very specific and elitist group of society.  
The hostile takeover of Forte Plc by the Granada Group in 1995 is used to 
show how the concentrated effort of financial public relations firms hired by both 
corporations manipulated the financial media towards one side or another in the 
various stages of the battle. Shifts in share prices were closely linked with many of the 
several thousand articles published in the pages of financial newspapers, with clear 
changes of heart happening after a series of information/numbers/opinions hit the 
headlines. Third parties, like market analysts and business schools academics, were 
used by both sides to convey a qualified opinion about the takeover. Issues raised by 
the communications teams, Davis argues, were chosen to impact the deliberation 
process of decision-making actors – in this case, fund managers with big chunks in 
both corporations. A contest between CEOs was fuelled by articles about 
personalities, management styles and performance records. 
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Numbers were hand-picked to paint the desirable picture, with analysts 
coming in to predict future growth for the firms and the industry. Davis also found 
that shareholder value and other City concerns were the only focus of articles (in a 
sample of 582 pieces, 93.8% were published in the financial and business sections).  
As a result, Granada had to raise its bid and Forte’s shares went up 54% in a little 
more than two months, while other stakeholders’ interests (e.g. employers and 
consumers) were absent from the coverage. Accountant, law and PR advisers were 
also winners, with fees reaching £150 million for both sides. Employees were the big 
losers, with Forte having to be carved out up to pay the debts Granada acquired to 
finance the takeover.  
 In Davis’ account, cultural practices are central to firm strategy: for the 
particular purpose of influencing decision-makers (investors), corporations establish 
‘discourse networks’ to engage in mediated battles structured around the rhetoric of 
shareholder value and strategic moves endorsed or rejected by management gurus 
(members of the broader ‘cultural circuit of capitalism’ identified by Thrift (2005)). In 
effect, Davis questions Golding’s assumptions by highlighting different and conflicted 
interests at play, including of actors sidestepped in the previous account such as 
employees and regulators. It also challenges the idea of information as a neutral 
commodity exchanged between rational actors, ranked in a neat pack order, bringing 
to the discussion the growth of a whole industry whose main job is to embellish 
information for achieving goals that naturalise power relations and structures that 
mostly benefit elite players.  
For the purposes of this thesis as a whole, however, this has to be taken with 
some caution because the analysis here is very specific to stock markets. Even if one 
assumes that the co-option of the financial media is a fact, this cannot necessarily be 
assumed to be the case for the entire spectrum.  As the author himself points out 
(Ibidem, p.46-59), corporate public relations has never really succeed in co-opting 
mainstream media in the UK and, given the increasing number of non-financial actors 
claiming a stake on firms’ decisions and strategies, corporations cannot shield 
themselves from firestorms by controlling the financial pages. The number of recent 
corporate PR disasters started and sustained on broadsheets is a sign of this 
vulnerability. While Davis highlights a very relevant process, it would be 
counterproductive to think of it as solving firms’ problems regarding their 
representation.    
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Another point that needs to be questioned is the underlying assumption that 
there is a financial elite working together and consistently towards a common goal. 
Corporations, institutional investors and merchant banks can have very different 
expectations and conflicting interests, the same ingredients that have been holding 
back the fulfilment of a true capitalist solidarity amongst business communities.  As 
the Granada and Forte battle makes clear, players are very often not on consensual 
terms and support has to be fought for; in fact, there would be not point in the war 
between public relations departments otherwise. The battle was relevant precisely 
because there was not a simple ‘rational’  choice available and the role played by 
individual beliefs and information gathering processes could be manipulated by smart 
advisers towards each one of the sides. Representing financial actors as a coherent 
elite group whose interests are in opposition to society’s interests might be necessary 
for setting up an analytical frame. But grouping these actors together as a 
homogenised block suggests an overwhelming top down exercise of power that 
unavoidably biases outcomes and builds a cage from which actors cannot escape.  
 
2.3 Agents, moves and numbers 
 
The previous accounts have offered very useful points: a variety of actors 
operating in financial markets build expectations about what the future holds based on 
constant information flowing directly and indirectly, the latter through the financial 
media. These information flows have become a strategic tool when corporations and 
their public relations departments, in a bid to influence decision makers, make use of 
mini epistemic communities, or ‘discourse networks’, as Davis calls them, to advocate 
the validity of their strategy and inflate share prices. 
Froud et al. (2006) take the idea of narratives as a strategic tool and develop it 
further by arguing that narratives are used in routine economic representation of giant 
firms to shareholders. The rhetoric of shareholder value and the strong pressure to 
perform according to financial parameters form the background of their account, in 
which corporations, investors, journalists and analysts are involved in co-authoring 
narratives of purpose and achievement to try to manage investors’ expectations and 
avoid costly share price oscillation. Despite uneven levels of power, actors involved 
in the process keep a degree of agency that allows them to challenge information and, 
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consequently, outcomes cannot be a priori established, with winners and losers 
differing in every round. 
They argue that firm narratives are collectively authored by public 
relations/communication departments, journalists and analysts that, having access to 
each others’ texts and analyses, re-write and re-interpret them constantly. These 
stories are usually influenced by broader narratives, both at sector and at macro levels, 
which function as contextualisation ‘canopies’. Abrupt changes in the plot of the story 
by corporations are taken as a breach of an implicit contract between management and 
investors, with consequences going from a few hours of share price instability to a 
crisis that may overhaul corporate governance or even invite attempts of hostile 
takeover. To avoid disruptions, companies try their best to keep the information flow 
and warn against possible changes as early and smoothly as possible. This is done by 
frequent meeting between investors and CEOs and CFOs, both as scheduled events 
(annual and quarterly results) and private one-to-ones.  
Discourses, however, only go so far. Action, in form of management strategic 
moves, is the visible side of stories, the turning of plans into ‘reality’. In this category 
are most of the mergers, acquisitions and other strategic decisions that keep the story 
flowing to investors but, at the same time, change the corporation, its drivers of 
profitability and its future story line.  In a crude way, the process of communication 
consists in firms building their stories around promises of future financial results that 
will stem from specific management moves, building expectations that are 
acknowledged and analysed by financial actors. Those managerial actions are causally 
linked with the delivery of financial numbers that, in the following year, will be 
scrutinised by journalists, analysts and investors. At this point in time, the company is 
already different from the one that made the promises and new narratives will be built 
from the numbers just delivered. In other words, narratives set in motion the 
performative which, in turn, will alter the company and its future narratives.  
In their case study of General Electric (2006, p.299-368), Froud et al. show 
how Jack Welch, in the early 1980s, divested one fifth of GE’s asset base to enact the 
strategy of only keeping business competitive enough to be number one or two and 
built an impeccable reputation of a star CEO; Jack Nasser, on the other hand,  bought 
Kwik-Fit in the late 1990s to prove that Ford was on its way to becoming a consumer 
company providing automotive products and services, a business sold three years later 
by a new CEO (Ibidem, p.250- 304). The difference was that while Welch was 
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building in GE a financial service basis that would keep the profits growing for the 
company, Nasser’s strategy was a kind of symbolic gesture that was eventually 
doubted by analysts, journalists and business schools’ academics (the cultural circuit 
of capitalism again), who could not see how his strategy would deliver short-term 
results.  
Stories are accepted or challenged depending on various factors, but the gap 
between promises and numbers is the quicker and more legitimate way to question 
corporate narratives: numbers presented by management will set in motion a whole 
new set of narratives that can reinforce, or damage, credibility. Both too good and too 
bad financial results, usually checked against commonly agreed accountancy figures 
like share prices, revenues and return on capital employed, expose firms to a wave of 
questions about management miscalculations and their links with strategic moves. But 
there are other structural and very often interlinked issues that can empower external 
actors to challenge corporate narratives: complexity and context of the industry to 
which firms belong is one of them. How complex or simple an industry is reckoned to 
be must influence the reception of stories from the part of the media or market 
analysts; the more transparent and predictable the sector is considered to be, the more 
likely it is to be questioned. The reason for this is linked to Golding’s concept of 
stories in a box. To simplify intricate corporations, financial actors strip them down to 
a few essentials that can be easily followed and compared. Some industries, like oil 
and pharmaceutical, have important benchmarks (oil reserves and drugs in pipeline) 
besides traditional accountancy numbers that provide a window into their future 
performance. They are thus judged by both sets of parameters. 
Industry narratives and grand narratives about the economy in general are 
other factors influencing whether stories are challenged or not. Within this wider 
framework, civil society’s perceptions of narratives can help in the contestation of 
business prerogatives. The pharmaceutical industry narrative that justified high profits 
with the need to innovate has fallen under heavy criticism from civil society since the 
1990s, throwing the whole sector into turmoil. In this particular case, reassuring the 
general public, media and governments of the social benefits of patents and high 
profits is even more important because the market is shaped and constrained by 
institutions and regulations and cost recovery is dependent on a favourable regulatory 
framework. When the industry narrative is under fire by social actors, governments 
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are compelled to intervene, threatening the business bottom line (Froud, Johal et al. 
2006, p.152-167).  
Crisis, therefore, can also start in the civil society domain and reach the 
financial realm because of their potential to affect profits. In relation to the City, 
crises where wrongdoing of senior management is suspected are particularly hard to 
manage. Merck’s withdrawal of the pain killer Vioxx, in September 2004, after grave 
accusations about the safety of the drugs reached the public, was also surrounded by 
controversy and loss of credibility after a string of media reports about the suspicions 
that top management at the American company knew about the risks and chose not to 
disclose them to the market and to patients were published (Ibidem, p.167). 
These scholars add contingency to the communication process by highlighting 
different levels of narratives that bring more complexity to the construction of stories 
and more actors able to challenge corporate narratives and practices that can affect the 
bottom line. Their view also sheds light on how these routine interactions between 
firms and financial markets are not simply rhetoric, as promises have to be enacted 
and failure is punished, both with tangible effects on the corporation itself. Central to 
this analysis are assumptions about the instrumentality of actors and the importance of 
numbers in their calculations, presenting a convincing account of failure and change 
within this environment. On this cultural economy account, narratives are a tool 
capable of constructing a shared reality that moves forward as long as there is 
consistency between narratives and numbers. This is enlightening in the context of 
financial market interactions but its attempts to draw actors from other realms is 
circumscribed to the effects of these actors’ narratives on firms’ profits, without an 
analysis of how firms are dealing with these attacks in other spheres. Given the 
importance of these inherently political actors, any attempt to discuss giant firm 
representation cannot sidestep interactions outside stock markets.  
 Moreover, the framework has mainly ex-post explanatory power regarding 
when and why perceptions change. Narratives and numbers discrepancy, contested 
industry narrative or management wrongdoing cannot explain, for instance, why 
under Jeff Immelt’s management GE’s shares have chronically underperformed the 
S&P 500 index by more than 20%, even though the company has met tough financial 
targets, expanded to fast- growing sectors, increased its participation in booming 
emerging markets and sold slow-growth and underperforming businesses. In other 
words, the main measurement of the power or weakness of a story is made against the 
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absence or existence of contestation: a narrative is considered powerful inasmuch as it 
is able to avert its own collapse and weak when it does not. While this opens the 
possibility for failure and change that is missing in structuralist approaches, it does 
not help our understanding of the processes and elements that gives narratives 
leverage, which is the main concern of this thesis.  
 
3. Corporate Communications since the 1990s 
 
The previous sections were about political economy and cultural economy 
interpretations of capitalist changes of the past 30 years and their impacts on firms 
and their representation. This section is a brief assessment of how corporations have 
been dealing with the changes, particularly the increasing importance of 
communication as a strategic tool. The growth of (mainly external) financial public 
relations and their involvement in mediated wars between corporations is M&A 
disputes described by Davis (2000) is one side of the picture; the other is a distinct 
upgrade of corporate communication in the internal rankings of firms in a similar 
fashion that human resources and finance departments once became the fastest route 
to the top. 
A  report by the Corporate Communication Institute (Goodman 2006) on a 
survey of 100 companies(Fortune 1000) revealed that executives see communications 
as “more strategic than ever” and considerer their primary role to be “counsel to the 
CEO” and “manager of the company’s reputation” (Goodman 2006, p.5).  In 
comparison with the first study, carried out in 2000, executives involved in corporate 
communication have become more senior, more educated, with the number of holders 
of MAs in business or communications doubling. The gender balance has also shifted, 
with the number of women on these roles falling from 55% to 35%, at the same time 
that the number of executives earning top salaries (300k +) doubled in two years. 
These changes were matched by alterations of business schools’ offers. The inclusion 
of communications either as a whole MSc course or as a core discipline in 
management/strategy programmes has become widespread, with top universities such 
as Pennsylvania Wharton and London School of Economics adhering to the new 
trend. 
Corporate communications, therefore, has evolved to integrate what hitherto 
had been separate functions. Public relations, employee communications, personnel, 
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marketing  and quality management are some of the activities Varey sees as being 
“broadened and melded into a core organization and management function” (1997, 
p.68), at the same time that the recognition of communication as an strategic issue 
rather than just an information dissemination role has become widespread. Unlike the 
old types of business communications “focusing on writing, presentational and 
communications skills (…) largely restricted to interpersonal situations such as dyads 
and small groups within the organizations”, the new corporation has wider concerns 
and communication should focus “on the organization as a whole and the important 
task of how an organization is presented to all of its key stakeholders, both internal 
and external” (Cornelissen 2004, p.20). 
Part of the exercise has been an exhaustive academic discussion about 
stakeholders and how to prioritise them. For an increasing number of scholars, the 
neoclassical theory of the firm, with the main assumption that corporations should 
aim at profits and be accountable only to themselves and to their financial partners 
(shareholders), has lost ground to a broader perspective: the socio-economic theory, in 
which the stakeholder model is embedded (Freeman 1984).  According to this school, 
accountability reaches out to others groups or individuals with legitimate interests in 
the firm. “Instead of considering organizations as immune to government or public 
opinion, the stakeholder management model recognizes the mutual dependencies 
between organizations and various stake-holding groups” (Cornelissen 2004, p. 59). 
Understanding how and why managers make their decisions to respond to particular 
stakeholders and whether they have been prioritizing the right actors has become a hot 
topic, with the great number of crises involving giant firms in the 1990s working as a 
catalyst to systematic research into a normative and descriptive theory.  
Different definitions of the nature of stakes and types of stakeholders have 
been developed. Freeman broadly defined stakeholder as “any group or individual 
who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives” 
(1984, p.46) and classified three groups of stakes: equity stakes, economic or market 
stakes and influencer stakes. Clarkson (1995, p.106-107) also uses the idea of 
economic or moral claims to base his classification on. In his view, there are primary 
and secondary stakeholders: the former being shareholders, costumers, suppliers and 
any other individual or group whose dissatisfaction has the potential to economically 
damage the company; and the latter being those who influence or affect (or are 
influenced or affected by) the corporation. Stakeholders can also be divided into 
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contractual and community (Charkham 1994): contractual stakeholders have some 
form of legal relationship with the corporation  while community do not –  here the 
dichotomy between economic and moral interests arises again.  
Attempts to narrow down the definition of stakeholder have also included the 
use of other dimensions to help with the task of identifying the broader stakeholder 
environment and, more important yet, deciding who really counts. Savage et al. 
(1991) added two dimensions – potential for threat and for cooperation – to classify 
stakeholders as supportive, marginal, non-supportive and mixed blessing. A more 
sophisticated account is presented by Mitchell et al. (1997), considering the 
combination of  power, legitimacy and urgency as creating different types of 
stakeholders. In this framework, the attributes are variable and not always consciously 
exercised, which means that stakeholders/firms relations are in constant mutation.  
Seven types of stakeholders result from the combinations of power, legitimacy and 
urgency. The first three types are what the authors called “latent” stakeholders, who 
possess only one of the attributes: dormant (power), discretionary (legitimacy) and 
demanding (urgency). Expectant stakeholders possess two of the attributes.  
To gain complete attention from managers, however, a stakeholder will need 
the three attributes, turning into what Mitchell and his colleagues call “definitive 
stakeholders”. The most likely scenario is that a stakeholder possessing power and 
legitimacy acquires urgency – if suspecting their interests are not being seen to 
properly, for instance. The 1993 upheavals at IBM, General Motors, Kodak, 
Westinghouse and American Express involved stockholders who became active when 
they felt that their legitimate interests were not being served by the managers of these 
companies. When stock values plummeted, a sense of urgency was engendered and 
these powerful and legitimate stakeholders removed management deemed to be 
responding insufficiently or inappropriately (Ibidem, p.878). 
With Mitchell et al.’s classification in mind, it is unsurprisingly that the most 
significant institutional change in the past thirty years has been the growing 
importance of the finance function, which is more directly linked to a potentially 
definitive stakeholder: investor relations. Until the beginning of the 1980s, interacting 
with shareholders was seen as part of the job of the chief financial officer (CFO) in 
his spare time, with investor relations departments functioning as a mixture of public 
relations and crisis management. “Contact with shareholders was largely episodic, 
reactive and unorganised”, says Useem (1993, p.132). By the end of the decade, it had 
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become a “full time professionalised operation”, with the office reporting directly to 
the CFO and CEO (Ibidem). In Jonathan Davis description, “until 10 years ago, for 
example, the finance director's programme of investor relations at one of Britain's 
largest companies consisted of a glass of sherry once a year with the 20 largest 
institutional shareholders. It was up to the company's brokers to do the day-to-day job 
of keeping the rest of the market happy. The financial press, meanwhile, was handled 
separately but on the same largely informal basis. There was little systematic attempt 
to decide what the company should be saying, nor much effort to ensure that the same 
message was directed at different audiences. Few companies would dare to act the 
same way today, particularly when management is held increasingly accountable for 
the company's share price” (1995, p.72). 
Marston (1996), in a study with 61% of the top 500 UK quoted companies, 
found that various corporation directors were involved in managing and executing the 
investor relations function within British firms as early as 1991, with CFO and CEO 
directly involved in its activities. More than 50% of the corporations had a designated 
investor relations executive, with the average board directors spending 37 days a year 
on investor relations. Moreover, privatised companies, as well as the ones with high 
specific risk, were more likely to have investor relations officers. In a survey of the 
top 80 European corporations (excluding UK-based), 96% of the respondents have an 
investor relations department, most of them established between 1988 and 1994 due 
to a variety of reasons including privatization, increased levels of disclosure and the 
establishment of global and fast moving capital markets (Marston and Straker 2001). 
In the US, Rao and Sivakumar attribute the exponential growth of the investor 
relations function in Fortune 500 companies – from 16% (84 companies) in 1984 to 
56% (270 firms) in 1994 – to investor activism and the increasing number of financial 
analysts monitoring listed firms (Rao and Sivakumar 1999).  
While Farragher et al. have not found a significant relationship between 
investor relations rakings and the accuracy of EPS forecasts by analysts, they did find 
that analyses are more consistent for companies that have a highly rated investor 
relations program (1994, p.404);  Ryder and Regester, on the other hand, argue that its 
main importance is to create closer links with investors, facilitating the job of 
developing strategies in tune with investors’ interests (1990). The need to discursively 
manage shareholders is also recognised in the literature as part of the job. By 
analysing shareholder reports of equity mutual funds whose total returns were high in 
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absolute terms compared to historical returns but low in relative terms compared to 
competing funds, Jameson shows how mixed-return reports use a non-linear structure 
and dramatise ideas by using contrasting narrators, creating a multivocality that draws 
the reader to the story. “By using several voices, the mixed-return reports invite or 
even force readers to take part in the story making: to assemble the details, organise 
them and choose among alternative interpretations” (Jameson 2000, p.16). 
Fundamental for her analysis is Mieke Bal’s (1997) idea of fabula, story and text. 
Fabula is the underlying materials of the story, including events, actors, time and 
place; story is the fabula presented in a particular way (i.e. sequence, duration, focus), 
which means a fabula can result on a myriad of stories; the text, on the other hand, is 
the way the story is told, the structure ‘converted into words by a narrator’, which 
indirectly includes what the actor chooses to highlight, select or omit.  
If we go back to Golding, Davis and Froud et al., the same kind of process can 
be seen behind stories in a box, discursive networks and co-authored narratives about 
past and future performance: while the fabula cannot be changed and certain numbers, 
by law, have to be disclosed, there are many ways to tell an investment story and their 
meaning depend on the way the fabula is structured. With the exception of downright 
fraud, corporations, through their communication/investor relations, chose the best 
way to present past performance and future moves in a story that will shape 
expectations. Actors external to the corporation are then compelled to tell their own 
version of the fabula, perhaps highlighting different elements or denouncing omission 
or selection, which also has the potential to create/change expectations. The City, 
therefore, run on narratives that shape players expectations and are in constant 
construction. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter intended to bring different scholarly versions about the changes 
of the past three decades, incorporating a more cultural account of capitalism and 
business representation to the view presented in chapter I. Putting them together 
fulfils two functions: firstly, it provides new ways of considering the changes and 
problems facing corporations, with the addition of ideas about culture and narratives 
that speak directly to this thesis; secondly, less flagrant, it shows that these views can 
be constructed as a spectrum of ideas that gradually shade into one another. 
Institutional accounts based on rational choice occupy one extreme of the field and 
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more constructivist accounts, considering firm as unstable coalitions (Martin 2000) or 
institutions as incomplete and incoherent players (Crouch 2005), are borderlines to 
cultural economy.  
Cultural economy’s take on capitalism in itself as a project in constant 
construction, however, is deemed more useful for the purposes of this work because 
of the lights it casts on the intrinsically cultural nature of the economic system and of 
financial market interactions, with the identification of these practices as central to 
firm strategy from the 1990s onwards.  In this version, corporate communication has 
become simultaneously a new scholarly discipline run by the cultural circuit of 
capitalism and a sought after senior position inside the giant firm’s rankings. Key to 
the strategy is the active management of shareholders, with investor relations 
departments becoming a quasi-universal feature of giant firms in the past twenty 
years.  
The management of investors though stories of promises and achievement as 
proposed by these scholars is an innovative framework because it explores the 
importance of a particular cultural practice (story telling) for business representation. 
At the same time, it recognises the contingency of managing information as a way of 
building credibility and pacifying conflicting interests, since stories are open to 
contestation and reacted upon. It also explicitly brings to the analysis actors who are 
routinely conflated as the ‘market’ (i.e. shareholders, analysts and financial 
journalists) by showing how their interests and actions shape the market itself and 
firm behaviour.    
We are, however, left with a question about how the different views of what 
have changed in the past three decades (reviewed in the last chapter about political 
science approaches and in this chapter advocating a more cultural view) can be 
compared and contrasted so as to add to our understanding of business and its 
representation in the beginning of the 21st century. This is the task of the next chapter.  
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Chapter III: The cultural business representation 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The first two chapters of this thesis have surveyed the changes of landscape 
for business in the last three decades through two different perspectives: a political 
science view, which looks at how the end of a system of interlocked elites and the rise 
of regional/supranational governance have encouraged British corporations to resort 
to a ‘do it yourself’ approach to representation; and a cultural economy account, 
whose understanding of discourses and performativity as linchpins of capitalism 
informs a business representation framework in which stories of purpose and 
achievement, as well as related management moves, are used by corporations to 
manage shareholders’ expectations.  
This chapter aims to bridge these bodies of literature to make a case for the 
importance of culture in the analysis of business representation. The argument put 
forward is that the changes of the last 30 years have thrown business into hitherto 
uncharted waters of contestation at social, political and economic levels, triggering a 
response that tries to counteract this negative exposure with direct engagement with 
different actors. This engagement, it is claimed here, is made mainly through 
narratives: at macro level, trying to influence broader debates and the direction of 
capitalism, as acknowledged by the culturally sensitive scholarship in political 
science, but also increasingly as strategic tool at micro level, as pointed out by 
cultural economists. Far from a straightforward flexing of business’ muscles, 
however, this argumentative exercise is complex and contingent on responses from 
other actors. 
This claim results from a meta-analysis of the two scholarly traditions 
undertaken in the first part of the chapter. The exercise focuses particularly on their 
accounts of the relationship between agency and structure and, consequently, on their 
understanding of business power. Although the terms political science and cultural 
economy are used to define the different approaches, I clearly do not intend to analyse 
the whole spectrum of work in these fields, as they are a broad church whose themes 
and interests go far beyond the scope of this thesis. What I am primarily interested in 
is how some characteristic approaches have made sense of big business: in political 
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science, the particular focus is on how the most influential and/or recent contributions 
are marked by particular ways of understanding the role of structures in enhancing 
corporate power and influencing strategies of representation; in cultural economy, 
attention is specifically paid to the notion that cultural interactions among financial 
actors, namely through narratives, are a way of overcoming power asymmetries with 
the help of matching performance. Broadly speaking, this chapter is about what 
happens when political economy accounts of business representation intersect with 
cultural representations of business. 
A relevant point is that, despite their different approaches, these accounts 
overlap in a important way: they are both concerned with the understanding of 
structure/agency relationships, namely whether and how structural changes have 
affected business power and, in turn, how business has acted to reposition itself and 
(re)claim influence. In this particular interaction, some findings are also somewhat 
shared. In both cases, it is argued that the entrance of new actors and arenas has 
created a need to respond quickly and in a bespoke way to different challenges, a task 
less suitable to traditional/collective bodies of representation. While cultural economy 
has explicitly invoked ‘story telling’, political science alludes to the formation of 
alliances and the building of consensus, two activities in which some form of 
negotiation is clearly needed. Therefore, from different starting points and analytical 
perspectives, political science and cultural economy arrive at fragmented pictures of 
business representation and influence as an activity increasingly dependent on 
communication. To complicate matters further, a great part of these interactions 
occurs in the public eye.  
The chapter starts by exploring the insights that these diverging and 
overlapping issues can offer to our understanding of narratives as a key tool in 
business representation. These themes, in turn, will form the basis for the empirical 
analysis conducted later in the thesis. The delineation of the ‘theoretical framework’ 
will be followed by an outline of the proposed methodology, with a justification of the 
case study as the most suitable framework to answer the research question and a 
discussion about the benefits and limits of the approach. A last section delineates and 
explains the chosen cases.  
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1. The cultural political economy of business representation 
 
The puzzle that concerns this thesis, as outlined in the introduction, is one about 
irregularity. At its core, this work is a quest to understand why some stories are very 
effective in helping firms to achieve their political and economic goals, while others 
are not. This variety of results, on the other hand, is reflected on divergent diagnosis 
among scholars: while a good deal of researchers of big business seems to arrive at 
the conclusion that its power has remained virtually unchanged in the past decades, a 
growing number of scholars have been basing their work on the premise of the decline 
of business power vis-à-vis other societal actors.  
The political science and cultural economy perspectives outlined in the first two 
chapters are an example of this. The former, in a nutshell, is a description of how 
business, when abruptly removed from an embedded environment in which 
representation was intrinsically linked to being a part of a powerful elite, has managed 
to retain its influence. It did so by adopting an individualistic approach to political 
representation in which business still crowds out other interests, but in a subtler way. 
The latter portrays the renewed exposure of corporations to the volatility of the 
financial market and to the interests of some of its key players as the reason spurring 
giant firms to create a specific kind of representation. The strategy, however, is 
subjected to regular scrutiny and challenge by external actors.  
The power debate in political science has since the 1960s revolved around the 
existence and relevance of different ‘faces’ of power: instrumental, in which one actor 
causes the behaviour of other actors, get them to do what they would not otherwise do 
(Dahl 1957); structural, which entails not only interaction but limitations on 
interaction, as power is caught up in institutionalized practices and therefore shaped 
before the actual bargaining starts (Bachrach and Baratz 1962); and discursive, 
pointing at the role of discourses in averting conflict by shaping the perception and 
preferences of others beforehand (Lukes 1974). Anthony Giddens (1979), however, 
argues that the transformative capacity of power is harnessed to actors’ capacities to 
get others to do what they want by considering the capacity of others. In other words, 
power is relational in the sense that the realisation of outcomes depend on the agency 
of other actors. “The use of power in interaction can thus be understood in terms of 
what the facilities that participants bring to and mobilise as elements of the production 
of that interaction, thereby influencing its course.  (…) power within social system 
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can thus be treated as involving reproduced relations of autonomy and dependence in 
social interaction” (Ibidem, p.93) 
This relational dimension, on the other hand, provides a distinction between 
‘power to’ and ‘power over’ that is missing on the three faces of power debate (Isaac 
1987) . The material causes of interaction, therefore, are not behaviour but social 
relations that shape behaviour. Domination and subordination, in this case, ceases to 
be a ‘contingent regularity’ to become a link between power and structure, with 
regularities of behaviour understood with references to structural relations of power. 
In these relations of power, the interests of actors play a central role because “they are 
the practical norms which justify and legitimate power relations” (Ibidem, p.26). In 
other words, power is shaped and constrained by enduring relations and the rationality 
about the role of different actors sustains their subordination. However, for the same 
reasons, power is also contingent given that social structures are not immutable. 
“Insofar as the exercise of power is always contingent, it is constantly negotiated in 
the course of everyday life. Thus not only the exercise of power, but the very 
existence of relations of power themselves, can become objects of contention and 
struggle” (Isaac 1987, p.24)  
My point here is that the pursuit of verdicts on whether business power is growing 
or declining has been privileging the idea of ‘power over’ and, therefore, missing the 
significance of the changes in social relations that followed the changes in structures 
in the last three decades and their impact on power – of business and other actors. 
Putting it in another way, the agency of actors and their interests have altered 
previously accepted and legitimised power relations and, consequently, analysis of 
business power has to take into consideration not only the ways power is exercised 
but also how it is constantly negotiated.  Looking at the connections and overlaps 
between political science and cultural economy, as well as their differences, is a 
useful starting point because their separate accounts cannot capture the complexity 
and ambiguity of actors, arenas and their interactions mentioned above. We start with 
an analysis of the roles of agency and structure in both sets of literature. 
 
1.1 Structure and Agency 
 
The paradigm shift portrayed in chapter I starts in the 1970s, with the rise of the 
regulatory state and the beginning of a ‘global turn’ of capitalism. A second wave of 
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change, in the end of the 1980s, is understood to have followed a different, but deeply 
linked, structural driver: the expansion of European governance powers and the 
change of its operational rules. Cultural economy’s account, on the other hand, is 
firmly rooted in the 1990s and the focus is the aftermath of these structural changes, 
more precisely the empowerment of equity markets as a key arena and the building of 
a ‘shareholder value’ paradigm. Both sets of literature, however, are involved in a 
similar exercise: tracing changes in actors’ strategies back to structural shifts.  
The political science perspective argues that the turn to neo-liberalism greatly 
weakened the elite networks through which business and political actors discreetly 
and efficiently interacted in Britain (Moran 2006). This, in turn, prompted giant firms 
to resort to a do-it-yourself approach to business representation, diminishing the 
importance of traditional channels of collective action (Grant 1984; Mitchell 1990; 
Coen and Willman 1998; Hart 2002; Lehne 2006; Boddewyn 2007; Hart 2007). 
Cultural economy, on the other hand, argues that the exposure to stock market 
demands have created huge pressure for management to perform well both in the 
product markets and the financial markets. This new environment has mainly exposed 
firms to external scrutiny and criticism, prompting publicly listed companies to try to 
‘manage’ shareholders’ expectations (Froud, Johal et al. 2006).  
In both cases, there is an unambiguous attempt to individually address specific 
actors with the aim of avoiding their negative reactions, be it policy making decisions 
or investors’ discontent. Moreover, the institutional response to these different 
challenges has taken exactly the same form: the creation of corporate departments 
called respectively government affairs and investor relations that usually work 
together to plan the strategic delivery of information to different stakeholders 
(Baysinger and Woodman 1982; Mitchell 1990; Marston 1996; Marston and Straker 
2001; Dolphin 2004; Hart 2001). Even though the verdict about how well each of 
these departments has been doing the job may vary, firms’ motives and responses are 
quite similar. Their differences are mainly related to the actors involved in the 
exercise. This takes us to agency. 
 
1.2 The new entrants  
 
 Both sets of literature are concerned with the usual suspects in their disciplines: in 
political science, the story is about political actors, the ones who start the structural 
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changes and the ones with whom business has to deal with for its representation in 
these new institutional structures. In cultural economy, financial and industrial actors 
take the fore. But if the main protagonists are different in each version, something that 
is very relevant and will be discussed further, there is a common trait: the crucial 
importance of new actors and the way their very entrance changed the game. The 
arrival of the so-called ‘civil society’ groups as dynamic players in the decision 
making process and the rise of institutional investors causes many of the adverse 
problems faced by business in its attempt to secure favourable outcomes.  
In the case of cultural economy, deregulation of finance has triggered the shift in 
share ownership from individual households to institutional investors and it is the 
appearance of this actor, making demands for performance and with a preference for 
liquidity over long term investment, that in turn catalyses the pressure on firms for 
financial performance (Morin 2000; Golding 2003). In political terms, the 
restructuring of government bodies at national and supranational levels to involve 
different degrees of civil participation has meant, in practice, that the bargaining 
process has to some extent shifted from direct negotiation between government and 
firms to a much more complex exercise involving a number of less like-minded 
partners (Berry 1999; Skocpol 2003; Derthick 2005; Eisner 2007).  
At supranational level, bodies such as the World Bank, United Nations, OECD 
and IMF are increasingly accepting input from the so-called ‘third-sector’. Despite a 
clear variation in their responses to civil society demands, actions such as the 
inclusion of commissioners from social movements and NGOs in the World 
Commission on Dams, whose job is to draw international guidelines for decision 
making by the World Bank (Khagram 2000); the IMF’s invitation of public reactions 
before new action on the matter are taken (O'Brian, Goetz et al. 2000, Ch 4); or the 
dismantling of the Multilateral Investment Agreement (MAI) negotiations following 
NGO opposition at the OECD (Walter 2001), were inconceivable achievements a 
couple of decades ago.  
At European level, the requirement of encompassing information stressed the need 
for dialogue amongst conflicting actors since “the more encompassing the access 
goods provided by interests groups are, the more likely these interests groups can 
contribute to the implementation of EU legislation” (Bouwen 2002, p.371). The 
institutional empowerment of directorates such as the DG Environment within the EC 
structure also enhanced NGO input, as well as the breaking down of high politics 
 71 
issues into technical matters to invite broader participation and aids consensus (Mazey 
and Richardson 1993, p.18-19).    
At national and local levels in the UK, a less direct but certainly significant 
change was the alliance between New Labour and four voluntary sector councils 
(England, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales) sealed in 1998, the so-called 
Compacts. Even though these partnerships are not legally binding, the involvement of 
charities and other independent organisations on the provision of services opens a 
door to participation in major policy initiatives such as Sure Start and Education 
Action and even NHS programmes in which local authorities need to consult and plan 
with the voluntary sectors (Morison 2000). While doubts about the rationale behind 
New Labour’s move towards the voluntary sector (Fyfe 2005),  the chances of these 
actors becoming “equal partners” in policy making (Lewis 2005) and the slow pace of 
the development of codes clarifying these partnerships (Plowden 2003) are valid 
criticism, few would disagree that the compacts are perhaps the first process 
establishing an official and sustained dialogue between government and sectors of 
civil society, bringing citizens to decision making that affect business. 
There is, thus, an added complexity to business representation that stems from a 
changing distribution of power within structures with the arrival of new entrants. The 
structure/agency relationship is subsequently analysed from two main angles: whether 
the changes are or are not significant enough to damage business representation and 
whether agency, in form of DIY representation, has been able to maintain the 
legitimacy of business interests as dominant. In cultural economy, there is a clear link 
between the empowerment of financial actors vis-à-vis business actors – it is this 
changing balance that has sent firms into DIY management of investors in the first 
place, thus the gloomier picture for business.  
Political science accounts, however, differ on this. On the one hand, it has been 
found that new actors, particularly civil society represented by NGOs, are a growing 
force within decision making arenas, especially supranational settings such as the 
Bretton Woods institutions and the European Union (Mazey and Richardson 1992; 
Pollack 1997; Walter 2001; Smismans 2006; Broome 2009). On the other, a 
significant number of authors have regarded their entrance as less significant (Grant 
2000; Higgott, Underhill et al. 2000; Ledgerwood and Broadhurst 2000; Grant 
2000b), concluding that large firms have learnt to navigate the maze of the new 
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political hierarchies with its capacity to influence virtually intact (Vogel 1987; Bennet 
1997; Coen 1998; Hart 2007; Hart 2001).  
These divergent results seem to be dependent on the extent to which one considers 
the structural changes impacting power relations in the first place, and this is linked to 
whether the new entrants are deemed to be themselves powerful: while institutional 
investors can wreak havoc by selling shares and resorting to activism, for instance, 
some authors doubt the actual power of civil society in comparison to large 
corporations because of the connections between business’ and states’ well-being. 
Therefore, there seem to be a clearer weakening of managerial power in comparison 
to financial actors than in relation to civil society. This could be an explanation for the 
differences between cultural economy’s and political science’s conclusions. But how 
does one explain the differences within political science? Why are many of the 
political science researchers studying business representation less likely to 
acknowledge the increasing influence of new actors?  
The main point here is that they seem to be working under the assumption that 
giant firms can and do behave solely taking into account their own interests, a bias 
somehow reinforced by the DIY turn and the general weakness of collective action. 
But, in reality, the success of a strategy clearly depends on the strategic position of 
others as well as on their power, as Giddens (1979) points out. The interactions 
among these different actors, particularly on policy making arenas, are a series of 
conflicting situations where solutions are not universally accepted and outcomes are 
not easily predictable precisely because other actors – actors that were not there 
before – will consciously act and exercise their own power.  In fact, the dismissal of 
new entrants on the basis of their perceived power misses the point that it is exactly 
their new legitimacy as players that has changed the nature of the game and prompted 
the need for the coalitions, cooperative and bargaining exercises encouraged by arenas 
such as the European Union. 
A further problem is the unwitting treatment of power as if it was a finite good in 
a zero sum situation: the gains or losses of business should be balanced by the gains 
or losses of other actors. These accounts tend to conclude that either business has 
retained its power, implying that other actors have not gained any, or that the 
empowering of these new actors necessarily means the disempowering of business. 
There is, however, a third alternative: while power is linked to structures and 
reproduces constraints and domination related to a specific arena, it is still very 
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dependent on the agency of actors on every round of the game – the constant 
negotiation alluded by Isaac (1987). This means that power is a combination of more 
and less malleable aspects and, as a consequence of this fluid nature, results are more 
complex than the usual verdicts of powerful or powerless. A whole array of ‘shades of 
grey’ is bound to appear depending on the combination of arenas and actors. 
Not coincidently, part of political science’s work identifying new opportunities to 
private actors other than business comes generally from perspectives in which 
strategies such as discourses are explored (Hajer 1993; McAdam, D. et al. 1996; 
Khagram, Riker et al. 2002; Holzscheiter 2005; Hajer and Laws 2006; Ruzza 2006; 
Susskind 2006; Scharper 2007), shedding light on a mobile and resourceful agency 
rather than on a fixed structure. This is a similar epistemological approach to cultural 
economy’s emphasis on narratives. For these scholars, it is not what constrains actors 
in a particular structure that is of interest but whether and how actors are able to 
overcome these structural biases and influence outcomes through some form of 
agency that, in turn, might trigger structural changes that enhance their influence. This 
takes us to the exploration of how narratives have become central to business 
representation. 
 
1.3 Narratives 
 
In the last section, it was argued that the analysis of the structure/agency 
relationship in business representation focuses on whether structural changes have 
damaged business power and whether agency, in form of DIY representation, which 
also includes the decision to act through collective bodies when suitable, has been 
able to counteract any negative effects. An argument against assumptions about the 
power of new actors – and therefore their relevance as opponents – and the 
questioning of power as an inflexible and finite resource was put forward. It is now 
time to analyse the turn to individual representation not as a mechanism for retrieving 
some lost power but as a way of securing aspects of power accessible to all players.   
The departure point is the overlapping conclusion that agency has become crucial 
for business representation. The next step is to identify the form this agency has taken 
according to each version. At a first glance,  political and economic representation of 
business seem intrinsically different: in cultural economy, it is the exercise of 
managing investors through stories that combine promises and numbers with the aim 
of smoothing expectations; in political science, it is about using material resources to 
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influence the political process. In between these two extremes are the roles performed 
by experts on brand management and public relations.  
The nature of the activity and its objectives are therefore dissimilar: one is a 
proactive and subtle exercise aiming at the creation of connections among actors 
while the other is a reactive exercise responding to crisis (e.g. increasing attacks on 
profitability through heightened taxes or regulations). There is, however, an important 
point: political science identifies two shifts in business representation. The first one,  
marking the beginning of individual representation, is indeed about a reaction to 
environmental changes; the second, which overlaps with the starting point of the 
cultural economy analysis of the 1990s, marks the turn from reactive to proactive 
political representation: from the ad hoc to a strategic approach to business 
representation, as Coen and Willman (1998) have phrased it.  
Therefore, the 1990s was an important moment for business representation. On the 
one hand, legitimacy problems started to haunt the European Union, whose reaction 
was to change its decision making structure to respond to criticism; on the other hand 
there was the emergence of the so-called industrial compact in which managers 
accepted regular communication flows and the shareholder value target as the new 
rules of the game in equity markets. In the UK, the third way of New Labour 
established compacts with the voluntary sector. Once again we return to the key point 
of the last section: the new entrants and the effects of their arrival. This is important 
because, when the focus was on structural shifts, the impression was that there were 
the changes in the arenas that allowed the entry of new players. However, when the 
picture is about the agency of different actors in the 1990s, what one can see is that 
things happened simultaneously, with a new range of players becoming legitimate 
enough to challenge incumbent actors.  
Civil society groups certainly pointed at the lack of legitimacy of the European 
Union as a policy making arena, a claim that in many ways was reinforced by the 
aggressive and growing business lobbying in Brussels – the EU was challenged for 
being not only undemocratic but also dominated by business interests. In the UK, 
even if one subscribes to the co-option motive behind the voluntary sector compacts, 
the very attempt to co-opt reveals the increasing importance of the sector and its 
criticism. Shareholders and particularly institutional investors, on the other hand, were 
actively pushing for more direct control of corporate decisions. In other words, all 
these actors were contesting the role of business in these structures, setting in motion 
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structural changes that have the potential to alter power relations. New rules at 
European level and the creation of regulators like the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) had the effect of institutionalising and, therefore, further legitimising the 
importance of these actors and their interests. This makes explaining away the new 
entrants as powerless even more unconvincing. It is because of their increasing 
influence that they are allowed to enter the official system. 
Central to the agency of these actors has been the challenging of business 
practices. Demands for accountability were suddenly flooding corporations: about 
product market decisions affecting society (with the environmental impact of these 
decisions leading the list), lobbying activities at all levels of the political sphere, 
strategic business planning (how, when, where to invest) and corporate governance. 
After being shielded by a discreet form of representation for more than half a century, 
giant corporations were faced with the need to justify themselves. Making things 
worse, the criticism does not necessarily go in the same direction: not investing in 
Canadian tar sands is the answer environmental groups would like to hear from major 
integrated oil companies but not the right one for analysts worrying about diminishing 
reserves. 
This is the process that Boltanski and Thévenot (1999) describe as a scene, a 
moment that results from actors realising that something is not working well and 
demonstrating discontent. The scene, on the other hand, turns into a “discussion in 
which criticisms, blames and grievances are exchanged”. From this point onwards, 
both sides are under the “imperative of justification” (Ibidem, p.360) and the only way 
out of this impasse is to return to agreement. Attempts to do so, according to 
Boltanski and Thévenot, involve making references to principles of equivalence, 
something that is mutually understood and, therefore, susceptible to calculations and 
comparisons. These ideas are at the core of the main point of this thesis, further 
developed in the next section: stories are the vehicle through which corporations 
justify and negotiate their interests in public spheres. 
 
1.4 Stories in business representation 
 
Communication among actors is thus central to both demonstrating discontent and 
returning to agreement. In business representation, this is made through stories. The 
term is used here in the same way of Walter Fisher’s (1987) narrative paradigm. For 
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him, human communication is a storytelling process and man (homo narrans) is a 
storytelling animal at heart. Unlike authors such as Bruner (1986), who believe story 
and argument make two different modes of cognitive functioning irreducible to one 
another, Fisher reasons that argument is actually contained within narration. In this 
rhetorical logic, arguments are tested for coherence and fidelity: the former is about 
determining if a story ‘holds together’ and makes sense for us (credibility); the latter 
regards whether the story matches our beliefs and experiences (soundness). “No 
matter how strictly a case is argued – scientifically, philosophically, or legally – it will 
always be a story, an interpretation of some aspect of the world that is historically and 
culturally grounded and shaped by human personality”(Fisher 1987, p.49). 
Therefore, his model challenges the traditional rational-world paradigm as an 
ontology that assumes traditional logic is the only acceptable form of discourse, 
excluding narratives that espouse a different set of values by placing “experts, skilled 
and logic as the sole progenitors of analytical knowledge” (Hanan 2008, p.4). For 
Fisher, reasoning is not a ‘mirror of truth’ but “rationality is determined by the nature 
of persons as narrative beings – their inherent awareness of narrative probability, what 
constitutes a coherent story and their constant habit of testing narrative fidelity, 
whether or not the stories they experience ring true with the stories they know to be 
true in their lives” (Fisher 1987, p.5). This idea that there are values behind reason 
resonate with Boltanski and Thévenot’s argument that actors inhabiting different 
worlds, in which particular ‘concepts of worth’ or logic applies, will draw on their 
experience to construct justifications based on a ‘worth’ that they believe can 
command respect. However, because people appeal to different principles 
(hierarchically superior in their world) while trying to legitimise their views, conflicts 
are inevitable. Hence, there is need for principles of equivalence to settle the matter.  
In business representation, stories are a conscious attempt to reach actors 
inhabiting different ‘worlds’ and with different rationalities and interests by clarifying 
and highlighting overlapping issues and interests. In this sense, expectations of 
investors are important to the building of a corporation ‘performance’ story line in the 
same way that expectations of civil society regarding corporate social behaviour are 
taken into consideration when a giant oil firm defines itself as ‘beyond petroleum’. In 
policy making, stories connect with the goals of legislators but also with the 
arguments of other actors taking part in the dispute with stories that espouse different 
principles or values.   
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The mass media also plays an important role in this process of storytelling. Firstly, 
it was not until the establishment of a global media that civil society was able to 
advocate its claims to a wider audience (Berry 1999; Berry and Wilcox 2008). The 
connection between environmental damage in the North Pole, or giant firms’ 
involvement in human rights issues in remote parts of Africa have only become 
visible after the media has taken on the task of publicising them in the early 1990s. 
Even after their establishment as credible storytellers, NGOs such as Greenpeace, 
WWF, Friends of Earth and Amnesty International routinely rely on the media to get 
their main points across. This makes the media an important channel through which 
claims and counter claims, the “criticisms, blames and grievances” alluded by 
Boltanski and Thévenot (1999), are exchanged. In the equity markets, the entrance of 
new actors and the media are also intertwined because the importance of information 
for the functioning of the perfect market (i.e. regular communication flows between 
corporations and investors) is one of the main forces propelling finance journalism. 
The result is the everyday public dissection of previously private issues like strategic 
moves, executive pay and failed targets. 
This has at least two major implications: firstly, it means disputes generally occur 
in the public eye and, as a consequence, there is very little room for an actor to forgo a 
response or justification when challenged without worsening the problem. Secondly, 
it turns the media not only into co-authors, with particular problems and consequences 
examined by Froud et al. (2006) and Davis (2002) but also into an arena in itself, as 
media coverage has the potential to engage actors that would not be involved 
otherwise. In other words, media vehicles are not neutral conduits of information 
between sources and audiences but actors that provide an interpretation of the story 
and an arena that brings together a particular audience whose agency or inertia can 
become central to outcomes.   
What can be seen here is a very clear correlation between agency of the new 
actors and the form the business response took: after being publicly criticised, 
business was forced to justify its decisions and practices through stories that address 
these claims, at the same time that it tries to avoid future criticism by proactively 
constructing stories that respond to and/or engage with actors’ expectations and 
interests, seeking converging points. The media is directly involved in part of this 
process but assuming that this strategy is confined to highly mediated interactions 
would ignore the fact that encouraging cooperation among players and the 
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identification of converging points of view is exactly what lies at the heart of the 
changes in arenas such as the European Union. Alliances, ad hoc or otherwise, do not 
exist without overlapping interests and shared justification of the reasons why a 
particular policy making decision should or should not be taken.  
Communication is thus the basis of the bargaining process that eventually builds 
consensus. In repeated policy making situations, cooperation and coordination among 
actors is not merely an institutional requirement but a crucial step to avoid inferior 
outcomes. Moreover, the act of justifying interests is particularly valuable for firms 
because it provides a much needed legitimacy:  proving the validity of a claim or 
demonstrating common interests that unite different actors, as Beetham (1991) argues, 
are useful for offsetting negative features of power relations. This is central because 
part of the problem that led to the entry of civil society in policy making mechanisms 
was business being perceived as excessively powerful vis-à-vis other actors. Stories 
are both a strategy to respond to criticism and a legitimising tool.  
In sum, both cultural economy and political science accounts of how business 
representation has evolved in the last three decades reveal new strategies, shifting and 
malleable power patterns and increasingly unpredictable results. Cultural economy, 
while looking at the changes in capitalism itself, exposes the cultural processes 
underlying the functioning of markets and the importance of narratives in creating a 
“feedback loop” that allows capitalism to “keep a step ahead of its own 
contradictions”, as Thrift (2005) phrased it. This reflexivity, however, is also clearly 
mirrored in capitalism’s governance structures described and analysed by political 
science: these arenas have moved slowly but surely towards a series of practices in 
which the input of a wide range of stakeholders is sought after and the structures 
themselves eventually change in response to it, in a bid to keep their own relevance 
and legitimacy.       
It is in the circle-circle intersection shared by these two scholarships – the 
reflexivity which, acknowledged or not, is a key part of both accounts – that the main 
claim of this work is constructed: this bidirectional process is to a substantial extent 
driven by narratives, understood here as a strategic tool deployed by actors interacting 
in these public spheres. Stories are, in short, cultural constructs designed to have a 
political and economic effect. While this is true for a variety of actors and interests, 
with part of the existing literature already exploring the importance of narratives for 
actors such as national states and NGOs, the focus on business, particularly giant 
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corporations, is justified by its role as a core capitalist player involved in both 
governance arenas and financial markets. 
The hybrid framework presented here, therefore, clearly recognises the importance 
of ideas and discourses in framing/influencing capitalism and the behaviour of its key 
actors but, at the same time, takes into consideration the relationship between 
structures and the various strategies (and their links with stories) that are chosen by 
different players at micro and meso levels. These ideas are in line with the so-called 
critical realism approach of considering structures as strategically selective, that is, 
favouring certain actions over others (Hay 1995; Hay 2002; McAnnula 2002) and, to 
some extent, relates to the morphogenetic approach of Margaret Archer (1995), in 
which the cultural is placed alongside structure and agency, but without conflation. It 
contends that capitalism, and its institutions, are engulfed in cultural practices that can 
be strategically used by different actors to alter these very structures to their 
advantage.  
As documented by both sets of literature, this engagement of large firms with new 
external actors has been a gradual process triggered by a public criticism, often 
channelled by the mass media, of their practices and privileged position within 
Western democratic settings. Business institutional response was, in fact, the creation 
of departments such as government affairs and investor relations whose main job is to 
deliver strategic information to different stakeholders. In other words, these are the 
corporate solution to a relentless “imperative of justification” (Boltanski and 
Thévenot 1999), to the growing need to interact with competing narratives that 
challenge interests and practices whose legitimacy, until recently, was taken for 
granted by business. 
This public negotiation, I argue, is made through stories that attempt to reach out 
to actors with different rationalities and interests, seeking an engagement able to 
identify and clarify overlapping issues. By acknowledging and reflecting on other 
actors’ expectations and demands, business stories can help corporations to project 
accountability and social worth often lost in advertising and traditional forms of  
lobbying. A desirable side effect of this negotiation process is the added legitimacy 
acquired by claims/demands that are seen as a result of public scrutiny and debate 
among different and often antagonistic interests. In a nutshell, stories help business 
representation by facilitating not only the achievement of immediate goals and 
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creating the basis for future cooperation but also enhancing its legitimacy as a central 
actor in democratic and capitalist societies. 
This is not to say that business power is reduced to business stories or that 
narratives can always be causally linked to outcomes. A particularly relevant issue is 
the fact that building successful narratives seems to be a particularly difficult art for 
business to master and in every round of negotiation, both in policy making and stock 
markets, some narratives are clearly more able than others to fulfil their primary 
function. This takes us to a central question of this thesis: why some business stories 
are effective when others come across as weak, and to what extent an actor can 
achieve desirable results through stories.  
Answering these questions clearly requires solid empirical evidence and a 
methodology that takes into consideration the ontological and epistemological 
positions adopted here. A discussion about these three factors – how the world works, 
how we should study it and the best instruments for doing the job – will be conducted 
in the second part of the chapter, together with a description of the plans for the 
empirical work. 
 
2. Methodology 
 
This chapter has so far attempted to highlight differences and similarities 
between perspectives on business representation presented by political science and 
cultural economy by looking at their understanding of the interplay between structure 
and agency as portrayed in the first two chapters of this thesis. This was necessary, it 
was argued at the beginning, because together these two different accounts about the 
changes in business representation in the last three decades provide us with a more 
‘holistic’ explanation about its present form. But highlighting, and to some extent 
challenging, these scholarly ideas about the relationship between structures and 
agency has a further purpose: it not only tries to reveal some of the implicit 
assumptions these authors have about the nature of the world and how we should 
study it – their ontological and epistemological positions – but also reveals my views 
about the nature of the world and how it should be studied. This, in turn, is 
appropriate because it has a direct impact on the research questions stemming from 
the literature reviews, and on the methodology chosen to address them (Hay 2006), a 
central issue addressed by the following sections. 
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Part of the recurrent criticism outlined in the first part of this chapter has been 
about a tendency toward a mild structuralism: business power is maintained because it 
is intrinsically linked to a powerful structure that works to constrain other actors. It 
does not, however, recognise as easily the set of opportunities that may exist within 
the structural settings for other actors. Cultural economy and political science writers 
such as ‘light’ constructivists or neo-Gramscians, on the other hand, point out the 
structural constraints that have the effect of privileging some actors over others but do 
not see them as necessarily ‘predetermining’ outcomes, hence the active stance of 
actors in trying, and succeeding as well as failing, to manage expectations. In other 
words, there seems to be an implicit recognition (i.e. an ontological position), 
something that is shared by this work, that structures both constrain and enable actors. 
The relationship is dialectical and agency is strategically focused: here, focused 
around narratives.  
Epistemologically, this thesis is placed in between positivist and interpretivist 
traditions (Marsh and Furlong 2002): it agrees with the latter on the existence of real 
processes and the possibility of causal statements but does not contend that all social 
phenomena can be directly, and neutrally, observed and that general and 
unchangeable laws governing them can be drawn; it is influenced by the former 
inasmuch as it recognises the importance of ideas and discourses and the subjectivity 
of the observer but rejects its heavy relativism and nihilisms.  
   Another point of disagreement concerned the conceptualisation of power, 
which is again an ontological position. The framing of power in mainly structural 
terms is partly what reinforces constraints and diminishes the scope for agency and 
change. Power, it was argued, is obviously related to institutional context and, 
therefore, has structural characteristics, but it is not trapped within those structures. At 
the core of the critique is the idea that understanding power as simple and quantifiable 
misses its complexity and ubiquity.  The very framing of power as related to agenda-
setting and preference shaping – characteristics pertinent to the second and third 
‘faces’ – suggests that non-structural issues play a role which is a direct result of 
agency and, even if structures can bias outcomes, there is still scope for variation.  
By looking at business representation in this light, what one sees are the 
multiple governance and economic structures in which actors interact. These 
structures may be biased towards certain actors but there are also enabling features to 
all players. Narratives about the nature of these structures, their aims and functioning 
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are relevant, as well as narratives used by actors to make their claims and explain 
demands. An increasingly important strategy seems to be the use of narratives in 
situations happening with or without media spotlight, something that is corroborated 
by the growth of in-house government affairs and investor relations departments. As 
the effects of a specific intervention are not, as Hay (2002, p.211) points out, merely 
“determined by the structure of the context at the moment at which the action occurs” 
but depend on a range of factors, including the action of others and unintended 
consequences, the line dividing success and failure in story telling is a fine one. This 
leads to two main questions: first, why some stories succeed and some don’t and, 
second, whether and how agency is able to overcome structural biases. 
These questions, however, are not aiming at finding a solution to structure and 
agency problems but, rather, trying to grasp and explain complex phenomena. As 
there is an ontological rejection of the positivistic idea of rational individuals with 
complete information leading to general laws, the outcomes of the interaction among 
actors and structures in this work is considered to be contingent, unpredictable and 
uncertain. These assumptions, in turn, are reflected directly in methodological 
choices: qualitative methods emphasising processes and meanings are clearly more 
appropriate than methods of measurement of quantities and frequency. Within the 
boundaries of qualitative methods, the case study, with its goal of obtaining a 
comprehensive understanding/explanation of particular events, can provide an 
appropriate framework. The next section looks at the merits and problems of 
qualitative case studies and outlines the empirical work. 
 
2.1 A case for case studies 
 
Robert Yin argues that the need for case studies arises “whenever an empirical 
inquiry must examine a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context, especially 
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (1981, 
p.98). This is more likely to happen when the questions asked about a contemporary 
set of phenomena are a how or why (Yin 1994, p.9). But while Yin calls the case 
study inquiry “an all-encompassing method”, Stake (2000) argues that case studies are 
not in themselves a methodological choice but a choice of what is to be studied, with 
emphasis on what can be learned about that event. The latter is a more convincing 
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argument and also better equipped to deal with a recurrent criticism of case studies as 
a research strategy: their supposed limited capacity for theory building.  
This is, however, a criticism that is also very often found at the centre of the 
debate about quantitative versus qualitative methods, reflecting again ontological and 
epistemological divergences. The problem thus is not case studies per se but what a 
researcher believes can be found out there and how one can know about it. If one does 
not believe in-depth interviews are a ‘scientific’ way of building theory, it is the fact 
that a piece of research is built around in-depth interviews and not the fact that it is a 
case study that is the problem. In many ways, it is seems to reflect a bigger battle 
between ‘natural’ and ‘social’ sciences and their perceived merit as scientific 
disciplines: a medical doctor studying diabetic children and eating habits, for instance, 
may not hesitate in calling his/her work a case study but a social scientist doing in fact 
case studies may chose to call it a “fieldwork” (Simons 1980) to avoid stereotyped 
criticism.  
The point about the difficulties of generalising from a single study, however, 
is more problematic and a way to respond to it may be by distinguishing between 
different types of case studies. Yin (1994) divides them broadly into exploratory and 
explanatory, with the latter more suitable for theory building and generalisation. Stake 
(2000, p.445-447) identifies three types of case studies: intrinsic, where the study is 
undertaken to achieve a better understanding of the case itself; instrumental, where a 
case is thought to provide insight into an issue; and multiple or collective case studies, 
chosen because the researcher believes that understanding them will lead to a better 
understanding and theorising about a still larger number of cases. While the intrinsic 
case may arguably fall into the exploratory category, both instrumental and multiple 
case studies seem to aim at explanation, theorisation and generalisation. 
In this work, the motivation behind the choice of case studies is perhaps a 
hybrid between the perceived outcomes of the second and the third types. As the 
question is about why some business narratives are successful while others fail, the 
use of a particular episode is not about understanding what the episode is about, even 
though this may be important, but about understanding a particular process – the 
building and use of narratives – within that context. Choosing only one case, however, 
would not be completely satisfactory. If the ultimate aim is to understand/explain the 
effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of narratives, and power is understood as 
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dependent on a combination of arenas and actors, a satisfactory degree of 
generalisation can only be achieved if a variety of situations and results are analysed.   
Part of the differentiation between the case studies described above can be 
related to methodological choices, given that a case study is a research structure rather 
than a method and, therefore, can contain qualitative, quantitative or mixed methods. 
As mentioned before, the choice of qualitative methodology here is linked to its better 
suitability to address the research questions (1988, p.108-109). Sending a postal 
questionnaire or conducting a survey could help me pinpoint how many corporations 
have in-house departments in charge of government, media or investors relations and 
even whether they consider ‘stories’ as an important part of their strategy, but it would 
not help me very much to understand why stories succeeded or failed in the particular 
case studies or, going beyond, why they do so in general terms. For this purpose, two 
complementary methods were deemed appropriate: analysis of documentary sources 
and open-ended elite interviews.  
The main source of data for this thesis is found in publicly available 
documents in form of government and special reports, letters, minutes of meetings, 
policy and legal documents, and analysts and newspaper articles. Careful research on 
these primary and secondary documents has a double purpose: firstly, it is crucial to 
establish ‘facts’ and provide specific details of the particular events; secondly, looking 
at the parts of the puzzle separately gives insight not only about stories specific actors 
are telling but how these stories have been incorporated into the final narrative. The 
scrutiny of what is being called secondary sources here – mainly the work of 
journalists and financial analysts – is particularly interesting and important because 
their interpretation of primary sources is itself part of the process of constructing 
stories.  
Relying on publicly available sources is, foremost, a response to the practical 
impossibility of, single-handed, gathering/producing relevant original data to recreate 
complex cases of corporate representation. In this particular inquiry, the problem of 
unwitting evidence and the natural bias of the sources (Finnegan 1996, p.143-146) is 
minimized by the fact that these partial views, regarding what is stressed and omitted 
and the ‘catering’ for specific audiences, are part and parcel of the construction of 
particular stories and thus, should be present, acknowledged and analysed. This is also 
relevant in relation to the unavoidable and important issue of the absence and/or 
conflation of some voices. The term civil society, for instance, is frequently used but 
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it does not relate to a representative sample of the population but to a handful of 
NGOs and associations who actively interact in these economic and political arenas 
and claim to speak for patients, the environmental conscious and animal lovers; in 
trade associations, the dominance of big business renders stories less nuanced and 
conflicted than they would be if small and medium sized firms were active co-authors. 
These ‘facts’ have to be made explicit but, when properly acknowledged, are of 
significance per se, since the very presence or absence of actors and views may 
contribute to the success or failure of a story.   
Attempts to address some of the issues, particularly the generation of 
distinctive and original data and to include some of the voices absent in documentary 
form, are made through the use of a set of 14 interviews with actors inhabiting the 
arenas where corporations need to represent themselves. Because of the nature of the 
research questions, open ended elite interviews are more appropriate than structured 
questions and surveys, as the aim is to “understand complex behaviour of members of 
society without imposing any a priori categorization that may limit the field of 
inquiry” rather than “capturing precise data of a codable nature so as to explain 
behaviour within pre-established categories” (Fontana and Frey 2005, p.706). Unlike 
structured interviews, open ended approaches allow interviewees to express their 
ideas and beliefs more freely, minimizing the so-called procedure reflectivity. 
It must be noted, however, that while interviews are a very useful way of 
corroborating suppositions, checking facts and acquiring important and original 
information – to an extent that Yin considers that interviewees may work as 
“informants rather than a respondent” (Yin 1994, p.84-86) – the subjectivity problem 
is strong here, as interviews involve personal and social interaction. This, in turn, has 
an impact on reliability, as the chances of other researchers being able to obtain the 
same results using the same methods are lower than in structured interviews (Wilson 
1996, p.119).  
Nevertheless, given the kind of problem being addressed in this work – why 
some stories are successful and others fail – asking actors involved in the construction 
and/or consumption of these narratives to speak freely about their perceptions and 
opinions is a valid approach and, by triangulating these interviews insights with 
document sources, a better and reliable understanding of stories as tools of 
representation should be achieved. Interviewees should be chosen on the basis of their 
direct participation in the episodes under analysis or their previous experience as part 
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of the particular process or arena in which the dispute takes place. Interviews should, 
when possible, be face-to-face and recorded, but telephone interviews are also 
acceptable.  
The next section will detail the case studies proposed for the second part of the 
thesis and explain the choices.   
 
2.2 The selected cases 
 
A set of three case studies was chosen to address the research questions: the 
making of the European chemical legislation called Registration, Evaluation, 
Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH); the process of approval of 
Roche’s breast cancer drug Herceptin in Britain; and Shell’s restatement of its proven 
oil reserves to investors and regulators. They were considered particularly suitable for 
two reasons: firstly, they are all contemporary phenomena, having occurred in the 
2000s, with one still ongoing; secondly, they are set in different institutional 
structures, with a distinct mixture of interests, actors and tactics; finally, they display 
dissimilar outcomes. Each of these points will be briefly discussed. 
Their recent time frame is of importance because, as it was argued in this 
chapter, the 1990s have witnessed a change in business representation towards a more 
reflexive and ‘cultural’ exercise: firstly, it was the moment of the turn from a reactive 
to a proactive approach; secondly, it marked the rise of an active and mediated civil 
society and the establishment of a ‘shareholder value’ ideology; thirdly, it was the 
moment in which different governance spaces started to gain recognition and power 
themselves. Therefore, cases happening before or very early in the 1990s would not 
have exhibited the same dynamics among actors and documented sources about 
interactions involving newcomers would not have been easily available. The fact that 
the cases are happening simultaneously (2002-2006), as well as the inclusion of an 
ongoing case, also allow for some comparison of modus operandi of actors or groups 
of actors and for analysis of the extent to which there is learning and strategic 
adaptation.  
The chosen time frame also permits better scrutiny of new arenas, from the 
increasingly important supranational governance mechanism of the European Union 
to late 1990s creation of bodies such as the National Institute for Clinical Excellence 
and the FSA.  Giving the central concern of this work with the interplay between 
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actors and structures and whether and how the latter enables or constrains players, 
cases staged on or around these new arenas,  displaying very different institutional 
structures, are essential for the probing possibly distinct ‘distributions’ of power and 
the role stories play in representing interests and, ultimately, negotiating power. 
The diversity of arenas is linked to another desirable feature: a mixture of 
actors, interests and, therefore, stories. When different sets of actors are positioned 
together and ‘against’ each other, complexity reaches high levels but, while this poses 
problems to the researcher trying to make sense of it, it surely provides a rich picture 
of how actors are able (or not) to build consensus, and convincing stories to go with it. 
On the other hand, the effects of other actors’ moves and unintended consequences 
are more easily identified in cases where there are fewer protagonists. A combination 
of case studies involving large and small number of players would be ideal to probe 
whether agency can overcome structural biases and the role of stories.  
A final desirable feature is the display of different results: winners, losers and 
inconclusive outcomes. As the interest here is to understand what make stories 
powerful and weak, the selection of cases in which there was a clear winner or a clear 
loser should provides ground for comparison and the identification of  some of the 
‘common traits’ of successful and unsuccessful stories that, in turn, can help in the 
analysis of the less clear-cut episodes.  
Another way of structuring this research would be using cases that take place 
in the same arena – for instance, the European Union – and involve the same actors 
over a period of time. The advantage would arguably be a higher replication factor 
and a more ‘like for like’ type of comparison, that in turn could lead to a deeper 
understanding of why stories are strong or weak in this particular setting. The reasons 
this was not deemed the best approach are two. Firstly, same arena and same actors 
can be a deceiving supposition, as different departments of an organisation (e.g. DG 
Environment or Enterprise in the European Commission) have different 
relationships/biases regarding ‘external’ players (i.e. different structural relations of 
power) and even if actors, broadly defined, are the same (e.g. oil multinationals, trade 
unions and environmental NGOs) their policy interests vary from case to case and the 
opportunities for consensus or disagreement will vary accordingly. But even if the 
exact same actors were trying to represent themselves in the same policy area with 
similar requests, learning and adaptation would certainly take place, meaning 
subsequent episodes were not likely to be similar to the first one.  
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This is related to the second objection, which is the assumption of a law or 
logic waiting to be discovered. As argued before in this chapter, the aims of this work 
are not finding rules or recipes regarding story telling in business representation – 
something that corporate communications gurus may pitch to their clients – but  
trying to understand and explain the complex ways in which a successful story is built 
and power negotiated. This is not to say that underlying and identifiable 
characteristics that make stories more likely to succeed are impossible to pinpoint – at 
the end of the day, this quest is implicit in the research question – but that these 
underlying and identifiable characteristics should be common to the art of building 
stories in complex settings, be it the European Union, the World Trade Organisation 
or Whitehall. In other words, instead of the idea of ‘all things being equal, there are 
rules’, this thesis is trying to argue that ‘all things being different, there are stories’. 
Stories are taken here as a common currency through which actors are being able to 
trade. Not every transaction will be the same, the value of the currency may vary from 
place to place and from time to time, but there are factors that make a currency to be 
perceived as strong or weak (e.g. inflation rates, level of taxes payable in that 
currency etc). Both with real currencies and stories, these ‘factors’ are very much 
dependent on subjective perceptions and shared principles.  
Therefore, a multi-case research design comprising different episodes, united 
by a hypothesis about the importance of stories, was considered to be the best option. 
A second step was to define criteria regarding the business actors that should be 
involved in the cases.  Firstly, two preferred industries were chosen: oil and 
pharmaceuticals. The reason for including corporations from these sectors is simple: if 
it is true that multinationals like the Swiss Nestle or American Nike have encountered 
problems to manage their image in the past years, some industries have had 
systematic problems with their representation. Oil and pharmaceuticals have been 
struggling to come clean from a series of oil spillages, human rights violations and 
workplace safety issues, in the case of the former, and drug prices and product safety 
in the case of the latter. These are directly related to two points raised before in this 
chapter: the entrance of an organised civil society and its mediated action.  
New York-based Harris Interactive, a market research company probing the 
reputation of 20 different industries with consumers since 1997, has found the 
pharmaceutical industry to be “the most volatile of any industry” - by 2004, it had 
gone from a net positive rating of 60 percent in 1997 to a net negative score of 4%. In 
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2006, time of the selection of the cases, pharma had recovered to 25% (just to 
plummet again in 2008) but the oil industry was at the bottom at the list with a 
negative score of 36%, where it still remains. Even when the judges are more 
specialised, such as in the Fortune ranking of the World’s Most Admired Companies 
voted by businesspeople, only Johnson and Johnson is included in the top 20 from 
2006 to 2008, with Exxon Mobil reaching the 18th place in its best year, 2007. This 
contrasts with the position of oil companies in the same magazine when the ranking is 
about size: Exxon Mobil, Royal Dutch Shell and BP are top five.  
Give their size and reputation, these corporations are not only more likely to 
have established strong in-house communications teams but also more likely to be 
involved in less friendly public relations and policy making battles in national, 
supranational and global arenas. The desirability of different arenas, as discussed 
above, has also influenced the sampling. The unequivocal importance of the European 
Union as a legal jurisdiction and its prioritisation of consensus building as a basis for 
policy making put the European Commission/Parliament in the list. The importance of 
national politics, however, could not be ignored, inasmuch as many of the decisions 
that directly impact corporations, such as legislation, macro economic management of 
national markets and public purchases, are still in the hands of national governments. 
A case study featuring national governments and the decision making processes they 
put in place was consequently in order. The role of the stock market under the Anglo-
American financialised capitalism, coupled with Froud et al.’s evidence of story 
telling as a management tool, on the other hand, called for a case involving 
corporations and their representation for the financial market.  
The institutional characteristics of each one of the arenas, in turn, would 
influence the number and types of actors involved in the cases, as well as their power 
to influence the debates. The search for the most interesting case in the supranational 
arena, for instance, determined the inclusion of a third sector, the chemical industry, 
which has not as bad a reputation as oil and pharmaceuticals but it is also a frequent 
target for environmental NGOs, arguably the strongest and best organised among civil 
society groups. REACH, for its impact on trade to and from Europe, has also attracted 
a number of actors from industries and governments around the globe. This is by far 
the most complex of the case studies due to the great number of actors interacting, the 
very technical nature of the legislation and its long duration, with final policy details 
still ongoing.  
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The Herceptin case, albeit played at a national stage by local actors such as the 
British government and its National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 
(NICE), pressure groups and other members of British civil society, indirectly 
involved the European Medicines Agency. It involved particular and increasingly 
influential members of the British voluntary sector, scientists and tabloid journalists, 
with very little visible interference of Roche, the Swiss giant producing the drug in 
question. The Shell case, a financial market crisis, is the most restricted of the cases 
not because there were fewer actors involved, since it attracted a variety of political 
actors who, in normal circumstances, are mere watchful spectators, but because the 
story was being constructed by a handful of actors. British investors and journalists 
were at the ‘discursive’ centre of this case.   
Another selection criterion was media coverage. This is because, despite the 
very instrumental reason that media coverage helps the research process in itself by 
providing documentation, the media, as mentioned in the first part of the chapter, has 
been a crucial part of the mechanism of exposure of giant firms, working as an actor 
and arena that brings on board particular actors. The sample of case studies seem 
adequate on this basis because the media exposure is different in each of them, 
something that may allow interesting insights into its impact on outcomes: Herceptin 
is a highly mediated affair, with hundreds of articles in mainstream papers and 
tabloids; Shell also had ample coverage but mainly on financial pages; REACH, on 
the other hand, is virtually unknown to most part of the European population despite 
its impact on citizen’s daily lives. 
 
2.3 Collection, selection and analysis of data 
 
Having discussed the methodological choices and described the case studies, 
this section offers further details about the process of collecting, selecting and 
analysing the primary and secondary data that provided evidence for this thesis.  
Given the very diverse nature of the empirical work delineated above, the 
combination of primary and secondary documents was different in each of the case 
studies. REACH, as a law making process, displayed a large amount of official 
documentation covering the whole period in question, both from European Union 
institutions (Commission, Council and Parliament) and other societal interests 
involved in the process. Media accounts were insightful but played a smaller and 
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more peripheral role in helping to recreate the episodes and identify actors’ narratives. 
In contrast, Shell and Herceptin were highly mediated stories, with financial 
broadsheet taking the lead in the former and tabloids dominating in the latter case. 
Primary documents for these case studies were circumscribed to press releases 
disseminated by the corporations involved and reports, mainly written by external 
actors such as auditors, academic researchers and regulators. Triangulation among 
sources was aided by interviews.  
The first step aimed at tracing the history of the cases in chronological order. 
In REACH, this process started with the download of 15 key documents created by 
the European Commission, Council and Parliament from 1998 to 2006, as well as 24 
brief reports about stakeholders’ meetings and the discussions taking place inside the 
Environment and Competitiveness Councils (within the Council of Europe). An 
electronic search using key words such as chemical legislation and REACH was 
conducted with the help of business information database Factiva for the whole period 
including financial and non-financial British media and international agencies such as 
Reuters and Dow Jones Newswires. Together these sources helped to clarify events 
and identify the most relevant stakeholders and their claims.  
Once the main players were acknowledged, documents and reports produced 
by these actors were collected, including their direct comments on the legislation 
received by the Commission through an internet submission (further 10 documents, 
including states’ position). In the case of major players, like CEFIC and the Health 
and Environment Alliance, every press release related to the legislation available in 
their website was retrieved and some led to a further search in media databases to 
explore particular (and usually controversial) episodes that were not captured by the 
previous key words. Because of the complexity of the policy making procedures at 
EU level and of the legislation itself, this case had the largest number of interviewees 
who were able to correct/add to factual descriptions and provide insider information 
about the tensions between different groups. A missing voice in the interview set was 
the animal rights movement, to which I could not obtain access in Brussels, but part 
of the problem was solved with the use of press releases and all the material posted on 
the website hosting the ‘Harmful if Swallowed’ campaign. 
In Herceptin, the selection of the relevant material was complex, as the media 
coverage was extensive and hundreds of hits were obtained from the key words 
Herceptin, NICE and Roche in Factiva. This was complicated by the fact that 
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‘official’ sources such as NICE’s records offered minimal information about the 
public furore around the drug, even though some of the key dates could be found by 
accessing public speeches and press releases in the websites of the Department of 
Health and Roche. A general rule was to discard articles shorter than an A4 page and 
‘follow up’ pieces that were mostly a copy and paste version of previous articles. 
When time line and main interlocutors were established, a search with new key words 
(e.g. CancerBACUP, postcode lottery, Patricia Hewitt) was conducted, allowing a 
better understanding of particular episodes and stories. The use or not of individual 
patient cases was also of interest. A similar process was followed during the research 
for Shell, since key words like reserves and Shell generated a very large amount of 
hits. Differently from Herceptin, however, all key dates were in Shell’s website and 
analyst reports offered a good source of factual information about the different 
shareholders’ meetings. Once actors such as Eric Knight and institutions like the 
Association of British Insurers or CalPERS were identify as central to the episode, 
database searches using them as key words were conducted, adding depth and detail 
to particular points of the process. Unlike REACH, in which interviewees had all been 
involved in the episode in question, Herceptin and Shell interviewees were insiders 
and familiar with the processes of drug appraisal and the functioning of the stock 
market (including a Shell former communication executive) but none was directly 
involved in the episodes. In an ideal scenario, a Shell employee and a member of the 
appraisal committee for Herceptin in NICE would also have been interviewed but 
problems with access and time constraints triggered a change of plans. The initial 
intention to interview journalists was abandoned after concerns were raised (including 
by the funding body) about involving the media, particularly tabloid media, in the 
research. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter was designed to function as a bridge in two ways: on the one 
hand, it is the link between the first part of the thesis, the theoretical perspectives that 
inspired the research questions, and the plans for the empirical work that will inform 
the rest of it; on the other hand, it is an attempt to reconcile the two quite distinct 
approaches to business representation delineated by cultural economy and political 
science. Through a meta-analysis of the structure/agency relationship portrayed by 
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these two scholarly approaches, this chapter has attempted to build a new analytical 
framework in which new actors and stories play an important role, questioning 
notions of power as an static and finite good.  The proposal here is that stories bring 
actors and structures together because they are a crucial part of the process of 
negotiating power in public spheres, an exercise that leads to the legitimacy of private 
interests.  
This argument implies ontological and epistemological positions in which 
power relations depend on social interactions and, even though power and social 
structures are linked, the latter is not immutable, leading to changes in the former. 
Structures both constrain and enable agency, meaning outcomes are not determined 
but dependent on a range of factors that rule out conventional notions of predictability 
and general laws. These complex, contingent and uncertain relationships are better 
understood by qualitative research to be conducted under the framework of multiple 
case studies in which business’ representation through stories has been met with 
different degrees of success, allowing for some degree of generalisation and theory 
building.  
The second half of the thesis is dedicated to empirical work, where the 
framework proposed and issues raised here will be further developed. The starting 
point will be the case of REACH, the European legislation. 
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Chapter IV: Diluting REACH: influencing governance at 
supranational level 
 
 
Introduction  
 
This first empirical chapter focuses on the most multifaceted of the cases 
examined in this thesis: the making of the new European chemical legislation, an 
eight-year process of deliberation stretching from the first requirements for changes in 
the old laws by member countries, in March 1998, up to the adoption of the new 
legislation by the Environment Council on the 18th of December 2006. In addition to 
the complexity of the subject matter, the number of actors involved espousing 
different and conflicting interests and the interconnected and institutionally specific 
policy making procedures in Brussels compose a challenging but rich ground for 
examining the value of stories for business representation and the characteristics that 
give these narratives leverage. 
The importance of the law entitled Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and 
Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) is unequivocal: it is directed at one of the world’s 
largest industries in which European players hold 35% of the share of global sales; it 
is the first major environmental regulation happening after a string of environmental 
victories of the Parliament over the Council of Europe and co-decision procedures had 
been considerably extended to other areas; it is one of the heaviest lobbying efforts 
ever seen at EU level, triggering the unprecedented and probably boldest American 
intervention in European affairs to date; it is still hotly debated and lobbied in its 
current implementation phase; both anti and pro REACH sides claim partial victory. 
From this quick overview it is possible to see the contours of a main issue raised in 
chapter III: complex and fast moving social relations, with actors influenced by and 
influencing institutional structures.  
Assessing the role of narratives and their effectiveness, therefore, calls for the 
identification and examination of actors and structures and the points of intersection 
of these axes. The main focus here will be the new entrants, recognised before as one 
of the reasons leading corporations to resort to different strategies for their 
representation – who they are, how they are organised and how much ‘access’ they 
seem to have are all relevant points. The incumbents, affected by the increasing 
competition for influence, are also important, particularly if one considers that players 
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in the case of REACH include countries like the United States. The same exercise has 
to be done in relation to structures that, in case of the European Union, raise questions 
not only about how they might allow and constrain agency but also whether and how 
their multiple institutional as well as geographical levels may influence decisions 
about lobbying and outcomes. How can actors explore these particularities? To what 
extent possible infighting and institutional rivalry can offer opportunities to particular 
actors?  
With these considerations in mind, we move on to issues related to 
interactions between actors and structures: strategies, stories, context and media 
coverage. Are lobbying tactics of a more traditional sort, such as time delaying, 
revolving doors, educational programmes for MEPs and journalists, or more recent 
moves such as forming ad hoc alliances and firm led coordination, used differently by 
players, with particular groups more likely to resort to them than others? Is the choice 
related to financial power? Or is it linked to the stage of the process? What are the 
synergies between these strategies and the stories that are being told? This is clearly a 
natural link to the stories themselves. What kinds of stories are being constructed by 
particular actors? To whom do they seem to be directed, what kind of justification 
they provide, in which moment of the process they are released and why? Both stories 
and strategies are also going to be examined here with relation to outcomes, including 
considerations about intended and unintended consequences.  
The analysis of strategies and stories, on the other hand, unearths further 
topics that will be considered here side by side because of their close symbiosis: 
context and media. What is the importance of the wider political and economic 
context to the effectiveness of strategies and stories? In other words, how do stories 
and strategies take into consideration context when they are supposed to remain 
strong and coherent when context change? How has the UK based media portrayed 
the wider economic and political climate and related it to the legislation? What actors 
does their coverage bring on board? 
The chapter will, therefore, be structured in the following way: the first section 
will provide a summary of REACH, chronologically ordered and with emphasis on 
the particularities of the European policy making processes and on the nature of the 
legislation. The second section refers to events described in part one but focuses on 
the characteristics of the main actors and structures involved in the dispute. A third 
and last section will consider the interlinked issues of strategy, stories, context and 
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media. As it will be clear, this is a way of analysing a policy which is very different 
form the kind of analysis that might be offered by more conventional political science 
or policy studies.   
 
1. The Legislation  
 
REACH started officially in February 2001, with the release of a White Paper 
by the European Commission proposing how to tackle the outdated and patchy laws 
regulating chemicals in Europe. Discussions about the need to streamline and 
strengthen the rules, however, were already at the centre of a meeting of the Council 
of Environment Ministers in Chester (UK) back in 1998. At the Council’s request, the 
Commission reviewed and identified weaknesses in all four directives regarding 
industrial chemicals. Its report highlighted the need for regulating substances on the 
basis of their inherent properties, proposed the reversal of the burden of proof to the 
industry and the creation of a strategy to assess harmful effects of existing substances 
(SEC (1998)1986 final). This analysis would form the basis of the White Paper.  
As regulations concerning chemicals in the European Union were spread 
between DG Environment and DG Enterprise9, the drafting of the White Paper 
became a joint task. The preliminary work involved one official stakeholder meeting 
in February 1999. “We had open hearings, open meetings, open seminars. No one 
really objected having the review. At this point we were working on how the 
legislation would look like”, said member of DG Environment10. 
The White Paper with the first outline of REACH invoked the “overriding 
goal of sustainable development” and the precautionary principle (COM (2001) 0088 
final, p.4), with the document calling for the registration and further information about 
the so-called ‘existing substances’(i.e. all chemicals in the market before September 
1981, more than 99% of the total volume of all substances currently commercialised). 
Of the 100,106 substances from which very little is known, the Commission proposed 
that some 30,000 produced above 1 tonne should go through more testing and at least 
                                                 
9
 The handling of ‘scientific’ data linked to classification, packing and labelling of substances, as well 
as the assessments of existing and new chemicals, fell under DG Environment’s responsibility in the 
old legislation. DG Enterprise won the right to a 50% stake in the making of REACH because of its 
previous role in deciding the restrictions on marketing and use of dangerous substances or preparations, 
as well as the handling of the supply chain.   
10
 Interview 1, conducted by telephone in December 2008 with a civil servant formally involved in the 
drafting of the legislation and now at the European Chemicals Agency (Finland) created by REACH. 
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1,500 would have to be given use-specific permission. The substitution of dangerous 
by less dangerous substances when alternatives were available was highly 
recommended by the Commission. Producers, not regulators or governments, would 
have to test and justify the use of substances. Downstream users, as well as 
manufacturers and importers, would be held accountable for all aspects of the safety 
of their products. 
An official debate to discuss the White Paper with stakeholders was called by 
the Commission in April 2001. Participants unanimously agreed that “sustainable 
development and the safe use of chemicals are, and should be, the main objectives of 
the new European chemicals policy” (Stakeholder's Conference Report, 2nd of April 
2001). The industry and member states, however, stressed the idea of 
competitiveness, while the NGOs saw the protection of human health and the 
environment as paramount. Therefore, the authorisation process was considered 
unnecessary by industry representatives, who disagreed with the principle of 
restricting or banning substances based on their intrinsic properties, with NGOs 
complaining that the strategy was already catering for industry self-interest. 
The next step was to send the White Paper for the consideration of the Council 
and European Parliament. The former adopted conclusions on the White Paper in June 
2001 (2355th Council meeting), stressing the need of a clear and simpler proposal and 
calling for a regulatory framework to be drafted by the end of 2001. In the Parliament, 
the Greens won over the conservatives the position of rapporteur, and Swedish MEP 
Inger Schörling was nominated. In August 2001, she presented a report (A5-
0356/2001 final) which, despite the Hughes procedure that allowed other Committees 
to have a say on the text (i.e. Legal Affairs and Internal Market; Industry, External 
Trade, Research and Energy), kept the strong environmental tone of its predecessor. 
On the 16th of October, with a full audience of professional lobbyists, chemical 
industry bosses and environmental representatives, more than 300 amendments were 
voted by the MEPs. Most of the recommendations from the report were approved to 
be added to the draft resolution.  
The task of drafting the legislation went back to the Commission. DG 
Environment and DG Enterprise convened working groups involving “all sorts of 
stakeholders” to bring what had become a huge political controversy “back to specific 
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technical details”11. In May 2002, a second stakeholder meeting took place for the 
launch of the Commission’s impact assessment, which estimated costs of REACH to 
be between €1,9 billion (best scenario) to €6 billion (worst scenario). According to the 
assessment, the effect of the White Paper on innovation was positive to all companies. 
The only negative line was about the possible impact of REACH on the 
competitiveness of small and medium enterprises (SMEs)” (RPA 2002, p.121).  
After eighteen months, the proposal package was ready for an internet 
consultation. Comments on the draft were allowed from May to July 2003, with some 
6,400 contributions received by the two teams assigned to analyse the texts and make 
the appropriate changes to the draft legislation. “They (the proposals) varied an awful 
lot. Some were about broad concerns and others very specific, concrete. We then went 
back to technical discussions within the Commission about what should be changed 
and what shouldn’t be changed to address these questions”12. The full REACH 
proposal was released on the 29th of October 2003. The new text removed 
intermediate chemicals used in sealed conditions and polymers from the legislation, 
Chemical Safety Reports were not required anymore for substances below 10 tonnes 
and substances of very high concern could still be marketed if “adequately 
controlled”(COM(2003) 644 final).   
The release of the draft proposal started the so-called co-decision process, in 
which both the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union are given 
the same weight to decide on the final shape of legislation, a process that usually 
includes two readings. Although the proposal was adopted in October 2003 and 
transmitted to the Parliament and Council in the beginning of November, the process 
of co-decision only really started in the Autumn of 2004 because of the recess linked 
to Parliamentary elections. The old Parliament, however, had already allocated 
REACH to committees and appointed MEP Guido Sacconi as rapporteur13. The 
process at the Council was less disruptive, with first results of a high level ad hoc 
Working Party on Chemicals established in November informing Council and EU 
Presidency debates as early as February 2004 (Progress Report 6200/04). Following 
some of these recommendations, the European Commission and stakeholders signed a 
                                                 
11
 Interview 2 with a senior civil servant involved throughout the policy making process (initially in 
DG Environment and later on in DG Enterprise), conducted in Brussels, January 2009 
12
 Interview 2 
13
 Interview 3 with one of the civil servants who followed the co-decision process for the DG 
Environment in Brussels, January 2009 
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Memorandum of Understanding to undertake further work concerning the impact 
assessment on REACH.  
Sacconi’s report (2005) adding over 400 amendments to the draft was voted 
and approved by the Parliament’s Environment Committee (40-19 votes) and, on the 
17th of November, the European Parliament completed its first reading after two and a 
half hours of deliberation. The legislation, simplifying the registration phase but 
calling for stricter authorisation control and time limits regarding toxic chemicals, was 
approved by clear majority (407- 155 and 41 abstentions). In a extraordinary meeting 
chaired by the UK Presidency on the 13th of December 2005, council ministers 
reached an agreement on the draft, weakening again the requirements for 
authorisation and making substitution non-compulsory even when alternatives existed 
(Bulletin EU 12-2005). A second reading in Parliament and Council and a final 
agreement was scheduled to happen before the end of 2006.  
In June 2006, the Council formally adopted a Common Position in which 200 
amendments from the European Parliament’s first reading were taken into 
consideration either “in full, in part or in principle” (7524//06 ADD 1). An European 
Commission Communication on the Common Position (COM(2006)375 final) was 
adopted on the 12th July 2006 and submitted to the European Parliament and Council, 
allowing the second reading to commence. On the 10th of October, the EP Committee 
on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety voted in favour of a stricter 
regulation imposing further rules on corporations, reinforcing once again the 
substitution principle by reinstating the provision that limits authorisations to a certain 
number of years (COD/2003/0256). This had been removed by the Council in its 
Common Position. The text was then sent back to the Council for its second reading.  
The trialogues (Conciliation) leading to the second reading agreements was 
presided over by Finland, keen to end the REACH negotiations, already in its 5th year, 
before passing the baton to Germany. After weeks of closed-door negotiations and 
allegedly strong pressure from the German government – an interviewee used the 
word ‘backstabbing’ to describe the behaviour of German Karl-Heinz Florenz towards 
rapporteur Guido Sacconi14 –  the Parliamentary delegation agreed to compromise on 
authorisation: some substances would get the green light even when less hazardous 
existed, but substitution was compulsory for a whole group of dangerous substances 
                                                 
14
 Interview 3 
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and all substances of concern will eventually have to be substituted (Final A6-
0352/2006). The second reading in Parliament took place on the 13th of December, 
with the Council second reading approval happening on the 18th of December. 
REACH ((EC) No 1907/2006) entered into force on 1st June 2007 but the process 
continues as the Commission moves on to the process of implementing the legislation 
at member state level. This phase is called ‘comitology’, as the Commission has 
powers conferred by the Council but has to be assisted by a committee. Since 2007, 
the Commission is in the process of reviewing various Annexes of the legislation 
 
2. Issues of agency and structure  
 
 
The previous section provided not only information about what kind of 
legislation REACH is but also a sample of the complexity of the policy making 
process in the European Union. From this section onwards, however, this chapter will 
distance itself from chronological accounts and details of the law itself to focus on 
themes that are relevant to the interactions between actors and structures and the kinds 
of business representation they produce, which is a central concern in this thesis. It is 
inevitable that events described above will be referred to and the artificial boundaries 
imposed among themes will be blurred during this discussion, but raising particular 
points from the dense and sometimes chaotic environment in which they are 
embedded helps the understanding of the function of stories and offers possible 
explanations for their effectiveness and failure.  
Before going into the discussion of these issues, however, it is necessary to 
identify and scrutinise the key actors, new and incumbents, and the institutional 
structures that form the European system, as well as their role in REACH. This will 
provide a link with the main themes discussed in the earlier chapters and the 
ingredients needed for the analysis of the main concern of the thesis: the role of 
narratives as a strategy of business representation. This will be extensively discussed 
in section 3. 
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2.1 Newcomers and incumbents 
 
As mentioned in chapters I and III, the active inclusion of different voices in 
European policy making was triggered by two interrelated factors: increasingly loud 
accusations of legitimacy deficit and a lobbying overcrowd that had become 
unmanageable (Goehring 2002). This was followed by a Commission discussion 
paper focusing on measures to improve and strengthen the existing relationship with 
NGOs (2000), a White Paper (COM(2001) 428) linking legitimacy and civil society 
participation, the creation of a Civil Dialogue and the sponsoring of networks like the 
Social Policy Forum, a permanent framework for cooperation and integration of 
NGOs with European institutions (Smismans 2006, p.476). Therefore, groups that 
gained greater access and that had grown in importance in the last 15 years, mainly 
public interest non-profit, non-governmental groups, are considered here as new 
actors, while those who had their access to decision makers institutionalised before 
these changes, like business, trade unions and governments, are taken as incumbents.  
The non-governmental organisations actively involved in REACH were 
environmental groups, arguably the most influential and professional among public 
interest actors at international and national levels; consumer, women and health 
groups, mostly represented by federations and associations; and animal rights 
organisations, which are particularly strong in the UK but were also represented by 
European coalitions. Greenpeace, WWF and Friends of Earth (FoE), pivotal for the 
environmental lobbying campaign, mobilised their national and European branches 
individually. But they were also members of the European Environmental Bureau 
(EEB), a federation of 142 environmental organisations, and part of the Health and 
Environment Alliance (HEAL), a network that brings together citizens, patients, 
women, health professionals and environmental groups across Europe. Other 
members of the coalition were Women in Europe for a Common Future and ChemSec 
(International Chemical Secretariat).  
Consumers were represented by the BEUC (The European Consumer’s 
Organisation) and EuroCoop, a coalition of member states’ co-operatives. Animal 
rights were also mainly acting through federations and alliances, with national 
charities represented by The European Coalition to End Animal Experiments 
(ECEAE) and the Eurogroup for Animals. The former is chaired by the British Union 
for the Abolition of Vivisection, a key player with a long-lasting individual campaign 
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throughout the legislation process. Most of the collective advocacy organisations, be 
it environmental, health, consumer or animal rights, receive part of their funding from 
the European Commission, with the Health and Environment Alliance as an example 
of the permanent networks that have been set up and fully funded by the Commission.  
Despite their differences, NGOs were seen by policy makers in the European 
Commission as a coherent block working on complementary issues. “They were not 
necessarily monolithic but were working together to define common positions”, said a 
senior civil servant, while another perceived the NGOs as “united”: “They were 
focused on different aspects but united and shared the responsibility and the 
workload. Greenpeace had one specific approach, WWF another one, Friends of the 
Earth another one but they were compatible” 15. The involvement of environmental 
organisations with the Commission started early in the process, with parts of the 
evidence that led to the Chester meeting in 1998 being provided by NGOs. “There 
was a lot of evidence mounting, the marine environment, which we were monitoring 
much before REACH, was already showing signs of the need of a new chemical 
legislation. We had a couple of people constantly following the chemicals”, explains 
the leader of the advocacy campaign for an environmental NGO16. Environmental 
organisations could therefore use their increased access to the DG Environment to act 
early, knowing what they would like the legislation to cover and how17.  Consumer 
groups were working closer to DG Environment while animal rights groups have 
more traction in the Parliament, particularly with British MEPs like Caroline Lucas, a 
Green Party member. Lucas was a member of the all-party Intergroup on the Welfare 
and Conservation of Animals in the European Parliament, whose secretariat and 
expertise is provided by the Eurogroup for Animals. In total, around 20 NGOs 
employees were working full time on REACH in Brussels during the making of the 
legislation. 
This contrasts with the number of people working for the incumbents. The 
industry lobbying alone, according to the coordinator of the REACH campaign18, had 
about 150 people working full time on the legislation including technical experts, 
members of various companies and national associations and federations. The 
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 Interviews 2 and 3  
16
 Interview 7  
17
 Interview 6 with a director of a consultancy firm specialised in bringing different stakeholders to the 
EU policy debate and coordinator of part of the industry campaign during co-decision 
18
 Interview 5 
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European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC) had four people working on it on a 
daily basis in Brussels: two at the European Parliament, one in liaison with the 
permanent representations and one in contact with the Commission. Small and 
medium enterprises were represented by the Eurochambres and the UEAPME – 
European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises.  
Giant corporations operated both through CEFIC and individually, with 
BASF, the world’s leading chemical firm, as the most aggressive and multifaceted 
player. Between 2002 and 2003, during the work on the final draft, the German firm 
co-chaired the Chemical Expert Group of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue 
(TABD), was part of the Transatlantic Policy Network (TPN), had the top job at 
CEFIC with vice-chairman Eggert Voscherau and the top job at UNICE, the 
employers federation, with Jürgen Srube, chairman of the supervisory board of BASF. 
Moreover, Jürgen Hambrecht, BASF president, would in the end of 2003 add the 
position of chairman of the German Chemical Industry Association (VDI) to the vice-
chairmanship of the German Industry Confederation (BDI). Dow and Unilever were 
also actively operating behind the scenes.  
Part of the work of federations, associations and giant firms was to engage 
national states, another traditional incumbent, in the debate. In REACH, this was 
clearly achieved with Germany, France and United Kingdom, with top politicians 
speaking publicly against REACH’s potential negative impact on the European 
industry. Outside the European Union, major allies were the United States and Japan, 
both involved with CEFIC to “anticipate debates that were coming later anyway”19. 
According to civil servants working on REACH, the American government offensive 
was “unusual at least in scope, intensity and vehemence of it”. 20 Lobbying from firms 
was channelled through the American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) and the 
American Chemistry Council (ACC)21. Japan surprised because of its less intrusive 
but still strong lobbying based on “lots and lots of questions and clarifications”, while 
China, the up and coming player in chemicals, did “not much lobbying at all”22. 
A third group of incumbents, the trade union movement, was represented by 
two main groups: the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and the EMCEF- 
European Mine, Chemical and Energy Workers Federation. A third active 
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organisation was the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI), a body funded by the 
European Union. ETUC, whose UK partner is the Trade Union Congress, worked 
closer to NGOs and ETUI. EMCEF, linked to United in the UK, signed a common 
position with CEFIC and the ECEG European Chemical Employers Group. The 
alignment with NGOs, however, was a gradual rather than instantaneous process: 
“This was something interesting during the REACH process because part of the trade 
unions in Brussels shifted. At the beginning, they were being very critical, worried 
about the health of their companies. But then they realised how much information and 
benefits REACH was going to bring to workers, not only in the chemical companies 
but also downstream users”. 23  
These key actors, as discussed in chapter III, have their strategies, success and 
failure linked to the structures in which they operated. Therefore, any meaningful 
analysis of strategies and stories has to take into consideration the institutional set up. 
We look briefly at the European policy making environment next before getting to 
strategies and storytelling.  
 
2.2 Enabling and disabling structures 
 
 The European policy making procedures have changed considerably in the 
past two decades, triggering a shift in the relationship between the European 
Parliament and the Council. The Single European Act of 1986 instituted two readings 
and a cooperation procedure, in which the European Parliament had to give its assent 
to agreements and could reject a common council position by absolute majority of its 
members (1986). In this arrangement, however, the Parliament was dependent on the 
Commission’s support even when amendments were voted by the absolute majority. 
The signature of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) would rectify the problem by 
introducing a co-decision procedure in which the Parliament is able to adopt legal 
instruments together with the Council through direct negotiation in up to three 
readings. For most cases of co-decision procedure, there is not a need for unanimity in 
the Council but qualified majority voting. Maastricht also created a Committee of the 
Regions, with representatives of regional authorities, and expanded the Community 
reach to areas such as consumer policies.  
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 Interview 3 
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The Amsterdam Treaty (1997) amended Maastricht and extended the co-
decision procedure to further areas of policy but reduced readings to two. In a 
nutshell, the process consists of a first step in which the Commission drafts the bill 
asked by the Council and the Parliament has a first reading, either approving it or 
voting amendments. If there are amendments, the proposal goes back to the Council 
for a first reading. If Council accepts EP amendments as they are, the text is adopted; 
if not, a Common Position is adopted by the Council. The Common Position is then 
examined by the Parliament, which can approve it as it is or vote new amendments in 
second reading. If the Council does not approve Parliament amendments to the 
Common Position, the process turns to Conciliation. Conciliation entails direct 
negotiations between Parliament and Council aiming at a common text. When the 
chemical legislation started to be drafted, therefore, the co-decision procedure had just 
been simplified to two readings and Parliament and Council were theoretically on 
equal footing regarding legislative power. Since December 2009, with the 
homologation  of the Lisbon Treaty (2007), the Parliament and the Council are 
involved in co-decision for most types of legislation, including sensitive issues such 
as the budget and agriculture procedures. While this does not affect the case examined 
here, it gives a sense of the constantly evolving nature of institutional procedures.  
Environment protection was not originally included in the Treaties and only 
appeared officially in the Single European Act as an active legislative area. In 
practice, however, it has been a traditional concern for European policy makers. By 
1987, around 200 pieces of legislation had been introduced based on articles of the 
Treaty of Rome allowing policy making in areas that affect the common market or are 
necessary to attain common goals (Focus 2007). The impact of these laws on nation 
states is substantial: in 1994, John Gummer, British Minister for the Environment, 
calculated that 80% of the UK environmental legislation were originated in Brussels 
and Strasbourg rather than domestically (Lowe and Ward 1998, p.25).  
Part of this drive towards green legislation is connected to the establishment of 
institutional presence by NGOs in Brussels. Greenpeace, WWF and Friends of Earth 
arrived as pioneers in the end of 1980s, while more specialised lobbyists such as 
Climate Action Network and BirdLife International opened offices in the early 1990s 
(Long 1998). Part is linked to changes initiated by the Commission. A request from 
DG XI for environmental groups to become more organised to facilitate the exchange 
of information led to the creation of the Gang of Four (EEB, WWF, Greenpeace and 
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FoE), which has become the G1024. Consultation arrangements between the group and 
DG Environment were extended and formalised throughout the 1990s, with at least 
two annual meetings being held with the Director General or Commissioner and one 
with the president of the Commission. NGOs became more involved in different 
advisory and working groups within DG Environment but also gradually in Trade, 
Agriculture and Fisheries, Development and Social and Economic Affairs (Long and 
Lorinczi 2009).  
Following Maastricht, when a significant amount of policy areas were still not 
eligible for co-decision, the Environment Committee in Parliament was involved in 
80% of all the conciliations that ever took place, with the remaining 20% divided 
between Social Affairs and Energy Committees (Wurzel 1999, p.7). Leading the 
Committee until 1999 was British MEP Ken Collins, credited with Parliamentary 
victories such as the push for a much stricter AutoOil package in 1998 (Friedrich, 
Tappe et al. 2000) and considered fundamental for the high political profile achieved 
by the group in the 1990s. 
When the United Kingdom took over the Presidency in January 1998, the 
AutoOil agreement was in its final conciliation phase. Prime Minister Tony Blair and 
Foreign Secretary Robin Cook expressed a firm ambition of bringing “environmental 
considerations into the centre of the EU's decision-making process, not keeping them 
as an afterthought” (BBC News, 7th January 1998). The green agenda included 
climate change, following the momentum of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, as well as 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and chemicals. The Amsterdam Treaty, 
signed in 1997, provided further tools: articles 174 to 176 of the European 
Community Treaty established the precautionary principle and preventive action as 
basis for environmental action and, among the tasks of the Community listed in 
Article 2, is “a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the 
environment”. This legal basis was a key demands made by the G4 in its first 
common paper in 1990.  
When REACH started to be drafted, therefore, the co-decision had been 
expanded and the Parliament had just achieved a substantial green victory over the 
Council in the Auto Oil package. Environment protection had become part of the 
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Treaty and NGOs had established a status of close collaborators inside the 
Commission, not only in DG Environment but also in other areas such as trade. Ken 
Collins stepped down from the European Parliament and the Environment Committee 
in 1999, leaving behind a strong Environment and Consumer Protection Committee. 
Moreover, the British presidency aims facilitated the job of Michael Meacher, UK 
Minister of Environment, in calling the Chester meeting that would kick start the 
review of the chemical legislation (Lind 2004).  
Changes in the balance of decision making power and political agenda show 
some of the evolving characteristics that allow or constrain agency. At this particular 
point in time, access and agenda setting favoured NGOs: environment issues were a 
priority, with the Commission working closely with environmental groups. While the 
Council had not been traditionally an ally of the greens, something that would become 
clear during the late stages of the power struggle between Council and Parliament, the 
combination of British top politicians was fortuitous. Here, the use of multilevel 
resources was crucial. Meacher, considered an ally to environmental causes in the 
UK, home to the two most active organisations involved in REACH (WWF and FoE), 
joined forces with Scandinavian ministers, backed up by their own regional NGOs 
that are part of the European network, to push the review. The momentum was kept 
with the choice of Swedish politician Margot Wallström as Environment 
Commissioner in 1999.  
Thus, the first phase of the process, the drafting of the White Paper, despite 
DG Enterprise’s participation, was subjected to strong NGO influence. While 
corporations and chemical industry collective bodies were officially involved in the 
formal discussions, the release of the first draft was confessedly the first moment they 
realised the extent of the challenge ahead.  “We knew that something was being 
prepared. We had conferences here in Brussels with the Commission, member states, 
industries, NGOs. Our understanding was that it had to be something that was flexible 
enough, not too difficult or too expensive and that was our idea at the beginning. 
When we saw the White Paper, it was really demanding a lot”25, said the coordinator 
of the industry lobbying. 
In co-decision, more problems and opportunities for access and multilevel 
institutional coordination appeared, with Parliament and Council seen as much more 
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resource intensive lobbying areas (Long and Lorinczi 2009) and, therefore, favouring 
financially and/or politically powerful groups. According to a NGO campaign 
coordinator, direct access to the Council is virtually blocked for non-governmental 
groups: “In some points we did not have a chance. The industry is much more able to 
book meetings with senior officials and ministers at the Council while us, as NGOs, 
get to meet them once a year and for a short period”26. Both newcomers and European 
incumbents went the national route to government representatives, with the industry 
having a full time lobbyist responsible for countries permanent representation in 
Brussels. International players, particularly important trade partners like the United 
States, had clearly more access to the Council than to the Parliament.  
With 785 MEPs, the European Parliament also required an intensive approach, 
which is one of the reasons the industry had its top lobbyist stationary there during the 
whole process of co-decision. NGOs had good access and working relationship with 
the Environment Committee, to which the rapporteur was linked, but three 
committees had joint responsibility to propose amendments. The discussion was 
polarised between the Greens and Socialists, who wanted a stronger REACH 
supported by the majority of the Liberals, and the Christian Democrats and part of the 
Liberals in favour of less regulation. For the greens, the major problem in Parliament 
was the division between environmental and animal rights supporters. “The greens 
were almost a block in the second reading. But the remaining animal rights faction, 
particularly with the UK bias, broke this. From our point of view (DG Environment), 
the animal welfare line did harm the legislation”27.  
The first part of this chapter described and discussed actors and structures 
involved in REACH, providing an overall picture of a highly complex episode of 
policy making and lobbying, a snapshot of these interactions at work. From this 
portrait, it is clear that structures can work in favour or against different players at 
different stages of the process, therefore impacting outcomes. It is also clear that 
actors take into consideration these enabling or disabling features when planning their 
moves. The second half of the chapter will focus on the strategies developed by 
different players throughout the process, bringing to the analysis the stories of 
business representation that are the central concern of this thesis.
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3. Strategies and stories in REACH 
 
The different strategies used in every stage of the process by all players would 
be clearly impossible to analyse here. There were, however, a few moves that seemed 
to have substantially impacted, intentionally or unintentionally, the course of events. 
Actors are going to be roughly divided as pro-REACH, meaning consumers, women 
and environment NGOs, and anti-REACH, referring to the industry and governments 
that took an active stance to water down the legislation: United States, UK, Germany 
and France. This is not simply to facilitate the reading but reflects the fact that the 
strategies of these groups were either overlapping or complementary. Animal rights 
organisations and trade unions, on the other hand, have been more ambiguous in their 
approach and therefore will appear on their own when relevant. 
The NGOs’ general strategy, as an interviewee summarised it, was to “play the 
long game”28. The first step, as it became clear in the previous sections, was to arrive 
early and set the agenda for a new chemical legislation. As well as a story about what 
was wrong with the old legal requirements, the pro-REACH groups had also planned 
what the new legislation should cover and how, helping to shape the White Paper 
according to their own justifications. Besides, their previous knowledge of the effects 
of chemicals in the environment, a result of their constant monitoring of the problem 
in different national contexts, made these organisations a valuable source of expertise 
that the industry could not provide. 
The success of this tactic is a result of intensive cooperation among NGOs 
through formal and informal alliances. Part of the work was based on international 
coalitions involving environmental groups working in Northern Europe, Scandinavia 
and Brussels. Acting as a block, such as the G10, was not only helpful for the delivery 
of a coherent set of arguments and demands but also contributed to the building of 
wider information channels: knowing in advance that a major environmental 
legislation was being prepared, the greens inside the Environment, Public Health and 
Consumer Policy saved points allocated to political groups according to their size, 
abstaining from becoming responsible for less important issues to ‘buy’ the rapporteur 
position for the first Parliamentary Resolution on REACH, snatching it from the 
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conservatives. Swedish MEP Inger Schörling was nominated (Lind 2004, p.109) and 
the draft left the Parliament with strong environmental overtones. 
 The link to member states was kept by the local branches of NGOs building 
their own cultural/nationality specific alliances because “while in the Nordic countries 
and Germany these were established concerns, in Spain, Italy, Portugal and some 
Eastern European countries it was a novelty ”29. In the UK, for instance, WWF and 
FoE have signed agreements with the Women’s Institute and Coop Bank. Brussels 
branches, on the other hand, concentrated on cross-organisational links. The formerly 
G4 launched the ‘Chemical Reaction’, a single issue organisation created around 
REACH, and ties between Swedish and British based NGOs were straightened with 
the creation of ChemSec. ChemTrust, a research charity created in 2007 based in the 
UK to study the impact of toxic chemicals in the environment and wild life, is another 
offspring of REACH and is funded by WWF-UK, Greenpeace Environmental Trust 
(GET) and other charitable trusts.  
The second major strategy for the pro-REACH alliance was the Detox 
Campaign, led by the WWF from 2003 onwards. The aim was to come in contact with 
MEPs and catch the attention of the media. “On one hand we needed to get the MEPs 
interested in the matter, on the other, to rebut industry claims that were hugely 
exaggerated”30. The way to achieve it was to organise events involving both actors, 
namely the bio-monitoring of the blood of ministers and members of parliaments to 
show the presence of chemicals that should not be there. In 2003 and 2004, 40 
members of the European Parliament, 14 ministers and more than 300 volunteers 
including celebrities, journalists and scientists across Europe were tested (Detox, 
2007). This involved intensive work from the national offices, with WWF UK 
responsible for 150 volunteers, including people like John Vidal, The Guardian’s 
environment editor.  
The events were accompanied by activities such as ‘vampires’ in Brussels 
announcing the blood test results, families travelling to meet MEPs, pregnant women 
showing up at the German Parliament or valentine’s cards with information about 
musk in perfumes being handed to passers by in February. Actions of this kind, 
however, were limited to key moments of the legislation for financial reasons. “That 
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is not something that NGOs can keep up with. WWF was spending a million of Euros 
a year for that work, which is not that much when you think of staff costs and the rest 
of it but it is a lot for a campaign. The answer for the question why we haven’t seen 
more of that is that we have not got the resources”31.  
The animal rights group BUAV also released a campaign, Harmful if 
Swallowed, “the most intense lobbying the institution has ever undertaken” according 
to website (http://www.buav.org/campaigns/reach/campaignhistory). The strategy, 
coordinated by the European Coalition to End Animal Experiments, was to get 
Parliamentary support to reduce the number of animal tests required by REACH and 
ignite a debate about alternative tests. The latter was set in motion by a position paper 
(ECEAE  2001) and culminated in the EFAA, The European Partnership for 
Alternative Approaches to Animal Testing. This joint project between the 
Commission and corporations was set up to facilitate knowledge transfer and 
accelerate the development of new research and methods.  
The link between the animal rights groups and the industry was part of the 
industry plan to bring dissonant views to the debate. This was intensified during co-
decision, when it also involved bringing institutional, pro-industry actors to the table: 
“This was quite deliberately done by CEFIC and it worked in some Council 
discussions to a greater extent than it did in Parliament” 32, explains a consultant 
working for the industry lobby.  Like the environment NGOs, the anti REACH 
strategy relied strongly on networking and alliances, particularly among big players, 
with established partnerships such as the one between European and American 
industries and new coalitions playing a role. The Downstream Users of Chemical Co-
ordination Group (DUCC), established with the help of CEFIC as a platform for 
associations whose members use chemicals to formulate preparations as finished 
products for end users, went from an ad hoc association to a permanent network. “It 
was not an easy coalition. They did not always agree on things that CEFIC would 
have wanted but they activated trade unions and workers involved in the industry”33. 
DUCC also brought together giant corporations who generally do not collaborate, 
such as Unilever and Procter and Gamble34.  
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Engaging national states was also central to the lobbying campaign because, 
with their support, the division of labour would work roughly as follows: industry 
federations, associations and firms concentrated on national and supranational 
governance bodies while governments targeted EU institutions, particularly the 
Council, as insiders. An extensive lobbying campaign involving national and 
supranational partners and activities aimed at all institutional players, however, was 
only delineated and set in motion after the release of the White Paper. Before that, the 
industry kept insisting on a self-regulatory solution by increasing donations to the 
Long Range Research Initiative35 and other voluntary schemes, which did not bear 
fruits. 
In Brussels, the Parliament was offered ‘educational programmes’ consisting 
of visits from university professors, brochures, presentations and discussions “to get 
the MEPs to understand what the chemical industry means, what happens in the 
chemical factory”36. CEFIC was also responsible for contacting the permanent 
representatives. At the same time, the Commission drafting its final version of the 
legislation was heavily targeted by the United States: “they were there all the time, I 
was approached by the US Embassy in my country, and everybody was sent Colin 
Powell’s line of argument”37. The Secretary of State’s line of argument, drafted in 
partnership with Dow Chemicals and industry bodies, was also sent by fax to all 
American embassies in the EU zone to have the message transmitted to the pertinent 
authorities (Waxman 2004). Greece and Italy, holding the EU presidency during 
2003, and Germany, with a strong industry but also a strong popular support for 
environmental causes, were of particular interest. 
In member states where the chemical industry is important, federations and 
companies contacted national governance bodies (in the UK, the House of Lords and 
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution held hearings on REACH) and took 
MEPs to visit chemical factories. During this period, a controversial discussion about 
impact assessments started, with the industry refuting the joint report by DG 
Enterprise and DG Environment regarding the costs of the legislation.  The British 
government started the trend even before the White Paper, doubting the feasibility of 
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completing tests within the proposed time frame, predicting significant delays, costs 
three times higher than anticipated by the Commission and the death of more than 12 
million animals (IEH 2001). A series of commissioned assessments were released by 
national industry federations predicting catastrophic effects on corporations’ bottom 
line and job losses. The French and German (Little 2002; Mercer 2003) reports 
became the most known and cited by the media. 
Other components of the industry lobbying were classic time delay and the so-
called revolving doors. During the internet consultation, extended from five to eight 
weeks after intensive pressure from the industry, the anti REACH lobby flooded the 
Commission with comments on the draft38. The delay was of interest for at least three 
reasons: first, parliament was about to have elections and the looming enlargement 
would bring ten new countries from Easter and Central Europe with weaker economic 
performances and established chemical industries; second, these industrial groups 
were full or associate members of CEFIC since 1992; third, green discourse and 
institutional arrangements are weaker in these countries39.  
REACH had also a couple of high profile cases of revolving doors. The first 
was the case of a “BASF employee working on writing REACH at the same time he 
was still earning his salary from BASF”40.  The second was Jean-Paul Mingasson, 
Director-General DG Enterprise during an essential part of REACH (2002- 2004), 
who left in 2004 to work as General Adviser to Business Europe (former UNICE). In 
the UK, Chemical Industry Association director Elisabeth Surkovic was ‘loaned’ to 
the government to help formulating the UK position on REACH (DiGangi 2003, p.8) 
and, in 2003, appeared in official documents as a DEFRA representative.   
Most of these tactics, however, are connected and in some cases dependent on 
discourses and stories. This is particularly relevant for this thesis because strategies 
that require more elaborated story telling are not traditional lobbying practices such as 
revolving doors, time delay or expensive day trips to educate politicians, some of the 
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important tools of the industry kit, but the ones that depend of engagement with actors 
who are not necessarily natural allies, such as new coalitions or parliamentary 
factions. This reinforces the argument that taking narratives into consideration is 
crucial for understanding business representation. The next section considers the 
stories in REACH.   
 
3.2 Narratives, the media, and the importance of context 
 
Both the so-called pro and anti REACH lobbying had a central story about the 
chemical legislation that was kept throughout the process and developed in different 
ways depending on the stage of the policy. In other words, the basic argument (the 
fabula) was kept but some aspects became more or less prominent according to the 
audience and timing of the intervention. The pro-REACH lobbying key story was 
about why Europe needed a new regulation and what it should look like. The anti-
REACH, on the other hand, disputed the claim of lack of knowledge and argued that 
the costs of the legislation were not proportional to its benefits.  
Because of the early involvement of NGOs in the process, the pro-REACH 
main story is tightly entangled with the Commission’s own narrative. The central 
point was that the patchwork of rules for the production and use of chemicals in 
Europe was not enough for protecting human health and the environment, with more 
information provided by the industry needed. Thus, an efficient chemical legislation 
should be based on the precautionary principle, reverse the burden of proof to the 
industry, provide consumers and workers with information and hold an authorisation 
process for substances of high concern, leading to the substitution of the most 
hazardous products (WWF, FoE and Greenpeace, 2001). This is not far from the 
Council’s own calls for a new legislation based “on the precautionary principle, the 
goals of sustainable development and the environmental safety and the efficient 
functioning of the internal market”, with collection of data, substitution of dangerous 
by less dangerous substances and sharing of data as desirable features (Council 
Conclusions, 1999).  
 It is important to remember that, as mentioned before in the chapter, green 
policy making was given a double boost in the early 1990s with the recognition of the 
political dimension of the environmental problem and prescribed a capitalism friendly 
approach based on sustainable development. Institutionally, the Single Act and 
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Maastricht unequivocally made the environment a policy goal and strengthened the 
Parliament (McCormick 2001, p.60). While REACH  was being drafted, in 2000, 
MEPs backed several proposals ‘against’ the industry, such as the introduction of a 
ban on the sales of cosmetics tested on animals, the tightening of laws on genetically 
modified products, as well as approving the End of Life Vehicles, making car 
manufacturers responsible for re-use and recycle of automobiles in Europe. In 2001, 
the Commission officially adopted the precautionary principle (COM (2000)1). Thus, 
key words related to environmental protection – precautionary principle, insufficient 
evidence, knowledge gap, high concern substances – are central to both the 
Commission and the pro-REACH stories, in line with the broader objectives of the 
EU for the environment in this particular moment in time.   
From this idea, other narratives were developed. In 2002 and 2003, when the 
battle of impact assessments around costs was ongoing, the green narrative was about 
the benefits of the legislation. The story was that costs for implementation were not as 
high as estimated by the industry (ChemSec, 2004). Supported by a  report 
commissioned to independent British academics, the story contended that savings of 
over £180 billion could be achieved by 2020 after implementation costs were deduced 
(Pearce and Koundouri 2003). Another component of the narrative was that the 
industry’s assessments were not pricing in the benefits to competitiveness coming 
from innovation and new markets (Korzinek, Warhurst et al. 2003). This story was 
complementary to ETUC’s narrative about the health benefits of REACH for industry 
workers: a commissioned report from the University of Sheffield predicted a steep 
decline on respiratory and skin diseases from exposure to dangerous chemicals linked 
to measures such as duty of care, authorisation and substitution of hazard chemicals 
(Pickvance, Karnon et al. 2005).  
Despite the potentially persuasive argument, narratives about the financial 
benefits of REACH had less traction with the media than the ones about costs. This 
could be partially linked to the structure of the media in itself, as the leader of the 
advocacy campaign for an environmental NGO put it: “The media usually reports on 
individual companies routinely, even if only every couple of months. NGOs have to 
be real big news to get space”41. Another, and also relevant factor, is the connection 
with the types of stories that the media vehicles were telling themselves, namely that 
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the high economic performance of the previous decade was not about to be repeated 
in Europe. During the final stages of the second draft, reports were about Germany 
struggling to deal with unemployment figures at a four year high, France cutting taxes 
to solve its problems, Greece and Italy fighting a galloping public sector budget 
deficit and the UK facing the true extent of the household debt that had fuelled the 
economy in the 1990s (WSJE, 9th of January 2003; FT, 10th of January 2003). 
Moreover, after eighteen months of lethargic economic performance, the European 
Commission’s report for the Spring Summit was about missed targets (i.e. Lisbon 
Agenda) (FT, 13th of January 2003) 
Better media coverage, however, was obtained by a third green story, 
developed from 2003 to the co-decision procedure. Once again the narrative is a 
development of the previous two stories, but with a stronger focus on the pervasive 
nature of untested chemicals that are found in places they were never intended to be 
and the lack of knowledge from the industry about what happens next. The story was 
set in motion with the testing of MEPs and environment Ministers’ blood samples in 
2003 and was extended with the testing of three generations of 13 European families, 
totalling 350 people. Results of the  series were released in 2004 (Chemical Check-
Up) and 2005 (Generations X), just before the first reading in Parliament. These 
revealed the presence of more than 70 hazardous chemicals in human blood, 
challenging the knowledge claims upon which voluntary schemes such as Responsible 
Care are based. “In some countries, it fleetingly caught the public imagination. In 
Brussels, we completely stole the agenda because, even when we were accused of 
being scaremongers, we could say that we were not scaremongering but doing 
something that a responsible industry should have done but failed to42. The industry 
admitted the story was “very, very clever” 43 and, “in the small world of Brussels, the 
only show in town for much of 2005”44.  This response from the media, particularly in 
Brussels, was considered very important during the stages in the parliament45.  
But even during the debate about costs, NGOs were able to place their own 
stories in European newspapers. Outlets like the Guardian and BBC produced 
business coverage quite critical of the watering down of the project by industry 
interests (The Guardian, 5th of November 2003) and opened space for pro-REACH 
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initiatives such as blood testing in Wales (BBC News, 26th ofJune 2003) and 
Scotland (BBC, 30th of June 2003), as well as their results (The Guardian, 23th of 
October 2003; The Observer, 24h of October 2004). Scientific findings linked to 
WWF and Greenpeace research were also published (The Guardian, 29th of April 
2003).  
Part of the criticism to REACH via mainstream media in the UK, however, did 
not come from the industry but from animal rights groups, supported by the House of 
Lords. The latter sent angry reports to the European Commission regarding the use of 
animals in the legislation framework (BBC News, 12th of March 2002). This 
happened about the same time that the Coalition to End Animal Experiments, which 
was in agreement with most of the pro-REACH claims, gained prominence in the 
debate. Their main contention was with the extent to which information is really 
unknown and with the rationale behind the calls for further tests. The story, outlined 
in an early position paper, claimed that any knowledge gap about existing chemicals 
could only be calculated after data was shared by the industry. Moreover, considering 
that a significant part of toxicity tests using animals is unreliable, requiring more tests 
is not only morally unjustifiable but part of the problem, not the solution (ECEAE 
2001). The coalition’s narrative placed, therefore, strong emphasis on alternative 
testing but supported the phasing out persistent, bio-accumulative or hazardous 
chemicals as proposed in the substitution principle (ECEAE 2001). 
The general no-test line of the animal rights story, on the other hand, was 
incorporated to one of the anti-REACH lobbying narratives, reviving a very 
unsuccessful early story about voluntary schemes and self-regulation as an effective 
information gathering mechanism. The revamped version of the industry voluntarism, 
which reached its peak during the setting up of the European Partnership for 
Alternative Approaches to Animal Testing, in 2005, was also a positive note on a 
lobbying campaign that was mainly driven by stories about the harmful nature of the 
legislation for the industry bottom line. From the release of the White Paper, the anti-
REACH narrative was an argument against a proposal leading to a “costly, 
burdensome, bureaucratic and, therefore, less effective system” that would “give the 
wrong signals to the business community. This would make Europe less attractive for 
new investments” and “could rapidly affect the success of small and medium sized 
companies, and even jeopardise the competitiveness of other industry sectors that 
depend on the chemical industry”(CEFIC, October 2001). The solution proposed was 
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the exclusion of chemicals from testing and the removal of authorisation and 
substitution procedures.  
With opinion polls showing that animal welfare was (and still is) one of the 
top concerns of Europeans  (FT, 6th of April 2000) – politically reflected in the swift 
response from the House of Lords –  the portrait of REACH as promoting animal tests 
harmed the environmental NGOs by providing the media with  ‘NGO’s split over 
regulation’ headlines and making the relationship with pro-animal parliamentarians 
such as Gunter Verheugen or Caroline Lucas more difficult in co-decision. “But I 
honestly do not think the animal rights campaigners were that happy with the industry 
pretending they were good friends because we could easily agree in many things and 
they were, like us, fighting the industry in many aspects”46.  
Stories about costs were particularly used during the Commission’s second 
draft, with constant reference to impact assessments showing the negative effect of the 
legislation on corporations across Europe. Studies such as Arthur D. Little’s report, 
widely criticised by leading German Institutes for its methodological flaws (2003), 
provided lobbyists with numbers such as 2 million of jobs losses and 20% of decrease 
in production in the worst case scenario (Arthur D.Little 2002, p.9).  The industry 
numbers were vehemently questioned but attracted public support from groups such 
as the European Mine, Chemical and Energy Workers’ Federation (EMCEF) and 
UNICE for the first time. Simultaneously, the merger between the Internal Market, 
Industry and Research into a Competitiveness Council, “a response to the perceived 
need for a more coherent and better coordinated handling of these matters related to 
the European Union's competitiveness”47, provided new story telling possibilities. Its 
remit was to probe “whether the balance between the three pillars of sustainable 
development is maintained, in particular in terms of ensuring the competitiveness of 
European enterprises” (MEMO/02/269).  
Two connected stories were subsequently created. Part of the narrative, 
summarised by UNICE in its internet comments to the Commission, was the 
connection between REACH and a damage to the competitiveness of the industry. 
“The risks of production shutdowns, limitation in the choice of chemical products 
available or relocation will have serious consequences for European industry. 
Moreover, this climate of uncertainty could hold back investments in the EU or divert 
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these investments to regions outside the EU which offer better potential for 
competitiveness”(UNICE, 2003). Another line of argument was the emphasis on a 
perceived imbalance regarding the goals of ‘sustainable development’. According to 
CEFIC, “the philosophy behind the new chemicals policy still appears to be too one-
sided in concentrating on environmental and health protection, even though we have 
already achieved extremely high standards in these areas in Europe. The draft 
regulation can therefore achieve only marginal environmental improvements at a very 
high price: If growth and employment play a secondary role, then they are the price to 
be paid” (CEFIC press release, 6th of May 2003) 
With the economic downturn and failure of the Commission to reach its own 
targets, these concerns gained support. Declarations such as Mike Gregory’s, chief 
Executive at the Mechanical and Metal Trades Confederation, that “this sort of 
regulation will simply put more manufacturing companies out of business and thus 
affect the wealth-generating future of the UK” (FT, 16th of July 2003); or Degussa 
AG's chairman Utz-Hellmuth Felcht claims that the legislation would “significantly 
weaken the company and the German economy”(Dow Jones Newswires, 21st of 
September 2003),  became politically difficult for the Commission to ignore. 
American claims that REACH would “disrupt world markets and violate international 
trade agreements” added to the pressure (AmCham, 2003). The defining moment, 
however, was the written intervention of the British, French and German 
governments. In their two letters to the Commission, Blair, Chirac and Schröder 
explicitly warned about the risk of using the industry “as a laboratory for regulatory 
experiments which increase costs or burdens on employers” (5th of February 2003) 
and asked for the Competitiveness Council to be given a major role in REACH and 
any new Community project (20th of September 2003) 
“There was a lot of excitement when people were saying that GDP was going 
to fall by 6% because of REACH. It was obviously nonsense, but how do you draw 
the heat out of it, how do you let the institutional process of making the law carry on 
and feed some sensible numbers into it?”, asks a senior civil servant working on 
REACH48. For an NGO senior coordinator, the internet consultation was a direct 
attempt to do so: “The decision to hold an internet consultation in the middle of it was 
Margot Wallström salvaging the legislation. Maybe we would not have REACH at all. 
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It was about taking the heat out of it”49. Another way was to compromise on another 
story line incorporated by the industry: the impact of REACH on SMEs, the only 
weak link of the legislation recognized by the Commission’s own impact assessment 
because of possible product withdrawals or reduced R&D (COM(2003)644 final). 
The possible negative effect of REACH on SMEs was also a concern for unions, but 
CEFIC as a storyteller did not convince insiders in DG Environment: “We’ve asked 
CEFIC how many SMEs they represented and how many of those were manufacturers 
of substances but never got the figures”50  
A  fifth narrative was developed for co-decision linked to initial claims about 
the existence of programmes informing the industry and to the ‘scientific’ basis of the 
legislation, which in turn is also linked to narratives about tests. In this story, REACH 
is unworkable in its proposed form and part of the problem is the insistence of the 
Commission in using intrinsic substances and risk instead of hazard and exposure, a 
more realistic measure (CEFIC 2003). This is also reflected on the disproportionate 
number of animal testing required. “Workability is a bit boring but it was something 
that all sides really wanted to get right and, therefore, there were arguments that could 
be played out: in principle, you will get a better environmental result if the system is 
workable. It does not mean that all agreed with it but it worked better in the 
Parliament because the greens could relate to it to some extent”51, said the interviewee 
in charge of the construction of the narrative. For the industry lobbying coordinator, 
the workability was undoubtedly their “winning story”, as it was also linked to the 
SMEs, trade unions narratives. However, while SMEs were certainly asking for 
‘workability’, part of it in their version was to make data sharing mandatory (UEPME 
2005), an issue CEFIC and large firms were fiercely lobbying against.  
There are, therefore, important links between different stories and the broader 
economic, political and, ultimately, institutional context. In the first phase of the 
legislation, environmental issues were at the top of the political agenda, supported by 
public opinion and a strong economic performance. The green story is, at this point, 
harder to refute on the basis of costs and most of the industry attempts backfire. The 
shift to the competitiveness argument was an important and more fruitful strategy not 
only because it was connected with the goals of the Commission itself (sustainable 
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development), institutionalised with the creation of a watchdog (Competitiveness 
Council), but because it resonated with national governments facing tough times. In 
Parliament, on the other hand, the costs argument did not work well and the story 
shifted towards the workability line, something that could unite different groups. 
Evidence against the knowledge the industry was claiming to have was put forward 
by NGOs in a very successful manner, with the blood tests initiative, but the 
‘division’ between environmental and animal rights NGOs, exploited by the media, 
hindered the formation of a stronger green block.  
The analysis of stories, therefore, provides a version of the episode that cannot 
be offered by an orthodox examination focused solely on the lobby tactics chosen by 
big business and federations in REACH. Strategies and stories go hand in hand, 
evolving in a symbiotic way as the policy making process moves on. If the analysis 
was restricted to business strategies, the making of the European chemical policy 
would appear as simply one more case of a powerful lobbying watering down 
inconvenient legislation; taking stories into consideration adds explanatory power to 
the analysis, shedding light on other actors, their agency and strategies and on how 
they can limit or aid business interests.    
 
Conclusion 
 
 The watering down of the European chemical legislation has been a highly 
complex exercise of business representation. Moreover, the dispute is still ongoing, 
with the comitology meetings and the work of the European Chemical Agency 
thoroughly scrutinised by both anti and pro REACH lobbying groups and a review 
scheduled to happen in 2012. A summary of the policy making process, however, 
would probably classify the final result as draw: the legislation is weaker in 
comparison to its first version, with a significant amount of substances removed from 
testing, but the industry was not able to remove authorisation and substitution 
requirements, which were the at the centre of their, and their allies’, demands.   
The main obstacle in the industry’s way was undoubtedly new actors, the 
coalition headed by the environmental NGOs, which made good use of their access to 
the DG Environment and the priority green issues were enjoying at the European 
level, a structural advantage, to construct a narrative compatible with the goals of the 
legislation. Structural biases favouring the industry were also clear later on in the 
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process, when anti-REACH pressure at national level with stories about cost and 
competitiveness paid off with the division of the Council, a central player in co-
decision, and direct interference by the biggest states in the Union. This mobilisation, 
on the other hand, can also be linked to a convergence of stories – the narrative 
connecting the legislation to high costs and lack of competitiveness is intertwined 
with media stories about the decline of European economic growth, reinforced by the 
Commission’s own admission of missed targets. This contrasts with the industry’s 
earlier narratives, of a more self-interested kind, constructed without any engagement 
with arguments further afield. The result was a stronger draft that needed to be fought 
against in the subsequent stages.   
In Parliament, a more divided terrain, stories were important to convince 
undecided MEPs to join the cause, leading both sides to develop new lines of 
approach. Even though the workability narrative was able to connect different 
interests, the institutional fight between the Parliament and the Council suggests that 
the green story about the extent of the chemical contamination, coupled with a clever 
involvement of parliamentarians of all parties in the testing, was more effective. The 
successive strengthening of authorisation and substitution by MEPs, in turn, led to the 
agreement maintaining the procedures despite the Council clear intention to remove 
them. 
The media coverage was important in particular moments because it brought 
more actors to the table (i.e. national states) after the links between the economic 
downturn and the legislation were amplified, particularly in the financial papers. The 
coverage for the pro-REACH was given space in mainstream media, particularly on 
the blood test issues, but was probably more important in Brussels. The portrayal of a 
‘division’ between animal rights and environment, however, was considered harmful 
by insiders because it compromised their relationship with key green MEPs close to 
the animal rights cause.  
REACH, therefore, shows the complexity and close links between stories that 
are constructed by different actors and their use in different moments of the process. 
Strategies that coordinate the release of these narratives at the ‘right’ stage of the 
dispute, therefore, seem to be central to the process. Alliances are important but their 
strength is enhanced when they are formed among groups with difference interests, 
producing a narrative that is a compromise of some sort. This is true for the animal 
rights/ industry coalition but also for the green coalition, which shared the story with a 
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broad membership including unions, financial institutions, women’s movement and 
even the animal rights movement itself. In the next chapter, an episode happening in 
different geographical and institutional settings will be explored, bringing new actors, 
strategies and stories to the analysis. 
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Chapter 5: The mediated story of Herceptin 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter focuses on the process leading to the approval of the drug 
Herceptin (trastuzumab) for the treatment of early-breast cancer, in August 2006, by 
the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE). The medicine, one of the first of 
a new group of genetically engineered drugs to reach the market, was approved in 
2002 for use on metastatic breast cancer patients after a one and a half year appraisal 
condemned by cancer charities as unnecessarily long. New trial results, released in 
2005 in the United States, showed that the drug also produced good results for early 
stages of HER-2 breast cancer, setting in motion intense media attention that reached 
its peak much before the drug maker, Roche, had filed for a marketing license with 
the European Medicines Evaluation Agency (EMEA). A fortnight after the EMEA 
approval, NICE widened the availability of the drug for all patients who can benefit 
from the £20.000 a year drug. 
By contrast with REACH, the “battle for Herceptin”, as some newspapers 
dubbed it, was not in any sense a classical business representation episode: it was not 
fought inside restricted committees, executive or legislative, but through the tabloids 
and the courts; it did not entail a conflict between corporations and civil society 
interests but a perceived discrepancy between government and civil society needs, 
with cancer charities and patients on one side and Primary Care Trusts (PCTs), NICE 
and the Department of Health on the other; it benefited from speeding up rather than 
delaying decision making, with the rushed process undermining NICE’s main role and 
established protocols and leaving some local authorities with the uneasy choice 
between funding Herceptin for newly eligible women or offering adjuvant cancer 
treatment to more than four times the number of patients (BMJ2006). Lastly, unlike 
most mediated episodes involving big business in the last years, the company 
benefiting from the government decision was mostly removed from the debate, 
attracting very little criticism as a result. 
The geographical and institutional differences between the cases, as explained 
in chapter III, are deliberately chosen and analytically desirable: the funding of a drug 
in England and Wales is a national decision involving a relatively new technocratic 
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body supposedly working at arms length from government and corporate influence, 
but close to patients. Thus, interactions between actors and structures are likely to 
result in strategies, alliances and stories that are dissimilar from the ones found in an 
episode where supranational bodies are involved in a multinational negotiation to 
agree on a regulation that will translate into costs to a major industry. A particularly 
relevant difference here is the massive involvement of the media, raising questions 
about the manipulation of opinion in democracies and how it can lead to the disregard, 
even briefly, of previously established rules.  
While Herceptin involves a smaller number of actors than REACH, its 
complexity lies in the intricate nature of their relationship that can be traced back to 
historical and institutional ties. The activities of pharmaceutical companies are 
intertwined with both the state, the key purchaser of its products, and the National 
Health Service (thereafter NHS), where the prescribers sit in direct contact with 
patients, the end beneficiaries of drugs. There are, therefore, social (NHS), political 
(Department of Health) and private (pharma) actors that, in the 1990s, were joined by 
charities and patient groups clustered around clinical areas or diseases. This becomes 
less tidy, however, when the state, keen to maintain the pharmaceutical industry as an 
economic flagship of innovation and profitability, has to shape the institutional and 
regulatory environment in which the industry and the NHS interact while remaining 
the main customer of the former, a sponsor of the latter and answerable to citizens. 
Civil society members, on the other hand, are patients, voters, tax payers and 
consumers.  
It is sensible, thus, to briefly review these historical issues in the first part of 
the chapter, highlighting the roles of different actors and the structures that were 
created to provide and regulate medical services and medicines in the United 
Kingdom. Of particular importance are the developments of the past two decades, not 
only because this is when civil society started to challenge big business, particularly 
pharmaceutical companies, but also when significant changes in the health system in 
Britain brought new mechanisms to deal with medicines, their approval and funding 
(Moran 1999), and new actors like patient bodies were officially invited to become 
part of the decision making process (Wood 2000). Questions about access, the 
organisation of new actors and institutional particularities, as well as new alliances 
and strategies that have developed in the last two decades are some of the issues dealt 
with by this section.  
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The second part of the chapter moves on to the case itself, describing the first 
round of approval in 2002 but mainly concentrating on the process that led to the 
extending of the drug to early stage patients, concluded in 2006. Having considered 
the actors and structures in the first part, this section focuses on the intersections 
between the two. What kinds of stories were told, where and by whom? Were stories 
conflicting? Were stories accompanied by particular initiatives? Did actors form 
explicit alliances? What kind of media was involved and how was the episode 
portrayed? The existence of two subsequent episodes involving the same actors, 
institutions and drug adds a twist to the analysis of these issues, with the most 
important question being what could be learned from the first episode that might have 
helped Roche to obtain its goal in the second round.  
 
1.  A historical perspective on actors and institutions 
 
 The NHS was created on the 5th of July 1948. Britain was among the first 
Western countries to offer free medical care at the point of treatment to its citizens 
independently of levels of contribution, pooling the risk equitably across the whole 
population and bringing together hospitals, doctors, nurses, pharmacists, opticians and 
dentists under the same umbrella. Whilst most politicians were in agreement that the 
provision of health care in Britain, until then following Lloyd George’s National 
Insurance Act of 191152, was inadequate in both coverage and quality, labour Health 
Secretary Aneurin Bevan’s biggest challenge was to secure support from the medical 
profession, opposing the new plans. The dilemmas were mainly about how to 
integrate hospital and general practitioner services and keep high quality standards, 
professional autonomy, public accountability and the profession’s participation in 
decision making (Klein 2006).  
The British Medical Association  had particular problems with any proposal 
“which appeared to turn general practitioners into public servants”(Ib., p.10). Thus, a 
centrally run NHS would only become a reality after a series of concessions: general 
practitioners were allowed to work as independent contractors within the system and 
consultants (hospital specialists) were given the right to practice privately and retain 
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 The National Health Insurance, introduced in 1911 by the Liberal Government, aimed to maintain the 
income of sick workers and provide personal health services and was maintained via contributions of 
the state, employers and employee.  The scheme was the first time the state became involved in 
providing personal health services. 
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control over conditions of employment (Wally, Mossialos et al. 2004, p.6). In 
practice, the new system was about the government providing the money and the 
medical profession deciding how to spend it, a tacit agreement called “the politics of 
the double bed” by Rudolf Klein (1990). Instead of a domination of the state 
bureaucracy over professionalism, Klein argues, the situation was one of mutual 
dependency: if doctors became employed by the state and dependent on it for 
resources, the state became dependent on these professionals to run the NHS and deal 
with problems of rationing scarce resources, disguising political decisions as clinical. 
But tensions would soon arrive. For the state, the problem was that, even 
though doctors made decisions on how to spend funds, it was the government who 
was ultimately accountable for what happened in the NHS; medical professionals, on 
the other hand, were working on tight budgets and the gap between what was 
affordable in the UK compared to other Western countries was widening. These 
problems were at the core of the NHS reorganisation (unification) in 1974, which 
reinforced the “voice of the expert” into the structure (Klein 2006, p.69) and prepared 
the shift to a managerial efficiency doctrine. In 1991, further reforms directly 
impacted the double bed agreement, with doctors receiving indicative drug budgets 
and purchasers and providers becoming separate roles. Moreover, local health 
authorities were required to publish their plans and have contracts specifying the type 
of services they were providing for the population53.  
Geographic variations in the access of care, which would become a media 
favourite under the catchy name of postcode lottery, started to become visible. 
Waiting lists were increasing, NHS institutions were failing the minimum standards 
set by the Patient’s Charter and resources were tighter. Hostile academic and media 
coverage of the shortcomings was also increasing. Under these pressures, “the tacit 
arrangement was beginning to break down” (Harrison and McDonald 2007, p.87). 
Support was building for a central government body deciding what should be 
available on the NHS, a demand that would be met with the creation of the National 
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), in 1999, and the Scottish 
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 The solution found by the Conservative government for the rationing in the NHS was a creation of an 
internal market and competition with professional management in the public sector; standard-setting, 
performance measurement and target setting; emphasis on output controls linked to resource allocation; 
disaggregation of units into purchaser-provider functions, introduction of contracting; shift to 
competition and cost cut; emphasis on private sector management style; and discipline in resource use. 
In (Hunter 1997) 
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Medicines Consortium (SMC), in 2001, introducing an additional regulatory stage to 
the process of prescribing.  
 
1.2 Research and marketing: the Pharma elixir 
 
The link between research and development in medical science and the 
pharmaceutical industry started with the discovery of penicillin, in 1928, and gained 
scope and speed with the introduction of antibiotics in the 1940s (Abraham and Lewis 
2002). When the NHS was created, the strategy for success was based on two pillars: 
a very visible research and development area, which experienced a threefold increase 
in tandem with the number of new chemical entities introduced in the market 
(McIntyre 1999); and a much less obvious marketing and advertising activity aimed at 
doctors in charge of prescriptions. The idea of research-driven companies was central 
for the justification of high prices of products: ethical drugs are expensive to develop 
and should be protected by patents. If firms are not able to recover the money and 
time spent with research and development, they will choose not to do so. Despite the 
selling of over the counter and even generic drugs, the bulk of profits come from 
ethical drugs: “the larger part of the turnover, and an even larger share of profit, in 
giant pharma companies is in ethicals” (Froud, Johal et al. 2006, p.153-154). In 2002, 
companies had over 80% of sales revenue coming from ethical drugs. 
The slowdown of scientific advances and the tightening of regulation 
following drug safety problems in the 1950s and 1960s forced a change in business 
model: instead of a constant flow of new chemical entities, companies started to have 
one innovative medicine turned into a champion through heavy marketing to 
prescribers. Patent protection secures market share for a minimum amount of time, 
particularly important for blockbuster drugs; conversely, patent expiry brings huge 
anxiety for most companies. Moreover, companies also rely on the launching of the 
so-called me-too products54  and different versions of the same drug that can extend 
patent times. In this marketing driven environment, phase IV trials, happening after 
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 Me too medicines are variants of existing products that do not represent significant discoveries. They 
usually have slight molecular alterations allowing a new patent. In the US, between 1989 and 2000, 
only 35% of the drugs approved by the Food and Drugs Administration (FDA) related to new chemical 
entities – in other words, of 1,035 drug applications, 674 contained an active ingredient that were 
already in the market. For the complete report, see (Hunt 2002) 
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the drug has received licensing approval, are key sources of promotional material on 
drug efficacy.  
Pharmaceutical companies, therefore, are dependent on the actions of both 
groups of actors in charge of the ‘social’ body represented by the NHS: the 
government and doctors. On the one hand, doctors and other health professionals have 
to be courted to prescribe the expensive ethical drugs that increasingly display very 
little difference from one another. On the other, the state holds the key for profitability 
in two ways: cost-recovery is linked to patents, defined by regulation, and states are 
usually the largest buyers.  Therefore, keeping patent life unchanged, simplifying 
approval procedures and convincing the main purchaser to accept high prices are 
central regulatory issues for pharma, whose favourable framework has been 
historically secured with high expenditure on lobbying and political contributions. 
 
1.3 The state, the budget and the flagship export industry 
 
Drug prices were seen as part of the problem of matching demand and supply 
in the NHS from an early stage. Hovering around 10% of the total costs, drugs 
became an immediate target for savings because they answer for one third of the 
variable costs in a budget made up of 70% fixed expenditure. From 1948 to 1996, ten 
different measures were taken to try to restrain the growth of the medicine bill with 
very little success (Griffin 1996). The establishment of committees to consider how 
the costs of NHS drugs could be rationalised was also used to try and restrain 
escalating costs (Abraham 1995, p.57). The first was the Joint Committee on 
Prescribing, set up in 1949 to consider whether doctors should be restricted from 
prescribing drugs whose efficacy was dubious and branded versions of common 
drugs. In 1953, the Committee started working on a list of directly advertised 
medicines to ban them from NHS prescribing, triggering a prompt response from the 
Association of British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI). 
Under pressure for previous misleading advertisement, the Association found 
the answer to the problem in the merger with the Pharmaceutical Export Group. 
Instead of arguing for the protection of an industry partly responsible for the health 
budget imbalance, the ABPI framed the proposed rationing as a threat to the 
development of a relevant export industry in a country desperate for exports after the 
WWII. The argument was that removing well-known branded drugs and banning 
 130 
products from NHS prescription would affect the visibility and reputation of British 
products abroad. At that point, one third of proprietary drugs produced in the UK 
were exported. The lobbying would result in a different agreement: the Voluntary 
Price Regulation Scheme.  
The Scheme, later renamed Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS), 
aimed to be an unified answer to the multiple problems of saving money, protecting 
the health of citizens and supporting industrial growth. The first arrangement, 
established in 1957 between the Department of Health and individual drug companies 
represented by the ABPI, was an attempt to keep minimal regulation and “to achieve 
the health policy goal of cost containment and the industrial policy goal of a 
successful and internationally competitive pharmaceutical industry”(Sedgley 2001, 
p.13). The complex system is a combination of profit controls, with a cap on the 
return of capital (ROC) of companies selling to the NHS, and price control55 that 
gives companies freedom to set the initial price of new active substances, but restricts 
subsequent price increases and might include agreed price cuts. 
The industry would come under fire again, in the 1960s, following subsequent 
scandals regarding the safety of drugs such as the Thalidomide56, which ignited a 
heated debate about regulation. Lord Cohen, chairman of the Joint Committee on 
Prescribing, revealed that in 1961 more than half of the drugs issued had not been 
clinically tested and that information provided to physicians was inaccurate. The 
controversy led the Parliament to advocate a new system of licensing involving the 
Medical Research Council or a public institution like the American Food and Drugs 
Administration (FDA). A Committee on the Safety of Drugs  was created in 1964 but 
very little changed: the average process of appraisal only took three months and, in 
the first year, of the 600 submissions, only 15 were rejected (Abraham 1995, p.68). 
Harder measures were brought up a few more times, after other scandals involving 
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 To calculate the amount the company can charge the NHS for all its products, the Department of 
Health values fixed assets on a historic cost basis and, after taking into account allowances for cost on 
research and development, promotion and information, applies a special formula. If the return on 
capital is not reached each year, the company can raise the prices of other drugs in its basket and, 
conversely, if it exceeds the permitted return, it should reimburse the excess. 
56
 In the US, the case caused even more public outrage since the drug was not approved by the Food 
and Drugs Administration (FDA) and still millions of tablets were distributed to doctors for clinical 
testing purposes (Id, p.84). In the US, the Thalidomide case was the origin of the Kefauver Harris 
Amendment or Drug Efficacy Amendment of 1962, expanding the powers of the FDA and demanding 
stricter control over efficacy and safety of drugs. By 1972, as a consequence of the legislation, the FDA 
ordered the withdrawal of 1,925 of the estimated 4,000 drugs in circulation (Warden 1992).   
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drug safety reached the news, but the response has systematically favoured keeping 
the industry’s autonomy and secrecy over its own data.  
 
1.4 The 1990s and 2000s  
 
With the NHS reforms of 1991, doctors were at the receiving end of more 
bureaucratic rules, clear targets, budgets and new management policies. The power of 
the medical profession established in the early 1950s had become more linked to 
technical activities such as the prescription of drugs and contribution to the process of 
drawing guidelines. The latter was a consequence of the shift to evidence-based 
medicine57 addressing the problem of rationing and the safety concerns alluded above. 
In this context, medical doctors, the ‘voice of the expert’, were naturally involved, and 
the legitimacy of the recommendations would be challenged otherwise.  
Rationing in the NHS, albeit present since its inception through doctor-led 
gate-keeping, became a hot topic for both media and academic observers in the 1990s, 
when it started to be causally linked to the failures of the system. Thus, a range of 
government policies aiming at improving the services was offered. When Labour 
returned to office in 1997, the NHS struggled with a combination of tight budgets and 
failed targets. With a reform plan outlined in two policy documents58, the government 
tried to restore public confidence in its ability to provide rapid access to high quality 
care and solve the geographical differences in care, the postcode lottery. The answer 
was the establishment of NICE, in April 1999 (and its Scottish counterpart, in 2001).  
The Institute epitomised the scientific-bureaucratic medicine proposed by the 
Conservative government in 1991(Harrison and Checkland 2008). While NICE was 
primarily a vehicle to influence clinical practice in line with evidence, its functions 
were upgraded when officially published by the Labour government: the mission was 
to appraise not only the effectiveness but also the cost-effectiveness of clinical 
interventions and drugs, giving authoritative advice on what should be funded by the 
NHS. In a nutshell, the value story for pharmaceutical companies had just become 
more complex: a drug has to be clinically effective and its effectiveness has to come 
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 There are many models of evidence-based medicine, but generally it implies the analysis of cause 
and effect –that is, the impact of interventions on relevant health outcomes. For a detailed explanation, 
see (Harrison and Checkland 2008)  
58
 The New NHS: Modern, Dependable, outlined in 1997, and A First Class Service: Quality in the 
New NHS, a 1998 document. 
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at a proportional cost. Moreover, appraisals delay months of sales revenue, as Trusts 
usually deny the reimbursement of non-accessed drugs. The main political argument 
was that the unevenness of care would come to an end, as guidelines should be 
followed throughout England and Wales. 
The new body, operating at arms-length from ministerial control, was 
designed to use a wide range of experts in its analysis and guidance, but consultations 
should have representatives of all stakeholders on its board and committees. For the 
first time, patients had direct access to a process that used to be an exclusive domain 
of civil servants and doctors, subjected to indirect pressure from companies. The 
Citizens Council and the Partners Council was the chosen institutional form: the 
former comprises 30 people from various backgrounds and contributes to the 
development of guidance but does not interfere on specific appraisals; the latter is a 
standing panel of 40 members involved in the appraisals. Roughly half of these are 
NHS health professionals (mainly doctors), about a quarter are patient representatives 
and the remainder come from the health industry, unions representatives, health 
managers and quality organisations (Quennell 2003).  
The inclusion of citizens in the decision making process was politically 
necessary: as with the environment, civil society engagement in health issues was a 
fast growing area, after a timid start back in the 1970s linked to safety scandals and 
consumer rights (Abraham and Lewis 2002, p.72). In the UK, 25 health consumer 
groups59 were formed between 1961 and 1980 in contrast with 66 groups established 
from 1981 to 2003. In the last two decades of the 20th century, there was also a 
significant increase in the number of alliances between groups (Jones, Baggott et al. 
2003), as well as de facto mergers.  Despite the uneven level of financial resources, 
most charities aim to influence policy, with some being able to employ staff to work 
specifically on these matters (Ibidem). There is, however, a distinction that is relevant 
to this chapter: global NGOs linked to health and development have relentlessly 
targeted big pharma since the 1990s, with Oxfam and Médecins Sans Frontiers (MSF) 
exposing how the high cost of drugs and trade/patent agreements are leading to death 
in poor countries, AIDS in Africa as the most striking example. National groups, 
however, are focused on patients as consumers, providing information about drugs, 
treatments and active advocacy for patients’ rights.  
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 Health consumer groups are part of a voluntary sector including research charities and welfare 
support groups from rare to common diseases. 
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Thus, unlike organisations like Médecins Sans Frontiers, the relationship 
between national charities and drug makers is not necessarily hostile. In fact, the co-
operation between companies and patient groups has grown at the same pace as the 
creation of health advocacy charities. A 1999 survey of 123 British health consumer 
groups found that 60% of organisations reported contact with the pharmaceutical 
industry regarding issues of disease awareness and sponsorship of publications, 
meetings and conferences (Baggott, Allsop et al. 2004). Financial support, however, 
has not been properly disclosed, making it hard to tell the independent lobbying 
groups from the ‘astroturf’ lobbying, the capture of grassroots organisations by 
powerful actors or even the creation of fake front groups (Savage 1995; Beder 1998).  
This kind of strategy is openly acknowledged by PR gurus such as Michael 
Durand, managing director for healthcare strategy and planning for Ogilvy Public 
Relations: “Product managers see advocacy groups as allies to help advance brand 
objectives, like increasing disease awareness, building demand for new treatments and 
helping facilitate FDA clearance of their drugs” (2006). In Europe, where direct to 
consumer advertisement of medicines is banned, these obscure relationships are even 
more useful and controversial. The European Patients’ Forum, for instance, was 
established in January 2003 as a response to the calls of the European Union to have a 
pan-European patient body and occupies a key position in EU consultation, but is 
90% industry funded (Scrip, 2005). Ball et al. found that only one third of the 69 UK 
groups analysed stated clearly where their funds have come from and only four out of 
69 stated advertising and conflict of interests (2006). 
These links have proved fruitful within NICE. Despite a couple of highly 
controversial cases in NICE’s first year of functioning, with the refusal of Relenza60 
(The Independent, 5th of October1999) and Beta Interferon (Crinson 2004) causing a 
media uproar that prompted the Prime Minister to defend the new institution, episodes 
involving alliances between the industry and patient groups fared well. Of the 13 
appeals regarding technology appraisals processed by NICE from 2000 to 2002, all 8 
cases in which the industry or patient groups were the sole appellants were rejected. In 
contrast, four of the five cases in which both appealed simultaneously had at least part 
of the complaint accepted by the Commission. They were referred back for re-
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 In receipt of new clinical data, NICE conceded limited approval for Relenza. But then it was time for 
doctors to rebel against the guidelines because they were still “unconvinced of the benefits”(The 
Guardian, 11th of December 2000) 
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evaluation and  eventually “the objectionable NICE guidance was rejected” 
(Duckenfield 2003). This relationship, according to one interviewee, is desirable and 
encouraged to a certain extent. “It is important for companies to align with patient 
bodies because they can have an impact on the decision and they are allowed to have 
an impact”.61   
According to the chairman of a patient group and member of a NICE appraisal 
committee, the more specialised the charity, the more likely it will run the risk to 
become too close to a pharmaceutical company. “Charities that have a narrow focus, 
say breast cancer, are in a difficult position because they potentially only have two or 
three companies to turn to. There is a greater risk that they will become in the pockets 
of one company or will be perceived as being in their pockets”62. The quid pro quo, 
however, is becoming more sophisticated. While the request for the support of a 
particular product or drug made by the company for an appraisal is common and even 
encouraged, companies are now savvier in their approach: “If they set up a charity or 
do other up front moves, which they also do, it is obvious. But there are other cleverer 
ways and some companies, knowing what is coming on stream years in advance, are 
playing the long game. They develop long term relationships with selfish goals. It is 
less direct than setting a charity but much harder to detect”63.  
The shift to evidence-based medicine also provided the industry with a new 
avenue to influence doctors other than blunt marketing: the artificial creation of 
clinical consensus, usually through sponsored trials and ghost-written pieces. In 
charge of the research agenda, most of the funding and sole owner of the raw data of 
trial results, companies started to manage the scientific literature, “engineering 
clinical consensus that favour their product even in the absence of scientific basis of 
the superiority of the new product, usually much more costly than older ones”, 
according to Prof. David Healy’s memorandum to the House of Commons probe 
about the Influence of the Pharmaceutical Industry (2004). Richard Horton, editor of 
the medical journal The Lancet, called journal supplements “little more than 
information-laundering operations for industry”(Select Committee on Health, 2004).  
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The process of engineering clinical consensus starts with an external agency 
drawing a detailed strategy for the dissemination of a drug, from the organisation of 
scientific conferences and meetings to writing articles and setting up websites. A key 
part of it is a publication plan, including a review of the scheduled trials to decide 
“what kind of paper could be written, when they could be written (depending on when 
data becomes available), who the authors could be and which journals it could go to, 
depending on content and authors involved”64.  These articles would not show the 
name of the medical writer or a disclaimer about the agency or its work for the 
pharmaceutical company. “When I worked as a medical writer we simply wrote the 
paper and phoned around a number of people, doctors, asking: we’ve written this 
paper, would you like to be an author?”65 The use of ghost-written articles has only 
recently started to be debated among medical professionals and scientists (Smith 
2005; Smith 2006; Moffatt and Elliott 2007; Gøtzsche, Hrobjartsson et al. 2009; 
Hirsch 2009). The mention of the practice in the House of Commons review prompted 
a change of guidelines from the European Medical Writers Association (Jacobs and 
Wager 2005).  
In sum, the Herceptin case, to be reviewed next, is a story played in a scenario 
that differs quite strongly from the one set up in 1948, with the 1990s as a clear 
turning point. The shift to professional management and evidence-based medicine of 
the NHS reforms in 1991 changed the relationship between the three main actors. The 
medical profession moved into a more technical role as the expert assessing medicines 
and procedures from a scientific, evidence informed point of view. This role, in turn, 
was institutionalised with the creation of NICE, the technical body designed to make 
the uncomfortable political decisions about rationing on the behalf of the government. 
The growth of health consumer groups has been partially spurred by an opposite aim: 
to gain space in the public arena to influence policy making and fight any perceived 
discrimination, particularly if linked to costs.  
 
2. The battle for the drug 
 
Herceptin (trastuzumab), a breast cancer drug created by US biotech enterprise 
Genentech, was approved by the FDA in September 1998, after the medicine was 
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granted priority review and fast tracked. Targeting a particularly aggressive kind of 
cancer, tumours with an overactive gene called HER-2 that spurs growth, Herceptin 
was one of the first genetically engineered drugs to reach the market, developed to 
add months or years to the lives of patients in advanced stages of the disease. 
Designed to be used in conjunction with a genetic test, Herceptin enhances the effects 
of the chemotherapy by starving the tumour of nutrients. Between 20% and 30% of 
women test positive for HER 2 and, before Herceptin, the disease often killed within a 
year of being diagnosed. In the first release of trial results, at the opening of the 
American Society of Clinical Oncology Convention in May 1998, reports about the 
drug were greeted “with cautious optimism” (The New York Times, the 18th of May 
1998).  
Roche, the Swiss blue chip that owned 66% of Genentech, signed an 
agreement to market Herceptin outside the United States in July 1998 and the 
approval of the European Union was given in August 2000. In the UK, however, the 
company would not be able to get a rapid uptake: with the recently created NICE, 
health authorities would wait until official guidance was issued to start to foot the 
over £20,000-a-year bill for the treatment. Since its decision about Relenza, NICE 
was on the top of the love-to-hate list of pharmaceutical companies. Even the 
approval of two very costly cancer drugs (Taxol and Taxorene) for ovarian and breast 
cancer, in May 2000, did little to relieve the tension. The general view of the industry 
was that NICE was rationing vital drugs and being too slow to decide. The Beta 
Interferon decision, a month later, would sour the relationship between the two even 
further66.  
Amid this hostile climate, Roche submitted Herceptin for NICE approval in 
December 2000.  The process for late stages of HER-2 positive cancer took 15 months 
inside NICE committees. While the case was being analysed, patients launched 
campaigns to get Herceptin funded by the NHS in their area but very little about the 
drug and the individual cases made headlines: Dorothy Griffiths’ story in 
Staffordshire was followed by a single outlet, the local paper The Sentinel, and she 
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won the right to have the drug funded in November 2001; Michelle Hilton, in the 
North West, made the news because she died two days after the local authority agreed 
to pay for the drug (The Daily Mail, 5th of October 2001). The Daily Mail also 
published one article about postcode lottery (24th of July 2001), a discussion that 
would be taken up by The Guardian and The Independent in March 2002, when NICE 
issued the guidance for the drug. Cancer charities, patient groups and the industry, 
whilst welcoming the decision, accused NICE of “unnecessary delay to end “postcode 
prescribing”. Meanwhile, Primary Care Trusts refused to pay pending NICE decision 
throughout the appraisal (The Guardian, 16th of March 2002). 
Funding the new drug was going to cost the government about £17 million a 
year with circa two thousand women likely to benefit from the approval (FT, 16th of 
March 2002).  Prescription rates, however, were still below expectations one year 
after NICE’s decision. In October 2003, Roche provided CancerBACUP, a charity 
that would play a crucial role in the second round of approval, with evidence of the 
unevenness in geographical terms. According to the survey, the comparison of the 
sales region by region with the projected number of women who could benefit from it 
showed that the access to Herceptin varied widely from one region to another. Only 
14% of women in the Midlands were being given the drug while 61% in the South 
West were being prescribed (Roche 2003). The bottom line was that 50% of the 
women eligible to the drug were not receiving it.  
The line of cancer drug lottery was widely publicised by CancerBACUP, with 
Joanna Rule, the charity’s CEO, explicitly pointing out that “'There is no monitoring 
either by NICE or the Department of Health of whether their guidance is being 
followed by the NHS” (The Daily Mail, 16th of October 2003). The figures made 
headlines in most newspapers leading John Reid, then Health Secretary, to demand 
“to know why some health authorities are reluctant to prescribe drugs that are 
recommended nationally”. The government's cancer tsar, Professor Mike Richards, 
was asked to carry out an investigation to find out if patients are being denied cancer 
drugs (BBC News, 28th of October 2003). The next day,  speaking to the FT, Joanna 
Rule added that “the next step is surely that the new Commission for Health Audit 
and Inspection should be obliged to audit, publish and enforce national cancer 
standards, including the availability of NICE recommended treatments”(FT, 29th of 
October 2003). These were the last media articles about Herceptin until 2005, when 
new trial results were ready to be released. 
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2.1 The second round 
 
The process of approval of Herceptin for late stage breast cancer, therefore, 
displayed two characteristics: there was very little media surrounding the case, with 
scarce coverage about individual patients and not much about the drug itself, even 
though the debate about postcode lottery gained some traction after CancerBACUP’s 
intervention in 2003; secondly, once the technocratic process of appraisal started, it 
got enclosed in NICE’s committees, following its usual long course, led mainly by 
health professionals and health economists. Roche issued very little information about 
the drug during this time, with only one of the seven statements released by the 
company from 1998 to 2002 making reference to results and scientific data (Roche, 
15th of March 2001), an unusual procedure. “When the drug is about to be launched, 
there will be another phase of producing papers and meetings which will continue 
after the drug is marketed, establishing its name and keeping people aware”67.  
When the results of the HERA trials (phase 3) linked to early breast cancer 
were about to be released in 2005, however, the strategy was markedly different and 
more in line with the practice described above. The first to break the news was the 
National Cancer Institute, the medical facility conducting the randomised trials of the 
drug in the US. According to the report, “patients with early-stage breast cancer who 
received Herceptin in combination with chemotherapy had a significant decrease in 
risk for breast cancer recurrence compared with patients who received the same 
chemotherapy without trastuzumab”, an important achievement because HER-2 
positive tumours grow faster and are more likely to return (24th of April 2005). The 
report states that patients receiving trastuzumab in combination with standard 
combination chemotherapy had a 52 percent decrease in cancer recurrence compared 
to patients treated with chemotherapy alone, quoting scientists describing the drug as 
“truly lifesaving”.  
Roche followed suit to announce the results through its own press office (26th 
of April 2005), a procedure also adopted in other key moments of the process: new 
favourable trial data was made public by Roche in May and June 2006 (3rd of June 
2006; 29th of May 2006), straight after the new indication of the drug had been 
approved by the European Medicines Evaluation Agency (EMEA) but still needed a 
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NICE stamp. There was a clear clinical value story being used this time too: Herceptin 
was effective compared with placebo and other treatments, something that can be 
argued across different countries. The problem for Roche, therefore, was to create a 
convincing complement to the narrative about the cost-effectiveness of Herceptin for 
the particular British context in which “what they really want to know is how many 
life years do you gain and how much survival do you get for the money”? 68 Part of 
the answer is to deflect attention from the price or, rather, making sure “the drug is 
seen as having a good benefit so that it balances the price”69.  
Media coverage worked most of the time in Roche’s favour, partially because 
of the particularities of the British debate surrounding medical care. Throughout the 
process, newspapers based their stories in two lines: one was about the life saving 
character of the drug, used by all kinds of media outlets but more common in 
broadsheet and financial newspapers; the other focused on rationing and postcode 
lottery, with refusals to fund the drug from the part of local authorities fuelling the use 
of individual stories, particularly in tabloids. While both story lines were compatible 
and frequently used together, emphasis on the former or the latter depended on the 
type of newspaper and timing of the process. The narrative about the new and 
miraculous nature of Herceptin started to circulate straightaway, with The Guardian 
(27th of April 2005) publishing an article with quotes about how “the NHS needs to 
make immediate provision” for Herceptin one day after the new results were 
announced by Roche.  
The Wall Street Journal Europe referred to ‘cure’ despite the follow up period 
of the drug reaching only 18 months of the usual 60 required. The article reproduced 
the opinion of Eric Winer, from Dana-Farber Cancer Institute in Boston:“HER2 
positive may very well be the first subtype of breast cancer where we look back and 
say: we cured this type of breast cancer”(15th of July 2005). Tabloids were 
unsurprisingly drawn to superlatives: after being dubbed the magic bullet or wonder 
drug by The Daily Mail (19th of September 2005), Herceptin coverage included only 
positive specialist opinion. George Sledge, a breast cancer specialist in Indiana, told 
The Daily Mail that Herceptin produced “the most stunning results in a clinical trial in 
my entire career”, while cancer consultant Andrew Wardley, from the Christie’s 
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Hospital and Manchester University, stated that “it does not only shrink the cancerous 
tumour, it eradicates the cancer” ( 4th of October 2005).  
Within the scientific community, the debate was more controversial, with 
professionals considering Herceptin as one of the biggest breakthroughs in the history 
of oncology and others showing more caution. The results of the US trials published 
in October 2005 in the New England Journal of Medicine were greeted by the British 
Medical Journal as “stunning”. The American Medical Association, however, called 
for some sort of “scepticism”, while The Lancet called the excitement “premature” 
and “profoundly misleading”, arguing that was insufficient evidence to make reliable 
judgements on the drug’s efficacy and safety and calling for cooler heads. Reported 
by the FT, NICE’s chairman, Sir Michael Rawlins, claimed that the evidence 
published in medical journals was far from the necessary data taken into consideration 
before the licensing authority can give a verdict: “A couple of clinical trials published 
in a medical journal are woefully inadequate for really assessing the safety and 
efficacy of a product”(FT, 11th of November 2005). 
 
2.2 The dossiers, patients and the fast-tracking of Herceptin  
 
The mediated frenzy started to gather pace and endurance, particularly in the 
tabloids, when requests for funding started to be refused and local authorities were 
taken to court. A series of high profile cases kept the Herceptin case in the headlines. 
The very first high profile case was Jo-Anne Leese, a 30 year-old from Cheshire, who 
was pregnant when the illness was detected. She had an emergency C-section to be 
able to start chemotherapy but was denied Herceptin prescribed by her cancer 
specialist. Her story shared the tabloid headlines with another piece on Herceptin: 
charity Cancer BACUP had just released a ‘dossier of delay’(May2005), a list with 
the12 new cancer treatments that would take longer to reach patients because of NICE 
appraisal processes, including Herceptin for early stages. According to the patient 
group, Herceptin could only be expected by February 2009 and, therefore, should be 
fast tracked. After the dossier, Patricia Hewitt defended NICE and its approval 
process, as well as the independence of local health providers, but announced a 
decision to make an early referral of two cancer drugs to NICE in advance of it 12th 
work programme: one was Herceptin and the other Velcade (bortezomib) for multiple 
myeloma, also in the dossier.  
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At the core of Hewitt’s statement was that Herceptin could be prescribed even 
before NICE guidance if PCT or NHS trusts agreed to supply it at NHS expense and 
the doctor retained clinical responsibility for the patient. “I have decided that an early 
referral of Herceptin is necessary to allow NICE to begin preliminary work on the 
development of advice to the NHS on the clinical and cost effectiveness of these 
treatments and react as soon as possible after the drug is licensed” (Government News 
Network, 20th of July 2005)  
A few months later, the story of Barbara Clark, a 49 year-old nurse from 
Somerset, brought the discussion about rationing back in the agenda when she 
launched a landmark lawsuit against the Health Service to be given Herceptin. Clark 
argued her case on the grounds of the Human Rights Act by stating that the NHS was 
denying her “the right to life” by not assuring equality of treatment. Mother of a 
terminally ill adopted son, Clark had already put her house on the market to be able to 
afford the drug her consultant believed could save her life. In her support, the charity 
Fighting for Herceptin, led by Dorothy Griffiths, presented a petition of 34 thousand 
signatures to Tony Blair. She won her plea when Somerset Coast Primary Care Trust 
agreed to pay because of her ‘exceptional circumstances’, but was still refusing the 
drug to other patients.  
Her court case and deal was a turning point for the government’s story, with 
the Health Secretary going public to announce that Herceptin would be made 
available on the NHS to any women who needed it and that all women should be 
tested to see if their tumours are susceptible to the drug (The Guardian, 6th of October 
2005). Whilst the growing pressure from the press was certainly an important factor 
for the Department of Health’s change of heart, another issue is more likely to have 
triggered it: the release, in September, of the Audit Commission for Local Authorities 
in England and Wales’ report on the management of NICE guidance by local trusts 
demanded by Cancer BACUP in 2003. The document, compiled in partnership with 
NICE (2005), showed that while funding was indeed a problem for the 
implementation of guidance, a greater barrier was the local financial management 
arrangements.   
While the official response from the Department of Health to the study was to 
defend the independence of its Trusts, stressing that “NHS bodies must make their 
own decisions about whether or not to fund new drugs based on all the available 
evidence”, Hewitt’s public statements had another message. She not only promised 
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that denials could not be justified on the grounds of cost but made a public reprimand 
to North Stoke’s PCT when Elaine Barber, a mother of four who accused health 
managers of “leaving her to die”(Daily Mail, 9th of November 2005), had her 
treatment denied. An agreement was reached after Hewitt’s intervention, avoiding 
legal action by the patient. 
The emphatic response from the Health Secretary was probably helped by 
another report: a study by the Karoliska Institute and Stockholm School of Economics 
(Wilking and Jonsson 2005). Reviewing the uptake of cancer drugs in Europe, the 
researchers placed Britain nearly at the bottom of a 19-nation league table. Their 
analysis considered the speed of adoption of newest cancer drug therapies for breast 
cancer, colorectal cancer, lung cancer and non Hodgkin’s lymphoma. Austria, Spain 
and Switzerland were considered the top three, while the UK was placed with Poland, 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Norway in the below-average category. The report also 
considered ‘structural’ hindrances for the uptake of new drugs and singled NICE out 
as a main culprit for the delays. “While a positive NICE review should lead to more 
rapid and wider access to new treatments, there is, in fact, an issue with NICE’s 
capacity to cope with the growing workload of evaluations and undertake such 
reviews ”(Ibidem, p.5). On the bottom of the first page of the report, in smaller print, 
is the acknowledgment that the project “was supported by an unrestricted grant from 
F. Hoffmann La Roche Ltd, Basel, Switzerland”. 
The capitulation of the Health Secretary was strongly criticised by health 
economists and policy makers concerned not only with the economic impact of the 
drugs on the NHS expenses but also with the risks of bypassing safety checks in 
place, another role of NICE. Expert Joe Collier fumed at the pressure the government 
was applying on its ‘independent’ bodies. “It is unacceptable that the minister should 
be pressurising the licensing authority or dictating to NICE about the proper use of 
medicines. What they should certainly do is make sure the decision by NICE is very 
fast. That would be reasonable. But this is a dangerous precedent and Patricia Hewitt 
should back off”(Ibidem). The Department of Health response was that it was not pre-
judging NICE’s view but making possible for the drug to be adopted quickly.  
A regular feature of the second round of approval of Herceptin was the 
constant media interest and the particular use of individual stories, with a series of 
women featured in different newspapers. In The Guardian, Dina Rabinovich (who 
died in October 2007) wrote a compelling weekly column about living with HER-2 
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cancer (and herceptin); in The Independent, Kasia Boddy told of her struggle with the 
NHS; The Daily Mail readers got to know a string of cancer sufferers like Emma 
Hartup, 28, Zaria Chrisostomou, 46, and Kay Brooker, 35, denied Herceptin from 
their private insurers. Even the Wall Street Journal Europe reported on Suzanne 
Digwood’s plight (WSJE, 2nd of May 2006). In a analysis of 362 press articles about 
Herceptin from 1998 to 2006, Wilson and his colleagues (2008) found that named 
patients were mentioned in two thirds of all included articles, with cancer charities 
mentioned in 20% of them – CancerBACUP being the most frequently referred to. 
“Four out of five articles were rated by the researchers as positive towards the drug 
with the remainder being neutral and the main narrative was about “women being 
denied access to a potentially life-saving treatment principally on the grounds of cost” 
(Ibidem, p.130) .  
A key contact point between the press and patients, on the other hand, were 
the charities themselves. “The media is difficult and they will not give you any space 
unless you give them a real personal story. Sometimes we do and the media has 
handled it well and not so well”70. In Herceptin, the involvement of the global PR 
agency Ketchum in recruiting “celebrity patients” and patient groups to get support 
for Herceptin was revealed by Sarah Boseley, health editor in The Guardian (29th of 
March 2006). In its website, Ketchum cites the work with Roche towards the creation 
of the ‘Breast Friends concept’: “Media attention was maximized by working with 
celebrities who had either been supported through breast cancer by a Breast Friend or 
who had themselves been a Breast Friend. These famous pairings were captured in 
inspirational photographs by internationally acclaimed photographer Rankin and 
shared with the world through a global touring exhibition (which launched in July 
2006) and a coffee table book, launched during Breast Cancer Awareness Month 
(October 2006) (Ketchum website). 
The use of patient groups and a public relations firm to fuel media coverage 
based in individual cases was an important move not only for keeping a stream of 
articles on the news, inserting political pressure, but also for reinforcing a logic that is 
the very opposite of what NICE is about, moving away from questions about costs. 
“Companies’ and patient groups’ perspectives are on the individual, this is their 
principle. On the decision making side, there is a different principle looking at the 
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population, at all the patient groups, and that is why they use the Quality-adjusted life 
years measurement (the ‘QALY’): how many qalys this cancer treatment gives me 
against mental health or whatever. There is a conflict and the ideal situation is to find 
a common ground. When it gets into the media, say The Daily Mail, the impact it can 
have is too much, out of balance, and in the long run it makes the system not work”71  
Another part of the strategy was the reinforcement of the charity story about 
postcode lottery. The dossier of delay could easily, and probably was, made to be 
released at the same time as Roche’s press material, as the charity knew in advance 
about the tests in the US. The same can be said about the Karolinska Institute study 
which, in fact, had been released in September but was first published in the UK when 
The Independent ‘caught’ a copy on its way to the European Parliament (The 
Independent, 4th of October 2005)72. The release of the Audit report, however, could 
not have been timed by the industry and patient groups, even though the report is the 
result of charities’ (and to some extent doctors’) complaints about lack of 
accountability about what happens with NICE guidance. There are, therefore, two 
options: either it was scheduled to be released, in which case charities might have had 
an idea of the timing, or it was released as a response to the accusations directed to 
NICE, since it pretty much detaches the institution from the blame and the behaviour 
of Trusts. For Patricia Hewitt and her story about the independence of  PCTs, 
however, the report was a serious problem.  
Her new story regarding local Trusts and what their own narratives should 
look like, on the other hand, caused further problems down the line. This is related to 
the only individual patient case that went all the way from local appeals to the PCT to 
the High Court. Ann Marie Rogers’, a former restaurant manager who borrowed 
£5000 to fund the drug but could not afford a year’s course at £20000, said that the 
refusal of Herceptin by her PCT was like “a death sentence”. Her lawyer accused the 
Trust of operating against a direction and guidelines given by Patricia Hewitt (The 
Independent, 7th of February 2006). The New York Times reported the court decision 
adding that “figures compiled by CancerBacup, a charity, showed that the number of 
breast cancer patients with access to Herceptin varied considerably across England” 
(16th of February 2006). Rogers won her High Court Appeal two months later (The 
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Independent, 13th of April 2006) on the basis of the irrationality of the denial ([2006] 
EWCA Civ 392).  
 
2.3 The approval and aftermath 
 
The sense of urgency acquired with the massive media coverage set record 
times for the approval of the drug in Europe. On the 15th of February 2006, Roche 
filed with the FDA and, two days later, with the European Medicines Agency. Using 
an “accelerated assessment” from its Committee for Human Medicinal Products, 
EMEA approved Herceptin for the early stages of breast cancer on the 24th of May 
after an appraisal lasting less than ten weeks. Fulfilling its promise, Patricia Hewitt 
approved a new scheme for NICE in which less evidence was needed, allowing fast 
guidance and, within two weeks, a draft guidance was issued expanding the 
availability of the drug to early stage HER-2 cancer patients “except where there are 
concerns about the woman’s cardiac function” (9th of June 2006). This remains the 
quickest decision about the cost-effectiveness of a drug made by NICE.  Final 
guidance was released in August. Despite similar filing dates, the FDA only released 
its verdict on the 16th of November, postponing a decision that was initially scheduled 
to happen in August to acquire extra information from Roche. The American body 
was concerned about toxicity and the links between the drug and heart and respiratory 
problems (16th of November 2006).   
After the exposure of Ketchum’s and patient groups’ work for the approval 
behind the scenes, cracks in the apparent consensus about the drug started to be 
reported. David Miles, the doctor who ran the early clinical trials of Herceptin in 
Britain, condemned the fuss around the results in an interview with The Telegraph. 
“People talk about it halving the chances of cancer recurrence. But that sounds less 
impressive when you realise you’re talking about a fall from 20% to 10% - and that 
these are preliminary results” (The Telegraph, 16th of April 2006). Lisa Jardine, a 
cancer patient and University Professor who was contacted by Ketchum to endorse 
Herceptin, talked about misleading statistics and her decision not to take the drug to 
BBC News. “The new drug seemed to promise a smallish reduction of an already 
lowish chance (of the cancer returning)” ( 30th of May 2006).   
An argument about the use of patient groups by pharmaceutical companies and 
their financial links hit the headlines, particularly after the publication of a study from 
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Patient View, the market research and publishing house, stating that only 11% of the 
largest 530 patient groups in the UK publicly stated that they receive support from the 
industry (FT, 1st of May 2006; Jack 2006). The report was released in the same day 
that a new Code of Practice (ABPI, 2006), drawn up by the ABPI to formalise the 
relationship between patient groups and companies, came into effect.  But the 
controversy, and its links with Herceptin, continued well into 2007 (The Guardian, 
21st of May 2007; BBC News, 10th of May 2007; Kent 2007; Mintzes 2007). An 
article written by doctor and breast cancer patient Jane Keidan told of the efforts of 
both tabloids and cancer charities to make her a campaigner, exposing the media 
manipulation behind the case (BMJ, vol. 334).   
 Despite the late FDA approval, off label prescribing of Herceptin (when a 
physician prescribes a drug to treat a condition for which there is no approval yet) in 
the United States was so widespread that Citigroup analysts believed the green light 
by the regulator was unlikely to increase sales further: in the first months of 2006, 
months before the FDA approval, US sales rose by 86% from the same period in 2005 
( 17th of November 2006). The revenue of SwFr 3.9 billion in 2006 corresponded to 
about 9% of Roche’s total sales. Results of the HERA trials (early breast cancer) are 
still being released and, since the battle for Herceptin, a new phase 3 of the drug for 
advanced and inoperable stomach cancer (HER-2 positive gastric cancer) was set up, 
showing that it can prolong life when combined with chemotherapy. Roche is also 
working on “innovative technology” that might allow breast cancer patients to 
administer Herceptin themselves. The new application for gastric cancer was 
approved by the EMEA in January 2010 and NICE guidance is expected in August 
2010. In 2009, Roche merged with Genentech and Herceptin was responsible for 
SwFr 5.3 billion in sales, more than 13% of total sales of the Swiss group.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Herceptin offers very different insights about the use of stories in business 
representation. The first, and perhaps most interesting, is that an effective episode of 
business representation does not need to imply a huge amount of storytelling from the 
corporation itself. This, however, is not to say that a clear story is not required. 
Roche’s narrative about the impressive results obtained in the American (and later 
European) trials of Herceptin, reinforced by an apparent consensus among specialists 
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that are running independent research on both sides of the Atlantic, is crucial and acts 
as the underlying ‘fact’ in almost every piece of media coverage up to NICE approval, 
both in tabloids and broadsheet.   
A successful part of the strategy, therefore, was to rely on two external actors 
to tell stories on the behalf of Roche: doctors, as mentioned above, reinforcing the 
clinical value narrative; and cancer patient groups, with personalised narratives that 
could deflect public attention from the high price of the drug by placing it on the 
perceived flaws of the system. The stories told by the latter, thus, were about broader 
concerns with postcode lottery and rationing rather than particularly about Herceptin. 
Even though the drug was cited most of the time, and demands were made for its 
immediate availability after every funding refusal, the dossier of delay, the European 
study and the audit report were about problems that affected patients in need of a 
variety of cancer drugs, including the case at hand. This way, patient groups were able 
to push Roche’s story about the wonder drug while being perceived as an independent 
body that has only patients’ interests in mind, not a vested interest linked to the drug 
company. 
If patient narratives are about questioning the system and not defending a 
particular drug, they had to compete/connect with the narratives that legitimate this 
system in the first place. NICE, created to provide an expert-led approach to health 
care that could end postcode lottery, has its decisions justified on the grounds of both 
sound science (evidence-based) and economic calculations (cost-effectiveness). 
Therefore, patient groups’ narratives, in a nutshell, were about how the unevenness of 
care is not solved by the combination of these logics but actually exacerbated by it. 
The government story, in between the two, was an attempt to get away with the crisis 
by sitting on the fence: supporting the drug that was being treated as a revolution, at 
the same time that the competency of the different institutions involved in taking the 
necessary decisions was defended. The media story, on the other hand, was about the 
various emotionally distressing individual cases, the documentation of the plight of 
the ‘real’ women behind different numbers and calculations that encapsulate NICE.     
 As the episode progressed, a packing order of stories started to be formed: 
dossiers, reports and studies were incorporated into the patient group narrative casting 
doubts not only on the institutions involved in the decision making process but on the 
stories that were defending their autonomy. The media frenzy combining consensual 
opinions about the superior clinical qualities of Herceptin and the emotional exposure 
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of patients’ lives, on the other hand, turned  the PCT’s refusals to fund the drug into 
clear cases of ‘rationing’ in which effectiveness is being trumped by costs. The 
government story recedes until the point in which a guarantee of payment is made by 
the Health Secretary, bypassing and neutralising the only mechanism that could 
deconstruct and challenge the apparent rhetorical consensus on less emotional 
grounds: NICE. In other words, the narrative that legitimise the technical-scientific 
foundations of health care decision making were challenged by actors flashing their 
democratic credentials and was temporarily overruled by a government unable to offer 
a story that could contain the mediated scandal. 
It is also important to note that the second round of approval differs from the 
first one in crucial points that are linked to stories: firstly, there was a much less clear 
storyline about the clinical value of the drug from Roche; secondly, patient groups 
involved in the appraisal inside NICE, including CancerBACUP, had only a specific 
story about Herceptin and the importance of its quick approval, which is a standard 
narrative for appraisal purposes. This, in turn, might also partially explain the absence 
of another storyteller: the media, uninterested in one more drug being appraised and 
supported by its main beneficiaries. It seems reasonable to assume, thus, that the 
strategy and stories for the second approval of Herceptin have their foundations in the 
first episode. 
 The next chapter takes the analysis of business representation and its stories 
from policymaking arenas to the stock market, where narratives are identified as a 
crucial tool for the management of investors’ expectations in an environment virtually 
free from direct involvement of civil society organisations. 
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Chapter 6: Shell and the tale of shareholder activism 
 
Introduction 
 
The oil giant Royal Dutch Shell spent a great deal of the 1990s fighting 
accusations that it had neglected environmental and human rights issues in the name 
of profits, a campaign that culminated in a boycott of its gasoline. The episode 
analysed in this chapter, however, is not about civil society’s outrage at Shell’s 
ecological or political record, but about an accountancy scandal involving top 
executives and the oil reserves Shell declared to securities regulators in the United 
States. The problem started in January 2004, when the company reported a 20% 
downgrade of its proven oil reserves, a Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
classification for projects supposedly ready to be developed. As reserves are an 
important figure for investment decisions in the energy sector, the news hit the share 
price and caused wild speculation about what had gone wrong. Overnight, a firm 
whose technical robustness had historically compensated for a dull management 
profile was drawn into a six-months long crisis fuelled by shareholder activism and 
media attention that resulted in the destruction of careers, the effective consummation 
of a merger that had been allowed to remain incomplete for almost a century, and the 
first revision of SEC’s oil and gas reporting requirements in 30 years. 
Shell in particular and the oil industry in general offer a sizeable sample of 
episodes that would qualify as empirically relevant for this thesis73. But the choice of 
this reserves case as the stock market example is deliberate because it touches on a 
couple of points that are inherent to the problems this work is trying to grasp. Firstly, 
it illustrates the impact of external actors’ stories on corporations and their behaviour; 
secondly, it highlights the complexity of constructing narratives and living by them 
under the watchful eyes of stakeholders with different interests (and stories). Shell’s 
handling of its communications also contrasts with a popular belief that successful 
business representation is proportional to the money corporations are able and willing 
to spend: at the time of the reserves restatement, Shell was the world’s third biggest 
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corporation according to the Fortune Global Ranking74. This, and the extensive 
investment in projects and campaigns aiming to smooth its relationship with external 
stakeholders since the 1990s, including co-operation with environmental and human 
rights NGOs and the hiring of communications guru Maurice Saatchi, could not 
prevent it from walking straight into the worse public relations disaster in its history. 
This case has noteworthy characteristics that were not present in the previous 
episodes. Firstly, there is a clear absence: unlike Herceptin and REACH, Shell’s 
dispute did not involve organised civil society in the sense of the term used in the 
previous chapters - non-governmental entities acting as advocates on particular 
‘social’ issues. This is important because the effort Shell put into understanding and 
managing civil society actors since the 1990s did not seem to be useful at all in this 
case, reinforcing the proposition that stories legitimise different things in political and 
economic arenas and, thus, are not capable of fulfilling several functions at once. On 
the other hand, this story brings in two new types of actors, with different approaches 
and levels of engagement, who had not appeared previously: securities regulators and 
institutional investors. Their role is crucial for the development of the episode and the 
purposes of this thesis because the former are the institutional structure between firms 
and the more turbulent world of politics and its stories about regulatory priorities, 
while the latter are the main recipient of corporate stories and their ultimate judge and 
executioner, as reviewed in chapter II. This brings in the characteristics of the arena, 
in which corporations are constrained by the principle of shareholder value, a 
narrative that legitimates shareholders as the main stakeholder in this particular set up.  
Secondly, the Shell case is about the unexpected delivery of bad news, which 
breaks the unwritten rules of communications between actors in the City. In other 
words, the downgrade of reserves is a crisis that put the company into the 
uncomfortable position of having to defend its credibility whist being under attack.  
These attacks, in turn, were mainly delivered through and by the media, this time 
financial newspapers rather than tabloids. This is worth mentioning because the 
collaborative nature of the production of stories circulating between corporations and 
the capital market tends to instil a consensus-like aspect to narratives, which makes 
contestation much harder (Davis 2000; 2002), particularly when the case involves 
some kind of ‘scandal’ or rule breaking behaviour from the part of firms. 
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 It is now the largest company in the world, followed by five other energy firms in the top seven, 
which means only one of the seven biggest corporations in the world is not an oil giant. 
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Points to be analysed in this chapter, thus, have to take into consideration the 
impact that the combination of actors, structures and the particular context of crisis 
can have on stories and strategies. For instance: did all actors have stories or were 
some actors more prone to story telling than others? Were stories only about the 
reserves or about other problems? These are relevant both to the case and to the 
general proposition of the thesis that stories fulfil different functions in different 
arenas partially because of the actors involved. Questions about strategies, such as the 
timing of the release of stories and the involvement of the media, connect with the 
idea of crisis as a difficult moment for corporate story telling. The role of the media 
and their own stories, which will be extensively cited throughout the chapter, is a key 
point here because they alter the balance between competing narratives in the episode. 
This, in turn, is linked with questions about alliances, their function and the 
possibilities for their creation during a media storm: were alliances being formed in 
this case and, if so, between which actors? Were they based on overlapping 
narratives? Could the damaging and far reaching consequences of the episode been 
different if Shell had been able to form alliances or produce other stories?  
Because of the particular characteristics of the stock markets and of the oil 
industry, a brief account of what integrated corporations do and the technical 
information required by regulators and investors is the starting point of the chapter, 
followed by a summary of Shell and its troubles in the past couple of decades, an 
important background element to understand the reserves restatement. These 
introductory notes will be followed by an account of the restatement of reserves, with 
particular attention paid to the tactics and stories of institutional investors seeking to 
enhance their influence over Shell’s board(s). Given the importance of shareholders 
and their organisation in this particular case and arena, a session about the rise of 
shareholder activism is also included. As a broad summary, every piece of bad news 
revealed by Shell during the crisis was cleverly transformed into consensus about 
problems and solutions involving journalists, columnists and analysts, turning an 
episode of minimal financial impact into a reason for a complete overhaul of Shell’s 
governance and the change of SEC guidelines.   
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1. Oil Industry and Shell 
 
Major oil firms like Shell and Exxon Mobil are vertically integrated 
companies operating both upstream (exploration and production of oil) and 
downstream (refining and marketing of products).Their activities include searching 
for oil, pumping it from the ground, refining the crude and distributing the refined 
products to bulk and retail. Most of these companies are also involved in 
petrochemical and natural gas businesses, with the latter becoming increasingly 
important for its lower cost and even distribution around the world.  As part of their 
annual financial review, firms reassess their crude oil reserves at year end. Reserves 
can be booked as proved, which means there is at least 90% of certainty that they are 
technically and economically producible, or as less certain categories (probable and 
possible)75. As booking reserves is not an exact science, companies must only be 
reasonably sure they can extract the oil and gas, leaving space for managerial 
discretion. As a consequence, modest revisions both upwards and downwards are 
fairly common.  
For analysts and investors, the Reserve Replacement Ratio (RRR) has become 
an important instrument to evaluate management because it is a simpler way of 
estimating future performance in a complex structure where upstream, downstream, 
petrochemical, gas and power have different cycles and weight in profits. As reserve 
replacements represent what can be taken from the ground in the future, companies 
must replace the oil and gas they produce each year to stay even and reserve growth 
(or replacement) indicates how well they are doing. If the reserve size falls, the 
company becomes less valuable as a whole because, without replenishing reserves, it 
is harder to meet targets for future growth rates. The aim has historically been a 
minimum RRR of 100%, which means the company has replaced all the oil it 
produced during a given period. 
Reserves can be replaced with discovery of new fields, extension of existing 
ones, revisions of earlier estimates, improved recovery technology or purchase from 
others. The 1990s were characterised by slashing costs in exploration and production 
with new technologies and by high levels of mergers and acquisitions activity. In the 
2000s, however, the task has become harder. With the fields of Gulf of Mexico, North 
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Sea and Alaska rapidly ageing and their reserves declining (Warburg2003) the 
industry needs to invest if it is to meet demand, which means higher capital spending. 
At the time of the Shell reserves crisis, the International Energy Agency estimated 
that $3 trillion would have to be invested in global oil infrastructure before 2030 to 
cover the anticipated demand (World Energy Outlook, 2004,p.119). More 
complicated yet, reserve replacement is moving further away, with European 
companies having over three times as much success in replacing reserves in non-
OECD areas, usually more unstable and risky places, than at home (Warburg, 26th 
March 2003).  
For Shell, RRR became a problem in the late 1990s, when external criticism 
started to target what had in the past been a strong side of the business. In 1996, 
remaining life fell from 16,3 years (in 1990) to 13.8, a number still above the US 
average of 11,6 years, but with a worrying downward tendency. Since 1991, Shell had 
only replaced production twice and both times mostly through restatements. At that 
point, the company was forgiven because of its notorious conservatism: “In our view, 
if company’s restatements are all predominately positive, this is a sign of a very 
conservative initial proved reserve booking policy” (Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette 
1999). Part of the problem derived from strategic mistakes: after starting the decade as 
the company with “the largest combined crude and natural gas reserve base 
worldwide” (Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette 1990), Shell opted to weather the low oil 
prices storm that swept the decade with cost-cutting rather than acquiring reserves 
through mergers and acquisitions. When, in 1998, its stock price was more than 10%  
lower than its peers and nearly 40% against market indices (Donaldson, Lufkin & 
Jenrette 1999), Shell launched a recovery plan, similar to the restructuring schemes 
that benefited BP, Mobil and Phillips Chevron in the mid-1990s.  
Besides the oil replacement problem, Shell had other pressing issues to deal 
with during the 1990s. Damning episodes involving environmental and safety issues 
opened the oil industry as a whole to a scrutiny that slowly migrated from occasional 
catastrophes towards its everyday practices, triggering an intensive public relations 
work in all fronts (Levy and Kolk 2002; Lewis 2003), but Shell is probably the oil 
company that suffered most damage with the criticism of the 1990s. The first blow 
came with the Brent Spar case, in February 1995, when the British government 
announced that the company would be allowed to dispose of Brent Spar, an oil 
storage and tanker loading buoy, in the Brent oilfield (deep Atlantic waters at the west 
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coast of Scotland). Backed up by a worldwide media campaign, Greenpeace 
successfully attracted public and political opposition to the disposal, particularly in 
Northern Europe. Despite the continued support of the British government, Shell 
abandoned the plan (Rice and Owen 1999). A few months later, the company was 
caught in the middle of a new scandal: the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa. The leader 
of the Ogoni people of Nigeria, a human rights and environment activist, had accused 
Shell of spoiling the ecology of the Niger River delta with its operations. The 
company was heavily criticised for failing to intervene with Nigerian authorities to 
stop the execution and a worldwide campaign to boycott its gasoline was called 
(Boele, Fabig et al. 2001).  
These episodes set in motion an extensive operation to assess the changing 
expectations of external stakeholders, with more than 100 key opinion leaders in over 
50 countries participating in interviews and round tables about “changing perceptions 
of the role of multinationals” (Schultz, Hatch et al. 2002, p.80), as well as direct 
involvement with non-governmental organisations and local communities. Shell also 
revised its 1976 ‘Statement of General Business Principles’ to include its 
responsibilities to society, including human rights and the environment. One year 
later, in 1998, a report detailing the progress the company had made since the change 
of its Statement cited Brent Spar and Ken Saro-Wiwa as turning points for Shell 
(Knight 1998). “There was a big communication shift post Brent Spar and Nigeria, 
finding out the views of key stakeholders, bringing Maurice Saatchi, creating a set of 
quasi-ideological principles in an essentially non-ideological corporation”76, says a 
former senior executive. At the same time, measures to address the financial 
performance were taken. “From the late 1990s, with (chairman) Cor Herkstroter, 
measurement of success was financial performance and the time scale got shorter and 
shorter. Shell was concerned with its RRR, which is an imponderable, uncertain 
driver of financial performance. The solution was to remunerate geologists with 
schemes that are related to the extent to which they booked reserves, the score card 
system, at the same time that the company has become more and more centralised, 
driven by accountancy, cost cutting and performance related remuneration”77.  
As a result of the restructuring programme initiated in 1998, by 2001 the 
return on capital employed was brought in line with other majors. Shell, however, was 
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still underperforming in its upstream activities. In March 2003, having failed to 
replace reserves for the second year in a row, management told analysts and investors 
at the strategic meeting that reserves were Shell’s strength rather than its weakness. 
Comparing Shell with other majors, the CEO emphasised its reserve portfolio and 
detailed its resource base, confirming the 3% volume growth target for 2007. The 
announcement split analysts’ opinions about the feasibility of the task but there was a 
common line on the reports written about the meeting: if there was a pattern to Shell’s 
booking practices, it was one of being conservative.  
 
2. The announcement  
 
The turbulent 1990s, therefore, changed the way Shell approached 
stakeholders and the issues they raised. From an organisational point of view, the 
scandals and growing pressure from the stock market led to a stronger centralisation 
of decision making. This was supposed to enhance the accountability of managers, 
facilitating ‘unified’ communication with stakeholders and costs cutting. Financial 
numbers were eventually in line with peers and new types of environmentally friendly 
businesses, like ‘renewables’, were highlighted in advertisement campaigns. But the 
traditional and most profitable upstream oil and gas were still lagging behind, with 
reserves replacement ratios below optimal levels. Despite the underperformance, Shell 
was still perceived as ultraconservative in its booking practices, making the 3% of 
volume growth in reserves to be considered by analysts as doubtful but possible.  
Against this background, the telephone conference on the 9th of January 2004 
announcing that the company was downgrading 20% of its reserves had a startling 
impact. Held at 9.15am European time but  4.15am New York time, which meant one 
quarter of the company’s shareholders were still asleep when the news were released, 
and without the presence of Shell’s CEO, Sir Philips Watts, the downgrade triggered 
reactions that knocked 3 billion pounds off the company’s value during the day. The 
news also sent shockwaves across the market, reaching out to other stocks in the 
energy sector, feared to be in the same situation. Shell’s story was mainly intended to 
reassure investors that there was not foul play and that the re-categorisation would 
have “no material effect on financial statements for any year up to and including 
2003” (Press release, 9th of January 2004). 
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The conference call broke unspoken rules about dealing with the City, one of 
which is a no-surprise rule (Golding 2003). “The last thing a public company would 
like to do is to surprise the market in some negative way. The market does not like 
surprises, full stop”, says a senior executive in charge of investor relations in a Plc78. 
The second one is that, in case of surprises, clear explanations should be given, as an 
executive responsible for financial strategy in a retail Plc explains. “If you know that 
there are certain bad news, get it out of there as quickly as possible, but spend a lot of 
time understanding what happened because what you don’t want is analysts being left 
in the dark, trying to speculate the impact of whatever it was by themselves. What you 
will be trying to do is to get as rich an understanding as you possibly could of what 
has happened so that you can steer people towards reacting in the right way. The 
worse thing that management can do is continue to surprise”79. 
Trust in Shell as a reliable company was immediately gone for analysts, whose 
main story line was about a shift in market perception. Goldman Sachs stated in a 
report that the downgrade “raises significant concerns with respect to the credibility of 
the company’s underlying operational performance” (The New York Times,  10th of 
January 2004) while Paul Adriessen, analyst at SNS Securities, went further to link 
the quick punishment to a crumbling reputation: “The share price drop is clearly a 
story of higher risk perception”. For BNP Paribas, the news “materially damaged the 
investment case” and reinforced “Royal Dutch/Shell’s deserved reputation as a serial 
provider of disappointing news” (BNP Paribas, 9th of January 2004).  “Shell’s 
wounds were self-inflicted and things must change soon for the company to restore 
investor’s confidence”, wrote an analyst at Oppenheimer (12th of January 2004).  
Two other aspects of the restatement (FT, 10th of January 2004) dominated 
the press story: the reliability of the ‘science’ of booking reserves and the role of 
Shell’s top executives in the wrong bookings. The former was of general importance 
because of the fear that Shell was not alone in inflating its estimates, despite strong 
statements of rivals like Exxon Mobil and BP that no reviews should be under way. 
Analysts and journalists spent a great deal of ink and paper discussing the “murky 
science of estimating reserves” (WSJE, 12th of January 2004), highlighting the “need 
for greater transparency in the reporting reserves” (FT, 12th of January 2004) and 
wondering how this could be achieved. But while the technical problems of booking 
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reserves and the weakness of SEC guidelines were fully acknowledged as a collective 
problem, the latter issue was Shell’s own: CEO Philip Watts, whom British fund 
managers had long considered “aloof and uncommunicative” (WSJE, 14th of January 
2004). Not being present at the conference call caused further damage to his 
credibility and Watts’ tentative explanation that the restatement was a technical 
problem that did not require his presence reinforced, for some, the belief that he did 
not have what it took to be the top man at Shell.  
Matters were made worse because of the position of Watts as head of 
Exploration and Production at the time of the bookings. Questions about how much 
(and for how long) he had known about the problems and whether he had pushed 
guidelines to ‘book’ his way to the top job were implicitly or explicitly articulated. A 
considerable part of the write-down resulted from changes in Nigeria, where Watts 
headed the operations from 1991 to 1994, and Shell was the only partner at 
Australian’s Gorgon field to have booked these reserves as proved. The fact that the 
CEO was the executive promising the 3% volume growth target in 2003 turned the 
downgrade into an even bigger failure: “Those who argued in 2001 that Sir Philip 
should be judged on his results, not his delivery, this month had to face the fact that 
‘results are as bad as the communication’, as one investor puts it”, reported the 
Financial Times (23rd of January 2004).  
Watts’ was therefore at the centre of the discussion. Funds like the Dutch 
Robeco Groep NV and Spanish Santander went public to request his removal straight 
after the downgrade announcement, tuning down the volume after Watts presented his 
apologies in the 4th Quarter and Full Year Results 2003 presentation, a month later. 
British fund managers, however, were moving on the discussion to blame Shell’s 
‘cumbersome’ structure rather than Watts for the problem. The Association of British 
Insurers immediately arranged a meeting with Lord Oxburgh, a prominent member of 
Shell’s supervisory board, to press for changes. The argument was that the lack of 
accountability/transparency fostered by the dual board was the underlying issue, as it 
left CEOs free of scrutiny. In the first deliberate action to force Shell to review its 
organisational set up, British investors were quoted urging the company to “change its 
shareholder structure or face loss of the support” (5th of February 2004).  American 
investors, on the other hand, were simply starting to take the matter to courts, with 
five lawsuits linked to the reserves downgrade being prepared.  
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From the regulatory front, very little was said after the downgrade, but both 
SEC and the FSA were expected to launch an investigation into what caused the 
problem, which they jointly did throughout the summer 2004. Their work mainly 
involved analysing internal documents and conducting interviews. Shell flew 
employees to talk to investigators in the US and allowed full access to internal 
information. The only official comment was released in August 2004, when the 
company was fined £17 million by the FSA for breaching market rules and 
misconduct amounting to market abuse, and $120 million by SEC for violating 
American securities laws regarding reporting, record-keeping and internal controls 
(SEC and FSA 2004) 
Watts’ subsequent apology, in a meeting that also announced a replacement 
ratio of about 98% for 2003, a positive surprise given the previous announcement, 
momentarily deflected the impact of the bad news and unprofessional handling of the 
disclosure. But despite the four weeks between events, Shell had not yet worked on 
what an interviewee defined as “crafting a story to explain what has happened without 
telling the investment community everything”80. The information that an internal 
committee was looking closely at the episode, advised by US-based law firm Davis, 
Polk and Wardwell, was the only attempt to address the restatement story. Without 
concrete answers about what exactly led to the wrong bookings, media coverage 
moved from hard news about the downgrade to opinion pieces. The FT’s Lombard 
column stated that “investors are asking rightly whether the complicated management 
structure encourages bureaucracy and impedes creativity, accountability and strong 
leadership”(FT, 6th of February 2004). Jeremy Warner, the City expert at The 
Independent, had no doubts that changes needed at Shell “must surely be the creation 
of a unified board”(The Independent, 6th of February 2004). Analysts were not on 
board yet: “We don’t recognise the link between this reserve problem and issues of 
the overall group structure” (Commerzbank, 5th of February 2004). 
If there was little shareholder outburst after the meeting with Watts, there was 
no doubt that trust was damaged. As Ivor Pether, head of portfolio construction at 
Royal London Asset Management remarked to The New York Times, investors’ 
perception of the company had “gone through a seismic shift” ( 6th of February 
2004). The stream of news released from the company from the Full Year Results to 
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the FSA and SEC decision, in August, were not likely to lift investors’ spirits: two 
executives would be sacked, the good faith claim first issued by the firm dropped and 
the oil reserves would suffer three further minor downgrades. But before we move 
into the second part of the episode and the stories different actors started telling, it is 
useful to think about narratives so far, both linked to Shell and to the stock market as 
an arena of business representation. 
The function of stories in the stock market, this work suggests, is to justify and 
legitimise managerial decisions vis-à-vis alternative views, with the breakdown of a 
story likely to start a crisis making the construction of new ones more difficult, as 
both storytelling and management are discredited. Therefore, when Shell’s narrative 
breaks down, management credibility is hit at the same time that any storytelling 
involving new promises is met with suspicion. The perception of management as 
untrustworthy, however, has very concrete consequences, opening the door for 
different kinds of demands from key actors: the replacement of management, as some 
Spanish and Dutch investors called for, and the increase of investors influence in 
decision making, as the British preferred.  
The former would be quickly complied with. The preliminary results of the 
Davis, Polk and Wardwell report (2004) cast doubt on the role of top management in 
the scandal and led to the dismissal of Philip Watts and Walter van de Vijver, head of 
exploration and production, in March. In the way of the demands from the latter 
actors, however, was Shell’s dual board system, through which the Dutch side owned 
60% of the group, had a final say on decisions and also held 1.500 priority shares 
controlled by its management and supervisory board. Removing these shares and 
unifying the board were obligatory steps if investors intended to gain stronger control 
over management.   
 
2.1 The story of shareholder activism  
 
The importance of the British investors’ argument cannot be underestimated 
not only because it impacted the development of Shell’s crisis, as it will be clear as we 
turn back to the episode, but because it brings to the fore the complex relationship 
between stories and legitimate action that frame the arena in which this dispute takes 
place. Little more than 30 years ago, Alfred Chandler (1977) documented the rise of 
the modern giant business enterprise that was made possible, in his view,  by clear 
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lines of separation between ownership and management and the autonomy of the 
latter. Since the 1980s, however, investors have worked on new ways to blur these 
barriers: from junk bond- fuelled hostile takeovers by investors seeking to impose 
discipline on corporations’ boards and management to the creation of lobbying groups 
for shareholder’s rights, such as the Council of Institutional Investors, initially led by 
an estate treasurer responsible for both the California Public Employment Retirement 
System (CalPERS) and California State Teachers Retirement System (CalSTRS)81. 
The resulting corporate indebtedness and financial fragility of banks by the 
end of the decade led policy makers to find new ways of aligning corporate 
governance with shareholders interests. The answer was found in the rhetoric of 
shareholder value, institutionally imbued in bodies such as the FSA and the SEC and 
legally supported by changes that facilitated coalition building for investors82 and 
clarify the circumstances shareholders should actively intervene in a company, the 
approach they will use and how they measure the effectiveness of the strategy, laid 
out by the US Department of Labor (1994). In 2001, in a review for the Treasury, 
Paul Myners recommended that British rules should incorporate the American 
principle on activism (2001).   
These developments would pave the way to a more institutionalised kind of 
shareholder activism, with union-based funds taking the lead. Investors proposals put 
on proxies are not legally bound, but the changing attitude of boards speaks volumes 
about how seriously companies are taking institutional investors and activism threats: 
in 2002, only 15.49% of the proposals that achieved majority were implemented 
while, in 2004, boards followed the requests in 50.42% of the cases (Thomas and 
Cotter 2007, p.337). Proxies sponsored by institutional investors or coordinated by 
groups of investors received more votes than the ones presented by individual 
investors. On the type of proposal, corporate governance related suggestions are much 
more likely to receive support than social responsibility ones (Campbel, Gillan et al. 
1999) .83 Three common proposed actions to solve problems are a repeal of 
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antitakeover devices, changes in voting rules and an allowance for increased board 
independence (Gillan and Starks 2000, p.284-295) The largest number of proposals 
studied by these authors advocated the antitakeover measures but another typical 
request has been independent directors on the board. The target companies are usually 
large, well established but temporarily underperforming their peers.  
 Before the restatement, Shell ticked some of the most important boxes as a 
large, established corporation underperforming its peers for several years. Its huge 
size and its credibility as conservative and reliable, however, made any predatory 
shareholder activity difficult to see through. The breakdown of the reserves story, and 
the continuous stream of bad news, solved part of the problem, as this sequence of 
events exacerbated the underperformance and cast doubts over the quality (and 
honesty) of management, offering an extra legitimate reason to seek stronger 
involvement in the board. But any attempt to move towards greater influence, because 
of the governance changes that it would entail, required a quasi-consensus among 
investors. The task of making the case for a drastic change was pursued by one 
particular actor, Eric Knight, of Knight Vinke Asset Management, a New York-based 
firm “specialised in institutional shareholder activism”  established with seed capital 
from CalPERS84. 
Attempts to form a consensus around the need to change Shell’s structure, 
however, did not start until after the annual results meeting, the first encounter 
between Watts and investors, and followed the traditional script of activists: instead of 
submitting proxy proposals, the common strategy is to first initiate a dialogue with the 
management and board, at the same time that the media is used to undermine the 
company’s image and alert other investors about the problems and their own proposed 
solutions (Gillan and Starks 2007, p.57). Knight’s first appearance was in a Wall 
Street Journal Europe article about the need for Shell to “alter its corporate-board 
structure and strengthen the role of its chief executive”. At the core of his argument 
was that the company “should be managed by a unified board with a strong 
independent element selected with meaningful shareholder involvement”  (WSJE, 9th 
of February 2004), also a classic argument used by institutional investors in proxy 
proposals.  
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 According to its homepage (http://www.kvamllc.com/home.html), Vinke Asset Management 
specialises in underperforming large cap public companies and instigates change by highlighting 
problems in the company structure and governance, which fits Shell’s prospect to perfection.  
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His views about the inadequacy of the Shell structure, seen as a hindrance to 
shareholders’ ability to nominate supervisory and management boards,  sent via email 
statement, were also part of a feature in The New York Times (9th of February 2004). 
The only response it attracted was John Plender’s comment about the improbability of 
the request (FT, 16th of February 2004). At this point, despite the lack of a good 
explanation from Shell, the episode seemed to have settled, with the only noteworthy 
news regarding the announcement of the expected SEC investigation. The decision of 
keeping quiet or, as an interviewee put it, “having a very boring comment when 
confronted with speculation, rumours and new stories”85, seemed to be working.  
Shell announced the dismissal of Watts and Walter van de Vijver, as well as 
its decision to abandon the ‘good faith claim’ about the episode, without an 
accompanying explanation. A laconic note stating that the board did not find “illegal 
conduct” was the only comment provided (FT, 5th of March 2004). As a 
consequence, the hunt for the story behind the events was immediately restored in the 
media. Off the record sources pointed  at the internal audit group findings as the 
reason for the dismissal (WSJE, 4th of March 2004). Accounts that the final push was 
Dutch were also aired, with the Lex Column citing insider knowledge to reveal that 
the pair of hands responsible for the move belonged to Wim Kok, the former Dutch 
prime minister and non-executive board member of Shell (FT, 4th of March 2004). 
The division of labour between journalists and analysts was clear: daily coverage was 
a quest to find out what happened, with leaked documents and off the record 
comments pointing to early knowledge of the reserves problem by the executives in 
question (WSJE, 8th of March 2004); analysts puzzled about the departure of van de 
Vijver and whether malpractice was a component, worrying about regulators and 
possible impact on the bottom line. “Journalists and analysts are our two audiences 
and they are very different. Analysts are very much coming at it from ‘I have got this 
model, what assumptions do I build in here’ while journalists are looking for the 
story”, as an interviewee noted86.  
Eric Knight, at this point the official representative of CalPERS, continued to 
argue for greater changes while carefully ruling out further disruption at the top. “We 
have not criticized the performance of individual managers and we don't believe 
shareholders are looking for scapegoats.  Rather, we are focused on the effects that the 
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groups unorthodox governance structures have on the effectiveness of management 
and thus on performance and value”, said Knight in a press release ( 3rd of March 
2004). Robert Talbut, chief investment officer at ISI Asset Management, echoed the 
opinion: “We are playing a long-term game (…) The departure of one or two 
executives is the start of a process of change at Shell” (WSJE, 10th of March 2004). 
The Dutch were wary of further upheaval and giant funds such as PGGM refused to 
give any comments before the outcome of the internal report was known.  
A few days after the appointment of Van der Veer, Erik Knight was back in 
the media, signing the Comment column in the FT.  This time, he had his gun firmly 
pointed at the Dutch side of Shell and its dominant position in selecting all 
management and supervisory board positions allowed by the priority shares87. 
“Management succession is tightly controlled from within – it is effectively a closed 
shop”, Knight stated, using the quick replacement of top executives with internal 
candidates as the latest example of the Dutch supremacy. He then takes “the analysis a 
step further” to criticise the two main boards that, in effect, meant “the group’s senior 
management has to serve two masters”, weakening accountability and direct 
intervention to safeguard shareholders’ interests. “Shell is now going through an 
unprecedented crisis, partly attributed to a loss of confidence by the market in its 
unorthodox governance structures – and a lingering concern that the reserves fiasco 
could in some ways be related” (FT, 15th of March 2004).  The media quickly picked 
up on it, with his arguments reprinted in the Guardian and the subject of a Lex 
Column advising investors to maintain pressure for change to ensure more than the 
barest minimum is enacted” (FT; Guardian, 16th of March 2004).  
Knight’s opinionated article and the timing of its release were not accidental. 
In the following week, Lord Oxburgh, interim chairman of Shell’s UK arm, would be 
meeting investors from the Association of British Insurers and it was imperative that 
shareholders sang from the same hymn sheet. A major point was the appointment of 
an outsider as independent non-executive, an exclusive prerogative of the Dutch board 
up to that point. In the run up to the meeting, Knight’s opinions were presented as a 
quasi-consensus in different media outlets.  According to these reports, “a growing 
number of investors” (The New York Times, 11th of March 2004) or “leading 
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 The priority shares were established in 1968 to block any takeover or break-up of the group, a 
“poison pill” kind of device that was identified in the shareholder activism literature as the top priority 
for deactivation by investors.  
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shareholders” (FT, 13th of March 2004)  believed that Shell needed outside 
executives to “restore confidence” in Shell management. After the dismissal of Watts 
and van de Vijver, still not fully explained, and the hasty appointment of Jeroen van 
der Veer, shareholders were keeping Shell on the negative watch while negotiating 
behind the scenes. A huge operation to bring the Dutch pension funds to join the fight 
was in place. A British institutional investor revealed that their efforts “to enlist 
support at the Dutch end”, after weeks of trying, had “got stuck in the mud” while 
PGGM, the giant Dutch fund, publicly announced they “were not going to mix with 
other movements outside the Netherlands” (FT, 13th of March 2004).   
Investors saw a new opportunity in the announcement of a second downgrade, 
which erased the only highlight of the annual meeting by slashing RRR in 2003 to 
82%. Presented as “primarily technical in nature”, the news was again not harmful per 
se,  but the combination of another negative statement, the announcement of 
investigations on insider trading by the Autoriteit Financiele Markten (AFM), the 
financial regulatory body in the Netherlands, and questions by Euronext  (Press 
release, 18th of March 2004) was unfortunate a day before the meeting with Lord 
Oxburgh . Pressed about changes in the company structure, Jeroen van der Veer 
replied that the group did not see the relationship between the reserves problem and 
its structure, but reaffirmed the company’s willingness to review it by early 2005” 
(FT, 19th March 2004).“Deeply upset”, the Association of British Insurers demanded 
more power to influence decisions, including appointment of senior executives, and 
called for a unified board. Lord Oxburg told the FT the meeting was “excellent” while 
investors warned “the dialogue is not over and it will continue” (FT, 23rd of March 
2004).  
On the other side of the Atlantic, the Institutional Shareholder Services, the 
US proxy voting advisory firm, announced that governance problems at Safeway and 
Shell would be big issues for American shareholders, who should be focusing on their 
“peculiar” governance structures (FT, 12th of April 2004). With British and American 
dominating the Group shareholder base, Shell’s prospects were far from good. 
Ironically, a key point of Shell’s investor relations plan for 2004 was to charm large 
institutional investors in the United States, Japan and continental Europe, as well as 
dropping specific targets (e.g. reserves replacement), “once delivered”, in favour of 
fewer or less specific goals (Group Investor Relations Strategy 2003). Another 
paradox was the apparent uselessness of the communication shift set in motion after 
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the 1990s. “It is the supreme irony. Every day a box of material about crisis 
management, Corporate Social Responsibility etc arrived at Shell’s headquarters after 
Brent Spar and Nigeria. The reserves crisis outranked any statements about CSR Shell 
would like to make”88.  
 
3.  Aligning stories 
 
The impending release of the Group Audit Committee report about the episode 
kept the media going while Shell kept its silence. Days of ‘leaking’ preceded the 
announcement: citing insider sources, the Wall Street Journal reported that the 
document laid the blame for the overbooking heavily on Philip Watts and Walter van 
de Vijver (13th of April 2004). The article prompted van de Vijver’s first public 
statement denying the “inaccurate portrayals of his role” in the crisis and stating that 
the Committee of Managing Directors, Shell’s highest forum, was aware of the 
problems all along (FT, 14th of April 2004). His accusations, in turn, brought Eric 
Knight back to the limelight to urge “the protagonists in a growing dispute to allow 
regulators to settle the matter”, while announcing that a group of Dutch shareholders 
were now on board. “Mr. Knight, who speaks for 1% of the equity and is to hold 
urgent talks with Aad Jacobs, the head of Royal Dutch supervisory board, said 15 
shareholders in the Dutch arm were demanding greater dialogue” (The Guardian, 15th 
April 2004).  
Shell’s full account of the downgrade, completed by a new restatement of 
reserves and the dismissal of the CFO, Judy Boynton, spoke of lies, internal fights and 
deliberate attempts to fool the market after top managers were told, back in 2002, that 
the bookings were too optimistic (Executive Summary, 2004, p.8). The sudden 
decision to disclose was a direct result of the final conclusion, by the EP team, in 
December 2003, that “not to disclose would constitute a violation of US securities law 
and the multiple listing requirements. It would also increase any potential exposure to 
liability within and outside the US” (Ibidem, p.9). The summary also revealed that 
Shell had one part-time auditor for the whole of its global operation, a surprising 
number especially if compared with its more than 600 lawyers. The report was a 
necessary and overdue move to “ultimately meet negative issues head on with a 
                                                 
88
 Interview 14 with a former communications senior executive at Shell, in October 2008 
 166 
structured reason to explain something”89, but Shell’s story was intercepted by other 
narratives. If, for Lord Oxburgh, “the report makes quite clear that structure had 
nothing to do with the problems”, meaning that human rather than structural failures 
were the root of the problem, British investors were adamant about the need for 
reform, with Guy Jubb, the head of corporate governance at Standard Life 
Investments, expecting to “see a more unified structure and more efficient 
management arrangements”(FT, 20th of April 2004).  
In the media, analysts and commentators closed ranks with British investors. 
Lombard argued that “it is hard to avoid the conclusion that his (Walter van de Vivjer) 
concerns would have had much more chance of being aired and remedial action taken 
far earlier if Shell had had an Anglo-Saxon governance structure with a single unified 
board bringing together executives and independent directors under a non-executive 
chairman” (FT, 20 of April 2004). For analysts, a positive response for the stock was 
expected if Shell became a single structure because of enhanced accountability 
(Commerzbank, 20th April 2004). Rating agencies also joined the debate, with 
Moody’s Investor Services cutting Shell’s AAA credit rating to AA1 because the dual 
structure hampered “the company’s ability to make changes” and restore its credibility 
with the financial community (FT, 22nd of April). Standard & Poor’s would threaten 
to do the same in July if the company did not address its weaknesses in corporate 
governance and internal controls (Shell press release, 8th of July 2004). 
Dutch funds ABP and PGGM were still avoiding comments about structural 
changes but welcomed Shell’s promise to review the matter (FT, 20th of April 2004). 
It was clear that the differences among investors were becoming slimmer. 
Expectations were that clear proposals should be presented at the annual meeting in 
June. A British investor told the FT that “the Dutch investors now understand that no-
change is not an option. The company is hearing this message loud and clear” (22nd 
of May 2004). Two days after the Group’s 2003 accounts were signed off by 
‘unqualified’ auditors, together with a fourth downgrade, CalPERs released its “focus 
list” for poor financial performance and corporate governance including Shell. It was 
the first time the Californian fund included a European company in the list. According 
to CalPERS, the reason for targeting Shell was its persistent underperformance in the 
previous five years and the reserves restatement. “CalPERS is concerned that the 
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Dutch board, one part of Shell’s complex dual corporate structure, has failed to 
respond effectively to shareowner demands (9th of June 2004).  
Despite frantic contact with major investors through one-to-ones with Aad 
Jacobs, considered the most powerful executive within the company, information 
about the review of the company’s structure was not disclosed. Investors were 
allegedly sent home without knowing who was leading the review, its terms and to 
whom it would be delivered (FT, 14th of June 2004). They were only assured that the 
company was working on the case and details would be provided at the 28th of June 
meeting. A fortnight before the meeting, representatives of the Association of British 
Insurers were the ones leaving a meeting with Lord Oxburgh infuriated by his 
obstinacy in not revealing details of the review (FT, 15th of June 2004), prompting 
threats of mutiny in the meeting (FT, 14th of June 2004) and the return of Eric Knight 
to the media.  
In a letter co-signed by Ted White, CalPERS director of Corporate 
Governance, Knight “explicitly requested that the directors provide the market with 
this minimal level of disclosure sufficiently in advance so as to enable shareholders to 
form a well-balanced point of view in preparation for the (annual) meeting”. Citing 
evidence of a “powerful shareholder consensus” concerning the Group’s corporate 
governance and the need for change, they demanded to know “the terms of reference 
of this review – namely, the specific issues to be considered; the composition of the 
body conducting it; and a timetable, involving further shareholder consultation before 
formal approval of any changes is sought” (FT, 16th of June 2004). Shell responded 
with the released of an “Update on Structure and Governance for Royal Dutch/Shell 
Group” revealing that the steering group was led by Sir John Kerr, would be advised 
by external law and tax firms and investment bankers, and focused on three main 
points, with the simplification of the board/group as one of them. The text also 
explained that results should be made public by the Boards in November 2004 and 
further consultation with shareholders would then take place. A pleasant surprise was 
left for the last paragraphs, where the company announced that “the Board of Royal 
Dutch will propose to its Annual General Meeting of Shareholders in 2005 to abolish 
the priority shares” and promised further updates during the July meeting.  
At this point, the consensus was that the dual board and priority shares were to 
blame and had to go, and few commentators expressed different views. John Plender 
was certainly a lonely voice when he stated that “the dual voting system may have 
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been a factor in Shell’s problems. But I suspect that the Americanisation of pay and 
performance incentives, capital market pressure and culture change were more 
important”(FT, 21st of June 2004). When, three days before the meeting, Shell 
managed to announce that Philip Watts would be getting away with a severance 
payment of £1,057,971, the equivalent of a 15 months’ salary despite being a three-
month service contract, the Association of British Insurers issue an “amber top alert” 
to members. UK investors such as the Pensions & Investment research Consultants 
described the decision as “outrageous”(FT, 26th of June 2004). More worryingly, the 
Institutional Shareholder Services, followed by US-based funds holding 25% of Royal 
Dutch stock, called for a vote against discharging the directors. Peter Paul de Vries, 
director of VEB, the Dutch shareholders association, said his group would be joining 
pension funds in voting against the discharge. PGGM and ABP agreed a voting 
position but declined to divulge it. Even though the vote is non-binding, a block of the 
discharge by shareholders would be another public relations nightmare for Shell.   
During the meeting, 40% of investors refused to back the resolution to 
“discharge the responsibility” of the managing directors and the supervisory board for 
2003. Also in a very unusual fashion, PGGM and ABP openly criticised Shell’s 
refusal to call a special shareholders meeting to discuss corporate governance. “It is a 
pity that you are keeping the market and your organisation in a position of 
uncertainty. The risk is that it appears that you have not been listening to investors but 
are concentrating on your own plans”, a spokesperson declared (FT, 29th of June 
2004). The argument was very close to Eric Knight’s new request that the review 
group should have a shareholder representative. In the UK, Lord Oxburgh assured 
investors that the corporate review group was looking at “extreme measures”. “With 
extreme used to describe anything from sports to shaving products, investors must 
hope Lord Oxburgh’s version is worthy of the sobriquet”(Lex Column, 29th of June 
2004). By mid-July, Shell was running a series of face-to-face meetings between 
shareholders and members of the review committee and announced that Citigroup and 
N.M. Rothschild would advise on the changes in its corporate structure.    
Shell contacted SEC on the 2nd of July to make a new restatement – this time 
not of reserves, but of profits, as the overstatement of reserves exaggerated profits by 
$272 million and inappropriate accounting being responsible for an additional $156 
million. By then, the regulator, in partnership with the FSA, was conducting 
interviews with current and former executives. For regulators, Philip Watts justified 
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the wrong bookings on the failures of the current guidelines to reflect the reality of the 
industry and the dodgy foundations of figures linked to words like possibility and 
probability (FSA, 24th of June 2004). The restatement of profits, in turn, led to a US 
House Committee on Financial Service’s hearing, chaired by Michael Oxley. Entitled 
“Shell Games: Corporate Governance and Accounting for Oil and Gas Reserves” 
(Committee on Financial Services 2004), the meeting had as witnesses Eric Knight, 
two accounting professors and one engineering consultant.  
In his opening statement, the co-author of the feared Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
stated that there were three tasks to be examined during the meeting. Firstly, the 
hearing would probe “whether additional steps should be taken to ensure that oil 
companies’ reserve estimates are not compromised by improper incentives”; 
secondly, it should look at “the accounting rules themselves to ensure that the rules 
that the SEC has put in place have kept up with technology to provide investors with 
the most accurate possible information about a company’s proved reserves, and, 
accordingly, its financial position”; and finally, the hearing would “examine questions 
of corporate governance, in light of the unusual corporate structure at Shell”. He 
finished the statement reaffirming the belief that “there is significant opportunity for 
Shell to repair some of the confidence that has been lost by re-making its corporate 
structure to reflect the image of transparency and candour that is embodied in the 
majority of publicly traded corporations as a result of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act” 
(Ibidem) 
By the end of August, Shell agreed preliminary settlements both with FSA 
(£17 million) and SEC ($120 million) but never admitted or denied charges. By the 
end of October, the company announced the results of its corporate restructuring 
review, the biggest of its history. The company opted for a full merger of Dutch and 
British holdings, with Jeroen van der Veer appointed as the first CEO of the combined 
company. “Saying farewell to the collegiate system will enable me to speed up 
strategic decision making and make sure we have the right project delivery”, van der 
Veer was quoted saying after the announcement. Insiders were confident that the 
merger would provide the company with quicker decision-making and greater access 
to the capital markets, which would allow it to pursue takeovers – some accounted 
Shell’s inability to join the mergers and acquisitions of the 1990s to the complexity of 
its structure. Also in line with investors’ demands, the new structure would have five 
executives on the board and ten non-executives. At a value of about £100 billion, the 
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new company would account for about 8 % of the FTSE 100 (FT, 29th of October 
2004).  
Despite a new major reserve restatement, announced simultaneously, Shell’s 
shares went up in the Netherlands and London. By December 2004, when Shell was 
working on the legal and tax issues of its unification, Eric Knight had moved on to his 
next task: to force a structural change in the French conglomerate GDF Suez. Despite 
the alleged 4000 hours devoted by Vinke Knight to “Project Stork”, which involved 
visiting French municipalities to study Suez water contracts (FT, 8th of December 
2004), he did not succeed in breaking up the water and power conglomerate.  
In June 2008, in a clear response to Shell’s case and the questions asked by 
Michael Oxley, the SEC issued a ‘proposing release’ seeking pubic comment on 
amendments to the disclosure requirements regarding oil and gas companies, the first 
since 1978. The aim was to take into account the technological developments of the 
past 30 years “to provide investors with a more meaningful and comprehensive 
understanding of oil and gas reserves, which should help investors evaluate the 
relative value of oil and gas companies”. The final rules (SEC, 2009) mirror 
significantly the comments of Eric Knight, Philip Watts and the experts witnessing at 
the House Committee on Financial Service. As a result of the changes, Shell had a 
record year in adding proved oil and gas reserves in 2009: 3,420 million barrels of oil 
equivalent (boe) proved oil and gas reserves which, added to the annual production, 
made a Reserve Replacement Ratio of 288% (Shell strategic update, March 2010).  
   
3. Conclusion 
 
The Shell case has two remarkable features that relate directly to the 
propositions of this thesis: firstly, it illustrates how the breakdown of a story and 
subsequent crisis it unleashes can make the building of a (counter) story a much 
harder task, as trust in the storyteller is damaged; secondly, it reveals the 
particularities of an arena in which stories are constrained by established/legitimate 
narratives that define different roles, with corporations working towards the delivery 
of shareholder value, investors encouraged to actively intervene to make sure they do 
so, and a financial media whose main duty is to channel the necessary flow of  
information between the two. In this particular episode, most of the storytelling was 
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made by the two last groups, with Shell reluctant to provide any kind of narrative that 
could explain its problems. 
The financial media, and in particular influential commentators such as FT’s 
Lombard and Lex, are central to the final outcome because it is through their articles 
and columns that the stories of a few minor shareholders were disseminated and 
supported, at the same time that Shell, and its stories, were kept under a public and 
negative watch. In other words, the eventual consensus among journalists, analysts 
and British investors around Knight’s story, which linked the reserves fiasco to deeper 
governance problems that could only be resolved with a complete change of corporate 
structures, is created by and through the media. This is crucial because the strategy to 
build an alliance among major shareholders through a series of individual meetings 
behind the scenes proved harder than anticipated. The Dutch were visibly reluctant to 
join any kind of organised attack on Shell and, without the Dutch on board, the 
epilogue would have been different. 
  The consensus was made easier by Shell’s inability to draw a line under the 
story of the restatement of the reserves. This failure, in turn, gave outsiders the 
opportunity to frame the problem and its solutions according to their own agenda, 
justifying a complete change of corporate governance on an episode without financial 
consequences. There are at least three interconnected elements related to success of 
the shareholders’ narratives: timing, Shell’s silence and, finally, Shell’s overdue story. 
The first relates to Knight’s initial intervention about the need to strengthen CEO 
accountability, a recognised ‘right’ of shareholders. This came up straight after Shell 
had just managed to contain the heat around the downgrade and disastrous delivery of 
the news, bringing the subject back to the media and its scrutiny.  
At this point, the absence of a story by Shell meant that media, avid for an 
explanation, welcomed plausible and, coming from institutional shareholders, 
legitimate versions of the story. This narrative planted the seed of investors’ argument 
about a lack of accountability fostered by the dual board. When Watts and Van de 
Vivjer were fired and a new Dutch CEO was chosen, Knight moved on to criticise the 
disproportional power of the Dutch and the fact that two boards weakened 
accountability and direct intervention to safeguard shareholders’ interests. By taking a 
step back, Knight led the media to take a step back from the reserves scandal and the 
obsession with culprits in that particular case and look at a ‘bigger picture’. 
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When Shell disclosed the results of the internal auditing, its own story was 
about how two top managers, in a full war with each other, lied to the market to cover 
their mistakes, implying their ousting was the end of a localised problem. In a 
response to Shell’s narrative, Knight continued to decouple particular individuals to 
the particular episode and linking points revealed by the audit to shareholders’ own 
story about Shell: why were their mistakes not spotted by the ‘conference’? Could it 
have happened if there was an independent director, accountable to shareholders, on 
the board?  How is it acceptable that a group of the size of Shell has one auditor that 
reports to the head of EP only? This is also interesting because the drive to an ever 
stronger centralisation of decisions on few individuals was one of the responses of the 
company to the attacks of the 1990s from civil society and the stock market – an 
attempt to speed responses and cut costs. This time, however, given the arena in 
which the reserves scandal took place, Shell could not use the currently less hostile 
relationship with civil society to get them to tell stories that would work in its benefit, 
like Roche was able to do in the previous case study.  
The crucial alliance here, instead, was formed among investors, supported by 
the consensus on the desirable way to deal not with the particular episode that 
initiated the six month crisis, but with the functioning of the whole Shell Group. The 
final blow, however, was again partially self-inflicted, as Shell’s new story about a 
review of the dual board and the governance structure did not turn into the constant 
flow of communication desired by the investors and unequivocally demanded by 
Knight’s story, driving the Dutch to the British side.  
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Chapter 7:  Order in chaos: stories as incomplete, immersed in 
contingency, but not random 
 
Introduction 
 
This work has proposed to examine the role stories play in helping giant 
corporations to achieve their goals in a society increasingly aware of their power. In 
this light, the case studies analysed in the previous chapters raise important issues: 
how policy making arenas have become more susceptible of influence from actors 
with distinct levels of political and economic power; how this same democratisation, 
which is at the core of the problems facing business in the past three decades, can also 
work in business’ favour; and how institutions with significant power resources may 
not be able to prevent external interference that can change their own functioning. 
These considerations, in turn, open a window into a broader question about the nature 
and the limits of business power in democratic capitalism.  
Both political science and cultural economy scholarships can explain different 
parts of the puzzle: firms ‘accumulate’ power by forming alliances (Coen 1997);  
public relations professionals are able to manipulate the media on the behalf of their 
business clients who, anonymously, stand to benefit (Davis 2002); stories of promise 
and achievement, backed by numbers, attempt to manage actors capable of taking the 
decisions that may change corporations (Froud, Johal et al. 2006). These scholarly 
approaches are therefore visibly complementary: while political science points at the 
tactics that can work effectively for business in institutional structures of policy 
making, cultural approaches consider the importance of narratives and their role in 
‘framing’ reality in economic arenas, as well as the existence of a ‘cultural circuit of 
capitalism’ in the process (Thrift 2005). Bringing these approaches together adds a 
dimension to the picture which is lost when these lenses are used separately.  
In chapter III, it was argued that narratives are a strategy used by players, a 
vital point of interconnection between actors and arenas. The empirical work, on the 
other hand, showed that attempts to manage stories and the extent actors succeed in 
doing so are unmistakably a common thread that impacted outcomes in all episodes. 
This has important implications: firstly, it suggests that narratives may be a suitable 
bridge between these two bodies of literature because they provide an explanatory 
tool that can be shared and it reinforces the value of considering stories for the 
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analysis of business representation; secondly, it supports the critical realist argument 
that structures are strategically selective (Hay 2002; McAnnula 2002; Hart 2001). In 
other words, stories seem to have become a structural feature that enable actors 
operating in spheres where business has to publicly represent its interests. 
The second point has consequences for the way we understand business 
power. Competing narratives among different interests are part of the process that 
reproduce social relations and sustain power, the vehicle of an ongoing negotiation of 
the norms that inform social relations. However, this negotiation that previously 
included states, corporations and a few other elite actors is now open to other voices. 
This changes the picture because narratives work here as a destabiliser that requires 
constant and purposeful engagement with other stories in a contingent environment.    
  This chapter, therefore, is concerned with the key question of whether and 
how stories can be effectively used or, more specifically, why some stories worked 
and in what circumstances by comparing and contrasting the case studies. The 
analysis requires the examination of not only the ingredients that made these stories 
valuable as ‘stand-alone’ narratives but also their relationship with other stories and 
the arenas where the dispute is taking place, as well as the intersections between 
actors and structures considered throughout the previous empirical chapters. From this 
exercise, two findings are relevant for the understanding of narratives in general and 
narratives of business representation in particular: the incomplete nature of stories and 
their constant intersection with other narratives. These contrast with the framing of 
business stories as a ‘box’ (Golding 2000) or a set ‘plot’ with a beginning, middle and 
end (Froud, Johal et al. 2006). In the case studies, interests broke down into different 
story lines that developed in different directions to overlap with or contest other 
narratives, appropriating elements from different levels of story telling.  
The first section will revisit the stories told by corporations/sectors and other 
actors involved in the dispute in each of the cases. This will be followed by an 
analysis of how stories relate to each other and how these interactions affect their 
efficiency. The intention is to show how stories are in constant evolution, reacting and 
changing in relation to each other as well as taking into account the final objective of 
the storytellers. A third section will bring together stories and arenas, opening the 
framework for the consideration of other tools of business representation and their 
interplay with stories. Juxtaposing narratives and arenas highlights the interconnection 
between the stories actors tell and the stories and interests that inform the arenas 
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themselves, bringing the media into perspective through the analysis of the way its 
potential double role (as actor and arena) affects the effectiveness of narratives. This 
exercise shows successful stories as open-ended and incomplete devices able to 
engage with other narratives and interests particularly through the use of values and 
ideas considered hierarchically superior in modern Western societies (e.g. science, 
law, numbers, democracy). These ingredients provide a common language for actors 
and, by doing so, expand the scope for an interaction that is particularly valuable in 
political arenas.  
Section four considers more closely the literature used as the basis for this 
work to discuss what narratives can add to our understanding of business 
representation. It answers the crucial question of why we need stories to explain what 
both bodies of scholarship analysed in this thesis have accurately documented by 
arguing that what they describe in its final form is the result of a process that has 
stories at its core. These interconnected narratives, on the other hand, involve not only 
firms, analysts and journalists but a much larger range of actors that are legitimate 
players in democratic, capitalist societies. 
As the case studies were systematically referenced in the previous chapters, 
citations on the empirical material will be kept to a minimum. 
 
1. Who told what 
 
 If the case studies were ranked according to the achievement of instrumental 
goals for business, the order would be unmistakable: Herceptin, REACH and Shell. 
Roche’s main interest was to have its cancer drug Herceptin approved and marketed 
as quickly as possible without lengthy bureaucratic processes and quibbles about 
costs, which was fully achieved; the chemical industry was aiming to reduce its costs 
by slashing the number of tests, authorisations and possible bans of substances 
required by the new chemical legislation, and was able to do so to a satisfactory 
extent; Shell hoped to disclose the necessary downgrade of its reserves and move on 
to better stories with minimal damage to its credibility as a boring but reliable 
corporation, an attempt that failed spectacularly. We move next to a summary of the 
stories they have told in attempts to attain these objectives.   
Roche did minimal story telling during the battle for Herceptin, with public 
announcements confined to results of new trials, first in the US and then in Europe, 
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showing both the scientific enthusiasm about a drug that significantly increased the 
survival for women with early-stage HER2-positive breast cancer, and their progress 
in gathering the necessary paper work for the approval of the drug by bodies such as 
the EMEA and NICE. The chemical industry, on the other hand, did promulgate its 
own stories during REACH. In the early days, the main industry story was about 
voluntary schemes and self-regulation, emphasising the message knowledge of 
chemicals was not lacking. This story line, towards the end of the process, 
incorporated the funding of alternatives to animal testing.  
After the White Paper was published, two narratives linked to costs gained 
speed simultaneously, one with a strong emphasis on ‘impact assessments’, 
apparently showing nightmare scenarios in key European countries; the other linking 
costly and unnecessary tests to animal suffering. Throughout the whole period, the 
typical industry narrative about losses of jobs and competitiveness was also told, with 
the story acquiring stronger force after it was revamped to include a concern about the 
negative effect of REACH on SMEs, other industries (downstream users), the 
continent (including impairing the Lisbon Agenda), and on global trade. A similar 
process happened to a narrative casting doubts on the workability of a multilevel and 
complex legislation that seemed to be taking too much on board, which was created in 
the beginning of the process but gained more visibility towards the end.  
Shell, unlike the chemical industry and Roche, did not have much of a 
narrative: rather it had an admission that one of its previous stories was no longer 
accurate.  In fact, Shell’s first announcement after the crisis had to be contradicted 
further down the line. The initial narrative was about a one-off downgrade of oil 
reserves stemming from an honest technical error, with no bearing on the balance 
sheet, but subsequent stories were about removing good-faith claims, further 
downgrades, and changes in the profit outlook. Eventually, a narrative about what 
happened with the reserves was released, placing the blame on executives already 
dismissed for attempting to cover up the mistake. By the end of the process, Shell also 
incorporated the need to review its structures as part of a story to restore credibility.   
 These corporate stories were met with a wide range of narratives from other 
actors. In Herceptin, the main interlocutors were patient charities, PCTs and the 
government. Cancer charities had three interconnected and simultaneous stories 
pointing out flaws in the health care system that drew on past disputes, including 
Herceptin’s first round of approval. One narrative was about a postcode lottery in 
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which patients were treated unfairly and had their access to medication and treatment 
linked to where they lived, something that was about to be repeated with the new 
cancer drug. The second narrative singled out the National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence (NICE) for taking an unreasonable amount of time to evaluate life-saving 
drugs, as well as the local authorities for failing to budget for new approved drugs. 
These were, during the episode, corroborated by reports and studies that, in 
connection with the many media stories on individual patients, reinforced the points 
made by a third storyline about rationing, the existence of an in-built bias towards 
costs rather than effectiveness in the process.  
The government’s story, told by Health Secretary Patricia Hewitt, was initially 
centred both on the defence of NICE as a guardian of fairness in health care decisions 
and on the denial of any postcode lottery or rationing. The story reinforced the 
independence of local authorities regarding funding. As the case progressed, the story 
took a turn to include promises of approval and explicit warnings to PCTs refusing 
treatment solely on the grounds of costs, in an increasing alignment with the demands 
of ‘fairness over cost’.  PCTs that did not follow Hewitt’s demands had NICE and the 
desirability of its guidance (cost-effectiveness) at the centre at their own narrative: in 
the absence of official approval, only patients with special circumstances should 
receive the drugs. Stories about undue governmental interference with NICE 
processes, fragile trials and misleading numbers and media coverage emerged just a 
few days before the approval of the drug, told by journalists and academics.        
 In REACH, four key groups are considered here: the team formed by the 
British, French and German governments (and to some extent, the US), sided with the 
industry; the alliance of environment, consumers and health NGOs;  and animal rights 
groups and trade unions, considered as different interests both in relation to one 
another and to business. The Health and Environment Alliance, which includes 
Greenpeace, WWF, EuroCoop, worked close to DG Environment since the Chester 
Meeting and, therefore, their story and the Commission’s story are tightly entangled 
up to the release of the White Paper in 2001. In this narrative, there is a knowledge 
gap from the part of the industry that is not being addressed by the current legislation. 
Therefore, new rules based on the precautionary principle, the reversal of the burden 
of proof to the industry, information for workers and consumers and an authorisation 
process and phasing out plan for hazardous products are necessary. A second story 
made a case for the business benefits (particularly innovation) and savings the 
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legislation could bring for national health systems and workers, as well as nature. This 
was mostly developed during the ‘impact assessment war’ of 2002 and 2003. A third 
story, also constructed mid-way through the process, was about the pervasive nature 
of untested chemicals found in places they were never intended to be, namely in the 
blood of people living across Europe. 
The European Coalition to End Animal Experiments, chaired by the British 
Union for the Abolition of Vivisection, entered the debate after the White Paper. The 
narrative had two main points: it claimed that the existence of a substantial knowledge 
gap regarding existing chemicals could not be calculated until data was forcibly 
shared by the industry, and that animal tests are not a reliable source of data, making 
them morally unjustifiable. The coalition, however, supported the phasing out of 
persistent, bio-accumulative and hazardous chemicals as proposed in the substitution 
principle, in line with the environment narrative.  
Within the trade union movement, significant differences between stories also 
existed. Trade unions represented by the European Trade Union Confederation 
(ETUC) had two main stories: one was centred on the need to manage chemical risks 
in a socially responsible but workable manner, particularly for SMEs; the second 
focused on the potentially positive impact of REACH for workers, with a steep 
decline on respiratory and skin diseases from exposure being predicted from measures 
such as duty of care, authorisation and substitution of hazard chemicals. The story 
told by joint positions of trade unions and employers’ groups like CEFIC was plainly 
about the workability of the legislation, which would only be achieved if authorisation 
and substitution requirements were scraped.  
The British, French and German governments brought a narrative about 
regulatory overkill when the draft proposal was published in 2003, with their heads of 
state branding the legislation an example of how European competitiveness could be 
jeopardised by overregulation. In their story, the slowdown of the Lisbon Agenda 
would be one of the main casualties of this type of regulation. The United States 
tagged along by arguing the incompatibility of REACH with other trade regulations.   
In the Shell case, the main interlocutors were investors, regulators and 
analysts. Anglo-American shareholders authored the story attributing the failures both 
in gauging the reserves and in not disclosing the problems sooner to the inefficiency 
and opacity of the management structure of two boards spread between the 
Netherlands and the UK, while blaming Shell for not listening to investors. The 
 179 
narrative of Dutch pension funds, however, was that Shell had performed badly but 
was taking the matter seriously, listening to shareholders and moving forward. This 
position shifted towards convergence with their British counterparts a few weeks 
before Shell announced the overhaul of its structure. Analysts also added new 
elements to their story as the episode progressed: the initial version focused on Shell’s 
consistent underperformance, deficient communication strategy and credibility 
problems but was overtaken by a parallel narrative linking the dual board to Shell’s 
failure mid-way through the crisis. 
Considering the short versions of stories told throughout the different disputes 
highlights two points that are relevant for the purposes of this thesis: one is that there 
are incomplete stories rather than one self-contained story, with arguments being 
complemented or framed differently over time; another interconnected issue is that 
these stories do not exist in isolation but intercut one another. These issues will be 
discussed in more detail in the next section.  
 
2.  Stories versus stories 
 
The starting point of this section is the finding that stories are incomplete and 
in constant development, characteristics that cultural economists have linked to 
capitalism itself (Thrift 2005). Despite their importance as generic features of 
narratives, one that  in fact differs from the conceptualisation of stories as a self-
contained plot with a beginning, middle and end (Froud, Johal et al. 2006), these still 
offer limited clues about why narratives are successful or not. And this is so because 
part of the puzzle is how to deal with the contingency brought by other actors’ moves 
and stories. This section, therefore, put narratives together, case by case, starting from 
the most successful to the less successful outcome (in industry terms), to observe the 
synergies between the different narratives that may be lost in the midst of highly 
complex interactions. The aim is to unearth and develop further the second issue 
hinted at in the last section: the intersections among stories. In other words, using the 
boiled down versions of stories portrayed in the last section, this section intends to 
shed light on the act of constructing narratives as an ongoing dialogue between actors, 
a negotiation in constant evolution rather than a random reflection of self-interest.    
Herceptin’s second round of approval started with a simple press release about 
successful new results for the drug, with scientists commenting on independent phase 
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III trials. Less than a week after Roche’s announcement, patient group CancerBACUP 
released the ‘Dossier of Delay’ with the 12 new cancer treatments that would take 
longer to reach patients because of NICE appraisal processes, including Herceptin for 
early stages. According to the charity, Herceptin could only be expected by February 
2009 and, therefore, should be fast tracked. After the strong media coverage of the 
dossier, Patricia Hewitt defended NICE and its approval process, as well as the 
independence of local health providers, but promised an early referral of Herceptin 
and Velcade to NICE Working Programme, a de facto fast tracking. As individual 
patients had their story told by tabloids and went to court, the Audit Commission 
report argued that funding was a problem, but that poor planning and financial 
arrangements were to blame for the lack of access to medicines in many places. This 
had two effects: it partially absolved NICE, which was a co-author of the survey, but 
also forced Hewitt to capitulate on the independence of PCTs. The release of the EU-
wide research showing the UK at the bottom of a 19-nations league table regarding 
the uptake of cancer drug therapies, including Herceptin for late stage breast cancer, 
prompted her to reinforce the message. This included the public reprimand of Trusts 
refusing treatment ‘on the grounds of cost’. Stories about scientific disagreements and 
heavy PR surrounding the drug only started to circulate when Herceptin was going 
through fast track procedure to become the quickest appraisal by NICE to date. 
In REACH, despite the much longer process involving a wider number of 
actors, this correspondence among stories can also be found. The starting point of the 
legislative process was the story from the Commission and the environmental 
movement. Here, the narrative was about the need to bring a new law to harmonise 
patchy European chemical regulations reflecting the precautionary principle and the 
principle of sustainability, which meant an existing lack of knowledge about hundreds 
of widely used substances had to be closed. This should be done in a way that 
combined the protection of humans and the environment with the economic goals of 
employment and social protection. The story of the chemical industry during the 
process of translating the narrative into a White Paper, on the other hand, was a direct 
response to these concerns: committing to further hazard and risk assessment 
exercises as part of ongoing programmes such as the Long-range Research Initiative 
was an attempt to maintain the legislation within its own interests of harmonisation of 
rules across Europe, while keeping the costly extra tests and assessments voluntary. 
The fact that these industry programmes were running for quite some time was also a 
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proof, in their narrative, that there is not a shortage of knowledge but rather there are 
logistical problems about collection, analysis and use of such vast amounts of 
information, something bound to become worse with over ambitious demands. The 
former claim would became part of the animal rights story about doubting the 
existence of a knowledge gap while the latter formed the basis of the industry own 
story about workability used further down the line.      
The entrance of the British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection and the 
European Coalition to End Animal Experiments created a separate story questioning 
the knowledge gap and deploring the loss of animals in the tests required. The starting 
point of the narrative overlaps with the industry claims inasmuch as it argued that 
companies manufacturing chemicals had been investing time and resources to test 
their products for years and what was needed was mandatory data-sharing, not further 
tests. The industry swiftly moved explicitly towards this line of reasoning, slamming 
strict test requirements as not only costly but leading to unnecessary suffering. The 
industry support for data sharing was less encompassing that it sounded, given that the 
results the industry was willing to share were the ones already in public arenas and 
not the confidential data animal rights groups were urging them to disclose. But 
demands for funding of new testing methods provided their lobby with an opportunity 
to share part of the narrative, reviving the story about voluntary schemes by turning 
part of the voluntary work as a search for alternatives to animal testing. 
As the European economic stagnation debate grew, emphasis on costs started 
to predominate in the industry narrative, with catastrophic predictions about the loss 
of jobs and competitiveness being a card particularly played, prompting actors to 
engage with this story in different ways. Chirac, Blair and Schröder used it as the core 
argument in letters asking for caution over regulation. The environmental movement 
rebutted these claims by providing its own data and releasing third part studies 
showing the benefits and savings for health providers and workers. This story was 
shared with part of the trade union movement, but the possibly negative effect of 
REACH on SMEs, recognised by the Commission, also resonated with them, 
particularly the European Trade Union Confederation.  
At the parliament, because of the new and diverse audience, the environmental 
movement and the industry had new stories in the pipeline. They were, however, 
directly connected with former versions and criticisms. The environmental story, 
based on evidence from widely publicised and debated blood tests, was about a 
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chemical cocktail present in people’s bloods whose existence and consequences were 
largely unknown. This challenged both the claims that there was enough information 
about the substances widely produced in Europe and that voluntary guidelines are 
enough to prompt the necessary knowledge. The industry story was about the 
workability of REACH and how excessive test requirements can become a 
bureaucratic nightmare. This narrative drew on the industry alleged experience in 
handling large amounts of data to cast doubts on the good intentions of REACH and 
its naive supporters.  
In Shell, there were much less clear links between stories, even though Shell’s 
actions were an indication that the discussion was being followed by the company. 
After the announcement of the massive downgrade, despite the lack of immediate 
financial implications, negative responses were triggered. The first ones to comment 
were analysts, in stories that blamed the CEO for the awkward disclosure and fretted 
about the company’s inability to achieve targets. When Watts offered an apology for 
the handling of the downgrade announcement and a full investigation, but still did not 
provide a narrative about what went wrong, British investors went off to tell their own 
story. The main argument was that Shell’s unusual corporate governance was directly 
linked to the failures. When Shell’s story was finally released, the explanation laid the 
blame squarely on two of the executives already dismissed, a clear attempt to 
emphasise a right decision (the swift substitution) and remove the pressure from the 
structure. This, however, strengthened a counter narrative about failing controls. The 
announcement of a fourth downgrade and a millionaire pension for the chief-
executive who allegedly took the company into fraudulent mess, combined with a lack 
of information about a commission examining the possible changes in the structure, 
pushed the Dutch into agreement that radical changes were needed.  
The focus on the intersections between narratives highlights two important 
points about effective stories: they engage with competing narratives either to 
incorporate overlapping points or to construct appropriate ‘answers’ to their claims; 
and are not limited to the dispute in particular but actively attempt to engage with 
broader stories. This, in turn, relates to the ‘imperative of justification’ alluded by 
Boltanski and Thévenot (1999): when there is no consensus, the search for agreement 
has to imply references to ‘principles of equivalence’ that can be mutually understood 
and, therefore, are susceptible to calculations and comparisons. Stories provide these 
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principles and the more competing narratives can engage with them, the greater their 
effectiveness seems to be.  
 Independently of the case study, effective stories took stock of other 
narratives as the process moved forward. In other words, actors built their stories 
displaying full awareness of what others actors’ arguments were, deliberately trying to 
engage with their points, either to discredit them or to reinforce common interests that 
could lead to a compromise. While stories often do not – and need not – fully 
converge, linking narratives with other actors’ stories provide the material upon which 
counter arguments and possible alliances are built. In REACH, stories linked the 
chemical industry, the animal rights movement and trade unions to a key discussion 
about the right scope of tests affecting animals and SMEs. This influenced the 
outcomes of the negotiation about requirements objected to by the three groups, even 
though there was never a comprehensive convergence of narratives or interests. The 
contaminated blood story, conversely, undermined the industry point about sufficient 
knowledge of substances and their long term consequences, reinforcing the 
environmental movement, trade unions and even animal rights’ claims regarding the 
need for authorisation and substitution provisions for dangerous substances.  
In Herceptin, the stories from the charities were ‘responded to’ by the 
Department of Health and/or the Health Secretary. But when, in tandem with an 
increasing number of patients being refused the drug, reports that supposedly proved 
the incompetence of NICE and local authorities in providing patients with the 
treatment they needed were made public, the government story fell apart. This, in 
turn, generated a ‘crisis-like’ momentum that forced the government into granting 
more concessions than it had envisaged.  In Shell, this negotiation did not seem to be 
in motion at all throughout the episode, despite the company’s awareness of the 
stories told by other actors. Its failure to engage discursively is remarkable and, to 
some extent, connected with the absence of its own story. Not having a narrative 
meant other actors could simply build their own versions of what had happened 
without seeking engagement with any existing frame, which in this case gave British 
investors, led by Eric Knight, free rein to draw a causal arrow between the board and 
the reserves mistakes, at the same time that other actors were never offered anything 
they could cling on to support the corporation, like the Dutch tried. 
Therefore, it would be reasonable to say that good stories provide elements to 
which other actors can relate, lifting up possible areas of common interests as well as 
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points upon which counter argumentation can be built, as suggested by Boltanski and 
Thévenot. In other words, stories provide a road map for the engagement and power 
negotiation among legitimate actors when common interests are not obvious. By 
offering contact points that can be used to form compromises or refute claims, on the 
other hand, stories create the ongoing dialogue that is part and parcel of the process of 
creating credibility and legitimacy (Beetham 1991). Through their stories, 
corporations stand the test of close scrutiny by inviting other actors to join a 
negotiation that, in a recent past, was neither open to debate nor public.  
Besides the linkage with other actors’ stories, the construction of successful 
narratives is also related to the extent that micro and macro stories intercut. In 
REACH, this refers to the use of ideas like the precautionary principle, sustainable 
development, Lisbon Agenda, as well as the more contingent media stories about 
economic slowdown. In Herceptin and Shell this is more noticeable, as the winning 
stories that became consensual through heavy media coverage were not about a drug 
or reserves but postcode lottery and rationing, and shareholder influence inside 
boardrooms. This expanding set narratives, on the other hand, is again not randomly 
chosen but pertinent to the arenas where episodes take place. It is to the relationship 
between arenas and stories that we turn to next. 
 
3. Stories and Arenas 
 
One of the propositions of this work is that stories have different functions in 
different arenas, partially because the narratives that inform the arenas themselves are 
not the same: in governance spheres, ideas of pluralism and democracy are 
paramount, while in the stock market transparency and shareholder rights prevail. 
This suggests that, in building stories, actors have to take into consideration not only 
competing narratives but the aims and beliefs of the ultimate interlocutor: the actors 
that make up the structure one is attempting to influence, as well as the narratives that 
validate the arenas themselves. Arenas, therefore, bring to the discussion the idea that 
there are values/logics that are hierarchically superior in different settings (Boltanski 
and Thévenot 1999), while the judgment of how coherent stories are depends on 
values of the actors involved in the dispute (Fisher 1987, p.5). This section, therefore, 
intends to scrutinise the mixture of ingredients stories are made of by taking into 
consideration micro and macro narratives. By doing so, it brings to the fore two points 
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of intersection between actors and structures highlighted in chapter IV: the 
relationship between stories and strategies and the role of the media. We start from the 
broader setting of institutions interacting, in REACH, and work our way to the 
narrower, in Shell. 
The making of the chemical legislation happened in a supranational arena of 
decision making including executive and legislative, national and international 
elements. In other words, technocrats, national governments and democratically 
elected politicians were involved and had stronger decision power depending on the 
phase of the process. But, as a brief summary, REACH was in the hands of 
technocrats, national government representatives and democratically elected 
politicians. Each of these groups purposely operate under different pressures and 
ethos and have very specific tasks: proposing laws that address the main concerns of 
the member states and make technical sense (the implementing of the law is viable); 
bringing in the national view for consensus making; and representing the diverse 
interests of nationally based constituencies as well as ideological affiliations. 
Moreover, many of the actors have changed through the quite long process due to 
revolving doors, new governments coming to office in member states, and the 
enlargement of the EU and renewal of Parliament.  
The European Commission had a clear task from the Council of Ministers: to 
produce a new law that could protect the environment based on the precautionary 
principle and sustainable development. The latter meant a legislation that could foster 
the development of the industry by strengthening the single market through the 
harmonisation of rules, as well as promoting incentives for the production of new and 
safer chemicals. These are, thus, the stories guiding the technocratic work of drafting 
the law, which involved compiling the general principles to mirror the goals and 
convening the technical and legal working groups that would design the necessary 
requirements. Environmental NGOs, working closely with DG Environment, built 
their own stories intertwined with these ideas, responding directly to the questions the 
Commission was asking: what are the problems with the old legislation? Where are 
the gaps that have to be covered? How can one do that in ways that balance economic 
and environmental concerns? Part of the story, both of the Commission and NGOs, 
was firmly based on another broader narrative: the scientific paradigm about evidence 
(or lack thereof) implicit in the precautionary principle and underlying the claims of a 
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causal relationship (chemicals equal environmental destruction) and a quantifiable 
knowledge gap.  
The anti-REACH lobbying, on the other hand, was mainly working on an 
attempt to prove the legislation unnecessary through initiatives of self-regulation and 
voluntary research schemes, a narrative that failed to engage with other stories and 
was focused on the industry self interest. When the White Paper got to the Parliament, 
the first narratives addressing the legislation (i.e. the Commission story) started to be 
told by the industry but, at this point, to a very specific audience: members of the pro-
business parties, such as the European Peoples Party and European Democrats, 
particularly from countries where the chemical industry was (and is) strong, like 
Germany and France. The story, a traditional line on unworkable red tape that kills 
competitiveness and profits, hurting jobs and the economy, certainly resonated with 
these MEPs but did not stop the recommendations from the green rapporteur, in tune 
with the Commission’s (and NGOs) goals, from being approved.   
The ineffectiveness of the industry story in the Parliament, as well as before 
the White Paper, is worth a few sentences because it reinforces, rather than weakens, 
the propositions of this thesis: narratives, in the political arena, are tools that help to 
legitimate interests and, therefore, less effective when simply mirroring a widely 
recognised consensus. In other words, while business and their allies are legitimate 
players, their interests and demands about REACH still have to be legitimised 
because they stand in opposition to the interests and demands of other legitimate 
groups. Effective stories, as mentioned before, engage with stories told by other actors 
but seem to be particularly important when claims are in a route of collision, and this 
happens both between actors and between institutions. This should not, of course, 
come as a surprise: the very system of checks and balances of democratic governance, 
starting with the separation of the executive, legislative and judiciary, aims exactly at 
preventing the interests of a particular institution from dominating. The conciliation 
meetings that resulted in REACH were the checks and balances in play: Parliament, 
insisting on strong environmental protection, and the Council, tending towards fewer 
burdens on the industry, negotiate a compromise that uses the stories provided by 
different actors involved in the process. These rounds of dialogue between actors, 
including inter institutional activity, are therefore part of the process that purports to 
legitimate not only different claims but also the European Union as a credible and 
democratic sphere of supranational governance. 
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By aiming at the pro-industry constituency in the first round of the Parliament, 
the anti-REACH lobbying was preaching to the converted, at the same time that the 
narrowness of the story, also present before the White Paper, meant nothing was 
offered as connecting points that could engage other interests, those that did not share 
the same claims. This connection started to be built when the Commission began 
working on the final draft. While the central argument questioning the knowledge gap 
and the affordability of an overhaul of the system for an important industry remained, 
the story expanded to touch wider issues and narratives, including the Commission’s 
own stories: the Lisbon Agenda, the European project that was supposedly in danger 
of being killed by REACH type regulations; the privileging of the ‘environment’ 
pillar of sustainable development in detriment of the ‘economic’ pillar; the adoption 
of risk and exposure against intrinsic properties and hazard, a key scientific debate; 
the previous experience of the industry with testing and the mammoth task that 
threatened to turn REACH into a red tape nightmare. These reached across a range of 
potential interests and alluded to stories told in the European arenas. 
 
3.1 Numbers 
 
A key component was the use of numbers connected to different stories: 
numbers about costs and job losses added to the competitiveness story, the number of 
animals killed by tests touched the animal rights line; and numbers linked to risk, 
intrinsic properties, hazard and exposure in the story about workability, the latter a 
direct allusion to the rational scientific foundation of the legislation. While not 
necessarily leading to the end of a dispute, the use of numbers is particularly valuable 
because of the quantitative objective and standardization that, Porter argues, are an 
adaptation and creation of modern political and administrative cultures, a way of 
implying the subordination of personal interests and prejudices to public standards. 
“Numbers are the medium through which dissimilar desires, needs and expectations 
are somehow made commensurable” (Porter 1995, p.86).  
Stone (2002) goes further to consider numbers as metaphors, since the act of 
quantifying something both implies the establishment of recognizable boundaries, and 
the creation of a natural community, or the need for action. For the greens, numbers 
from scientific assessments and tests proving that the human blood is impregnated by 
dozens of dangerous substances showed the causal link between chemicals and 
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environmental/ human health damage, a justification for the demand of further 
knowledge; for the anti-REACH, it showed the disproportion between costs and 
benefits. While the Commission’s shared assessment removed doubts about the costs 
claimed by the industry, the combined local and supranational media reports of a 
looming recession – an external and contingent story - catalysed their importance and 
spurred reaction from national governments. In Parliament, where the only truly 
overarching story is democracy, all these narratives were used in a bid to gain the 
hearts and votes of undecided MEPs. 
In Herceptin, numbers were important because the ‘halving the chance of the 
cancer returning’ was the figure that gave the drug its aura of a miraculous product 
that sustained the clinical value story. Herceptin’s main story, however, is not about 
science but about democracy and its underlying concept of equality. The choice of 
macro narrative is clearly interconnected with the arena: as described in chapter V, the 
debate about the public provision of health services in Britain has been characterised 
since the 1990s by claims of postcode lottery and rationing that clash with the story of 
equality upon which the NHS, and democracy, are based. This contradiction is seen 
by patient groups and the media as institutionalised in NICE, a body whose main goal 
is to make rationing decisions based on a combination of scientific proof and 
economic soundness.  
The main stories told by the charities and the media, therefore, bring the 
Health Department and Labour narratives into the frame by claiming that Herceptin 
and its expected delay in reaching patients is yet another example of problems that run 
deep in the system and require a response from the government. Challenging 
decisions as based on cost rather than benefits, as well as the unevenness of NHS 
delivery around the country was central to patient groups’ narratives because both are 
seen as going against the principles of the NHS and the justification of NICE as the 
solution for postcode lottery, which are the stories told by the government. But the 
effectiveness of these narratives is dependent on the strategy of removing the debate 
from within institutional structures (i.e. appraisal process) because, fought under the 
overarching narrative of cost-effectiveness that informs NICE, Herceptin had a much 
smaller chance of an unrestricted and quick approval, which was clearly main goal.    
Broadly speaking, stories in Herceptin legitimised patient interests by 
undermining the legitimacy of the stories the government was telling. Drug approval 
in Britain, according to cancer charities, is a paradox: set up to fix the postcode lottery 
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and speed the process of getting drugs to patients, NICE does not do the job because it 
is also trying to save money for the government – emphasising the cost instead of the 
effectiveness. ‘Evidence’ was provided by a list of drugs that would be delayed by 
NICE, an Audit Commission report about incompetent local authorities and European 
research funded by Roche on slow uptake of drugs in Europe. The intense media 
coverage of young women battling breast cancer, on the other hand, was essential not 
least because losing the battle seemed to be clearly linked to the variation of care 
among local authorities which, even more shameful, reflect income and social 
inequalities impacting the poorest and most dependent on NHS funding. As the media 
frenzy escalated, Hewitt’s responses evolved accordingly: first a promise of quick 
appraisal, then a promise of approval, and lastly a promise of approval and payment.  
The media, by providing snapshots of the real devastating effects of these 
‘conflicts of interests’ in play, is fundamental for the success of the patient groups’ 
narratives. This, however, could not be guaranteed from the start: the risk of using the 
media as an arena is the unpredictability about the story lines that will be developed. 
A different outcome could be expected had the media engaged with other aspects of 
drug approval and funding, such as the fact that careful assessment of drugs is also in 
the interest of patients or that superficial scrutiny can be in the interest of the 
pharmaceutical industry. The omission of a more analytical tone is even more 
puzzling given the very recent inquiry of the House of Commons about the influence 
of the Pharmaceutical Industry, in which patient groups, ghost writing practices and 
the role of scientific publications were debated. When scrutiny about the very 
representation of Herceptin as the wonder drug and the apparent consensus about it 
appeared in broadsheets, approval was imminent. 
 The role of the courts in Herceptin is as symbolic as numbers in REACH 
because, in modern democracies, law and science are “the two social institutions that 
are in their own fashion charged with arbitrating disputes about causal theories” 
(Stone 1989). The first cases were settled outside the courts, but Ann Marie Rogers 
High Court appeal over Swindon NHS Primary Care Trust is a proof of how stories 
matters beyond a transient media crisis: the legal argument only existed because of the 
political interference in the case. Patricia Hewitt’s story, a clear attempt to steer away 
from the stigma of NICE as a rationing body, was about making sure that PCTs did 
not refer to costs if denying treatment. When Swindon tried to justify its decisions on 
‘exceptional circumstances’ but not on cost and was not able to explain what were the 
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characteristics that could justify the distinction among patients within the eligible 
group, it lost the case.  
The looming presence of the law is one characteristic that Herceptin shares 
with the Shell episode: the others are the media as arena and numbers as the starting 
point. Unlike Herceptin, however, the numbers in question are at the centre of Shell’s 
discredited narrative, the financial media is an arena that does not operate with 
alternative stories and the spectre of law worked as a hindrance, not a facilitator, to 
Shell’s new narratives. This is so because the stock market is a particular arena: on the 
one hand, the perfect market functions with a constant flow of information(Golding 
2000), with financial newspapers and analysts working as a vehicle for these 
exchanges (Froud, Johal et al. 2006); on the other, legal requirements, overseen by 
regulators, prescribe the disclosure of information and safeguard investors’ interests. 
The maximisation of shareholder value, the overarching story, is the collective aim. 
 In other words, while Shell’s difficulties in building a convincing story are 
connected to the ingredients at hand, as greedy bookings and hidden mistakes are 
damning and complicated by fear of regulators, the very existence of these ingredients 
is related to the arena where the episode takes place. Failure to gauge oil reserves 
accurately or to inform about changes in previous measurements is only an offence in 
equity markets, where particular rules for information disclosure are in place. And 
they are in place to protect investors’ interests against the interests of managers, a 
mechanism to prevent shareholders from being undermined by insiders. The very 
creation of the SEC in the early 1930s, with its standardised accounting and reporting 
rules that could expose fraudulent misrepresentation, was a move to restore trust and 
to lift investor confidence after the stock market crash (Seligman 1982). 
Given the arena and its stories, investors’ central argument was not about the 
case (the reserves), whose scientific reliability (and hence soundness as an investment 
yardstick) had been long questioned, but the fact that investors’ interests were not 
being looked after by Shell’s boards. The need to strengthen the role and 
accountability of the chief executive, with more shareholder involvement in 
surveillance, rather than changing the way reserves are recorded or audited, was their 
main demand. When senior executives were ousted and the good faith claim was 
dropped, investors’ narrative was not about a possible fraud but a complaint about a 
company run as a ‘closed shop’. When Shell promises a review of its governance, its 
failure to disclose the names of the executives involved is portrayed as ‘minimal 
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levels of disclosure’. The construction of investors’ interests as clashing with Shell’s 
interests is what gives investors’ narrative its eventual power, even though the Dutch 
were not onboard until the very end. The recurrent feature here is that Shell, once 
again, had no story with which to respond to these accusations 
Shell’s lack of engagement with the narrative being told by investors, a 
narrative about management accountability and investors interests, is puzzling. If the 
fear of legal action and the confidentiality required during regulators’ investigations 
were certainly valid reasons to be reticent about the reserves, there was little hindering 
Shell from addressing the demands for the unification of its boards with an engaging 
narrative, be it trying to show that appropriate checks and balances were in place, 
proposing an alternative plan that could give stronger shareholder oversight while 
keeping the two boards or simply providing an elaborated version about committees 
working on the subject before being publicly harassed about it. In other words, the 
downgrade of the reserves and revelations about wrongdoing involving top executives 
wiped Shell’s credibility but it was probably its completely incompetent handling of 
shareholders’ narratives that cost Shell its dual board, since it proved investors’ point 
about whose interests were being served within the corporation. The narrative told by 
investors, on the other hand, was particularly strong because of its clear connection 
with the arena’s own stories and hierarchies. 
In other words, Knight’s story passed the tests of coherence and fidelity 
described by Fisher (1987): his narrative made sense both in relation to the broad 
story that informs and legitimates the stock market and matched the beliefs of the 
audiences they were being told to. In REACH, stories were developed to connect with 
the different narratives informing actors and arenas involved in the decision making 
process: stories that worked in the Council were quite different from the narratives 
that were effective in the Parliament. The removal of the debate from NICE to the 
media in Herceptin, on the other hand, was strategically planned to provide a more 
hospitable environment and audience to the stories that were going to be told: under 
the overarching narrative of cost-effectiveness that inform NICE, staffed by appraisal 
members wearing a ‘population hat’ rather than the ‘individual patient hat’, the drug 
had a much smaller chance of an unrestricted and quick approval. In the media, the 
story could interconnect with issues related to democracy and (in) equality instead, 
bringing citizens, and their indignation, to the debate. 
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 Removing the storytelling from a particular setting and using the media as 
arena, therefore, allows the story to be linked to broader issues that would not be 
available in the original institutional setting. There is, however, a risk that the tactic 
backfires if the media, ultimately largely out of control of corporations or other actors, 
brings insights that are detrimental to the narrative. In the stock market this seems to 
be different (Davis 2000) partially because the financial media shares the beliefs of 
the arena: the narratives about its own existence overlap with stories about the need to 
protect shareholder institutionalised by bodies such as the FSA and the SEC.  
Effective stories, therefore, evolve as the episode unfolds, in a constant 
engagement with narratives presented by other actors, and have a stronger impact 
when able to engage with clashing narratives. The scope for this engagement expands 
when stories intersect with narratives relevant to the arena where the episode is taking 
place. The next section examines these findings in the light of the academic literature 
that informed this thesis, drawing some conclusions about what stories can add to our 
understanding of business representation. 
 
4. Stories in perspective 
 
Two bodies of literature that have been portraying the evolution of business 
representation in the past three decades are central to this thesis: one, referred to as the 
‘political science’ view, focuses on the mapping of institutional structures and on the 
political tactics that can work in favour of business interests in these various arenas; 
the other is a cultural economy approach in which a strong emphasis on narratives and 
on how reality is framed by them is applied to the analysis of the interactions between 
giant firms and the stock market, particularly after rhetoric of shareholder value. For 
the former, the entrance of corporations as active political actors in charge of their 
own representation (Moran 2006), a shift from more informal and discreet attempts to 
influence policy making that characterised the previous decades (Grant 1984), has 
opened new avenues for action, with alliance building and the subtle control of 
collective channels becoming useful tools for achieving corporate goals (Coen 1997; 
Coen and Willman 1998). The latter, on the other hand, argues that corporate 
storytelling, the building of narratives of purpose and achievement corroborated by 
numbers, are fundamental for the management of the stock market, an arena prone to 
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representational difficulties as the task of consistent and optimal performance is 
largely unrealistic (Froud, Johal et al. 2006). 
 The next step has to be the questioning of how the idea of stories as a tool of 
business representation, and used to respond to external criticism and legitimate 
particular demands, relates to this knowledge. This becomes even more pointed when 
the case studies analysed above, to a great extent, corroborate what both scholarships 
have already highlighted. Why do we need stories to understand the business 
representation of giant firms and what can stories show that we could not see before? 
The short answer is that stories are at the core of the process which builds what, in its 
final form, is called ‘alliances’, ‘ad hoc coalitions’, ‘issue-specific business 
roundtables’ and even, to some extent, collective bodies of representation. It involves 
firms, investors, analysts and journalists, but also interest groups, states, regulators, 
parliamentarians, academics, technocrats and the courts. Whilst parts of the puzzle are 
indeed present in existing academic literature, the fragmentation of the analysis in 
cross/sub disciplinary niches makes the connections between the pieces harder to spot. 
In chapter III, it was argued that stories bring actors and structures together 
because, to some extent, it is through this very public exchange of narratives that 
power is negotiated in public spheres. It is in these conscious attempts to reach actors 
with different interests and claims, finding overlapping issues and/or fending off 
criticism, that stories (and the interests they reflect) are legitimised as the result of a 
public negotiation rather than a top down exercise of corporate clout. Given the 
process and purpose, it is unlikely that stories that simply reproduce corporate 
demands can achieve desirable results without being heavily, and publicly, 
challenged. Hence the efforts to associate corporate interests, and claims, with those 
of actors that are not natural allies, particularly in political arenas such as the 
European Union.   
Alliances and coalitions, however, despite their clear strategic nature, are not 
simply the result of DIY corporate manipulation but an amalgamation of shared 
interests that only become ‘visible’ through narratives. In REACH, the most useful 
alliances were not the highly resourced and established transatlantic coalition, whose 
story of choking costs and trade barriers were partially deflected by the Commission 
itself, but the links with animal rights groups and downstream users (SMEs) that, in 
regular times, are far from having a harmonious relationship with the industry. 
Considering the animal testing coalition ‘unholy’, however, misses the point because 
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even if the argument might be considered a bit too cynical for an industry accused of 
destroying a substantial part of the planet’s wild life, the overlap of interests – fewer 
tests – genuinely exists. The difference is that one group wanted to save lab animals 
and the other millions of dollars. The SMEs coalition is even more interesting because 
it showed that the ‘colonisation’ of minor interests (Bennet 1997; Cowles 1998; Grant 
2000) inside associations by giant firms is also a relative point: with small and 
medium enterprises recognised as the only weak link in the story of the legislation, 
the position of the downstream users in the coalition was not at all subservient to the 
handful of giant corporations coordinating the effort. The SME story, which held the 
key to further concessions by the Commission, changed the story of states, of the 
Council and of CEFIC.   
Stories can also be connected to another insight of the political science 
literature corroborated by the case studies reviewed here: the usefulness of  ad hoc 
alliances (Coen 1997; Coen and Grant 2001). But while the literature does not 
strongly distinguish between the different types of alliances, the analysis of narratives 
points at a higher effectiveness of coalitions formed between groups whose interests 
generally differ quite markedly. This also corroborates the proposition that stories 
shared with antagonists dilute the self-interest component that plagues business 
representation. In Herceptin, the success of the episode rests clearly on the perceived 
independence of patient groups from corporate ties. If the interest of patient groups in 
the approval of drugs in general is recognised as legitimate and their involvement in 
drug appraisals even encouraged, their credibility is severely compromised when a too 
close alignment with the industry is exposed. This would turn the episode from the 
sharing of a particular narrative about a particular (and maybe exceptional) drug to a 
permanent partnership. 
 Shell, in a completely different way, also offers a glimpse into the close 
relationship between stories and alliances because the use of the media as a traditional 
tool of shareholder activism has a dual purpose: to weaken the credibility of the firm 
(i.e. to publicly attack its stories) and to publicise investors’ own narrative in a bid to 
attract allies (i.e. form investors’ coalitions) in time for a particular action, such as 
proxy voting. Eric Knight’s well-timed appearances in widely-read financial 
newspapers had the main purpose of reinforcing his story both in response to a new 
development (e.g. new reserves downgrade, sacking of top executives) or in 
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preparation for events in which investors needed to close ranks, with the final aim of 
convincing the Dutch to join the fight. 
This is not to say that alliances are only strong if the narratives they 
created/are created by are also strong. It is undeniable that CEFIC is a powerful 
political player even when its stories come across as weak, an argument at the centre 
of the ‘structural power’ proponents (Bachrach and Baratz 1962): because the fate of 
corporations matters to the well-being of actors in charge of policy making, generally 
states but also supranational bodies, there is a ‘natural’ tendency to benefit business 
vis-à-vis other interests. Looking at both REACH and Herceptin, the answer to this is 
yes, and no. In the chemical legislation, the largest watering down of the original text 
happened through the Council when the Commission was finalising the draft, in a 
public push from national states. This led to a weakening of test requirements and the 
inclusion of a larger number of actors inside the Commission and Council to give 
opinion on the draft (e.g. competitiveness council, internal affairs, etc).  
There is, however, an important point here: the initiator of the legislation and 
arena requiring the use of the precautionary principle was the same Council of 
Ministers that, later, was caught in an internal division led by Germany. This is 
relevant because of two factors that relate to stories. The first one is the fallacy about 
the unity of interests within arenas. The Council of Ministers is a body of 27 countries 
(in the beginning of REACH, 15) in which the chemical industry, the environmental 
movement and the animal rights have different levels of access and importance. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that the doom and gloom about costs could have the same 
impact on representatives attending meetings in Brussels.  
It is exactly because interests are diverse that it was important to broaden the 
story portraying REACH as affecting not only the chemical industry but other sectors, 
hindering a wider European project, killing an unacceptable number of animals, or as 
an example of the lies and lack of knowledge of giant corporations. The broadening 
offered links that appealed not only to Parliamentarians and technocrats but also to 
audiences that matter at national level, triggering fairly varied reactions. The UK, 
Germany and France sent a clear sign that the industry was able to mobilise key 
national governments. But the UK was also the country that hosted the meeting that 
triggered the legislation and proposed the technical solution that moved the 
negotiation out of deadlock without reducing the data requirements while holding the 
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presidency of the Council in 1998 and 2005.  Considering the interests and stories of 
arenas as monolithic and self reproducing seems unwise. 
The second related point connects to both the idea of self-reproduction of 
interests and stories because the precautionary principle, at the centre of the industry 
fury since it justifies the substitution and ban of substances, is in itself a story that 
have become legitimate in the European Union thanks to the strength of the green 
narrative represented by NGOs and national environmental ministers. Before 
narratives about melting glaciers and dying polar bears started to be told by these 
groups, environment concerns would not stand on the way of industrial development 
in most parts of the world, including progressive Europe. With the turning of these 
stories into a legitimate interest around the urgent need of protecting the planet, 
shared by a whole spectrum of actors, business has to argue its own interests against 
this concern, which is institutionally embodied in governance institutions like the DG 
Environment. In the US, professionals like Frank Luntz, the communications guru 
cited in the introduction of the thesis, helped to create counter narratives that 
influenced the environmental debate in different ways, avoiding this particular policy 
shift so far. The terms of the debate, however, are in constant movement through the 
stories actors tells. Without stories, these interactions look from the outside as simply 
the result of business ‘structural’ power inside institutions and the explanation about 
why green David could knock down the chemical industry Goliath in its priority point 
on substitution and banning of substances remains unclear.   
Stories are therefore important because they expose a range of actors that are 
often seen as the ‘arena’ or combined as one inside them: in the stock market, cultural 
economists pointed out, there are not only firms and investors but also journalists and 
analysts (Froud, Johal et al. 2006). But they are not the only actors that are actively, 
and discursively, operating in equity markets. In Shell, to keep to the arena in 
question, there were ‘activist’ investors, conservative Dutch pension funds, regulators 
in the US, UK and the Netherlands, courts and lawyers, as well as the US Congress, 
all of them picking, choosing, and combining different stories to create their own. In 
Herceptin, tabloids, patient groups and the government were at the forefront of the 
debate but narratives that were central to the case came from an Audit Commission in 
London, academics in Sweden, Roche headquarters in Switzerland, independent 
scientists in the US and continental Europe and a dying woman in Swindon.    
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The wide variety of actors and arenas involved in story telling and the often 
unnoticeable links among then, in turn, expands the coupling between narratives and 
long lasting consequences that caught the attention of cultural economists. In Shell, 
this is obvious with the unification of the boards and scraping of the Dutch priority 
shares, but also with the triggering of the first review of SEC’s criteria to report oil 
reserves in more than 30 years. The hearing conducted by Michael Oxley at the US 
House Committee on Financial Services is certainly part of the move that involved 
pretty much the same actors that told stories during the crisis. In Herceptin, the 
creation of a legal argument by the government story meant the loss of the legal battle 
by Swindon with at least two unfortunate consequences: the portrayal of PCT’s 
decisions as ‘irrational’; and the thousands of pounds in legal costs, which can also 
have an impact on the way future disputes with patients and patient groups in the 
absence of NICE guidance are handled. The late exposure of industry friendly patient 
groups and PR companies in the episode has also renewed the debate about funding 
rules for charities and the use of ghost writing, but so far without much institutional 
intervention. In REACH the process is ongoing but the engagement with the SMEs’ 
narrative has to some extent changed the relationship between CEFIC and 
downstream users because, to play the role the episode demanded, the federation had 
to turn the discursive overlap into a permanent working group. The negotiations, with 
amendments still taking place, means there is no possible way out at least until the 
whole process is finished, in a few years’ time. 
Inserting stories into the analysis of business representation, thus, brings 
together actors and arenas in a way that goes undetected without them.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In the introduction to this chapter, three puzzles raised by the empirical work 
were outlined: how actors with less political and economic ‘capital’ are increasingly 
more influent in policy making arenas; how this democratisation can also work in 
business’ favour; and how institutions with an excess of these types of ‘capital’ may 
be forced to change their functioning because of external interference. The answers to 
these lie in how well these actors are able to manage their stories. This, in turn, 
suggests that narratives have become a structural feature that enables different actors 
to intervene in public arenas where business has to represent itself. 
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The implication of these findings for how we understand the nature and limits 
of business power in democratic capitalism is important. While the insertion of 
competing narratives of a type that were excluded from the debate until recently does 
not imply an immediate ‘gain’ or ‘loss’ of power by any actor, their very existence 
has two consequences: the first is the need for a constant engagement with other 
stories and the dire consequences of their mismanagement; the second is the fact the 
stories that finish a round of conflict are different from the stories that started it. This, 
in turn, changes the opening of the next round. As the process continues, new 
narratives become legitimate and overall power patters may shift. Stories and their 
intersections, therefore, shed light not only on how particular disputes are won or lost 
but also on how the broader narratives that inform institutional arenas and, ultimately 
capitalism, are to some extent a result of smaller scale negotiations among actors and 
stories seeking legitimacy.  
 This chapter also connects to broader issues of the thesis. It is towards these 
that we turn next in a short conclusion. 
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Conclusion: What stories are telling us 
 
The starting point of this thesis was a suggestion that the representation of 
giant corporations can be thought of in terms of stories. The question proposed was a 
simple one: how can stories help firms achieve their political and economic goals 
under the watchful eyes of an audience increasingly wary of big business and its 
power? But taking stories as an important part of the process that legitimates business 
and its interests should not be confused with claims that corporate power is solely 
created and sustained through narratives. The idea was rather that bringing to the fore 
an ingredient that is often dismissed as a nicety can add depth to our understanding of 
business representation and the changes it has undergone in the past three decades.  
Two theoretical approaches analysing business representation were brought 
into dialogue: a political science view focused on the mapping of institutional 
structures and on the political tactics that can work effectively in these various arenas; 
and a cultural economy scholarship in which there is a strong emphasis on narratives 
and how reality is framed by them. A meta-analysis of their accounts of the 
relationship between agency and structure revealed a portrait of business 
representation in which constant communication among a growing number of actors 
is unavoidable. This, in turn, paved the way to a main claim of this work: this 
discursive engagement happens through the exchange of stories that bring arenas and 
actors together in a public negotiation of power.  
Actors and arenas have interests and beliefs in constant evolution but it is 
through narratives that they legitimate their demands, creating new sets of interests 
and structures in the process. The arrival of new actors and the increasingly 
recognised legitimacy of their interests are, thus, directly connected to their new 
found capacity to discursively access previously closed circuits, firstly through the 
media and subsequently through institutionalised channels created in response to their 
stories of democratic deficit and dominance of illegitimate interests. Whether these 
particular organisations and interest groups that have become able to influence the 
debate are in themselves legitimate for such a role is certainly an important issue but 
not the focus of this thesis. Here we go as far as to credit their narratives as an 
effective tool for acquiring and subsequently negotiating power. In short, stories have 
become a structural feature enabling all actors operating in public spheres. 
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For business, this represents both a challenge and an opportunity. A challenge 
because issues that had been previously debated and decided amongst elite players by 
a variety of means have become public and open to contestation through narratives, 
forcing changes in the way corporations deal with their representation and demanding 
constant monitoring and engagement; an opportunity because stories can also be used 
as a tool to manage and reconcile some of the conflicts between capitalist economic 
power and political democracy by allowing the public scrutiny of influential and 
largely independent actors. If successful, this is a process from which business 
accountability and further legitimacy is obtained. Moreover, stories are able to help 
business to achieve particular objectives at micro level.  
The empirical work developed in the second part of the thesis arrived at two 
findings that are particularly relevant for our understanding of this process: effective 
stories of business representation are not structured plots with a beginning, middle 
and end but are rather a set of arguments developed in different directions; these 
directions, in turn, depend on the narratives told by other actors.  In a nutshell, stories 
provide elements that can be combined and reassembled and to which other actors can 
relate. Narratives develop through the engagement with elements provided by other 
players and include the stories that inform the arena where the negotiation takes place. 
Stories, therefore, have to make sense both in relation to the beliefs of the audience 
involved in the negotiation and in relation to the values that are hierarchically superior 
in the arena in question.  
Answers about some of the characteristics that make stories of business 
representation strong, however, trigger an inevitable return to the three propositions of 
this work: corporate narratives attempt to convince by projecting accountability and 
social worth; they take into consideration audience and arena because of the different 
functions stories perform in each arena; and a breakdown of narratives leads to crisis 
and impairs the construction of new stories. All three assumptions are corroborated by 
the findings, but some points are worth mentioning. Corporate narratives are certainly 
an attempt to project accountability and social worth, but these are obtained both by 
the ‘fabula’ or storyline in itself and by the process of negotiation that the existence of 
different actors and stories sets in motion. This is one of the reasons why stories of 
business representation differ from marketing and advertisement and why self-
interested and self-contained narratives, the traditional lobbying aimed at particular 
interlocutors, seem to be less efficient. Gaining legitimacy is different from buying 
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market share by advertisement. On the one hand, open ended business stories offer 
contact points that can be taken and developed in directions that may eventually 
benefit the corporation, but can also work against it. The contingency of the process is 
partially what makes stories a valuable tool. On the other hand, the process of slicing 
a main interest into a series of malleable narratives is important because it opens the 
possibility of new alliances and the recognition of overlapping positions much more 
likely than if actors had to agree with each other on the whole ‘package’.  
In REACH, there were a few examples of this partial agreement through 
stories: the workability narrative was shared by most players, independently on 
whether they wanted a stronger or weaker legislation; trade unions shared narratives 
about costs and endangered competitiveness of SMEs with the anti-REACH faction 
but were also co-authoring narratives about the health benefits of the legislation with 
the pro-REACH groups; the chemical industry and the animal rights had a common 
story about tests. In Shell, a different arena, the conversion of the Dutch was clearly 
not a result of an agreement about the unsuitable behaviour of Shell when booking the 
reserves or about the need to unify the boards per se but on the lack of public 
engagement with investors that went on despite Eric Knight’s nagging narrative. This 
story, in turn, was directly linked to the recognised primacy of investors’ interests in 
the stock market.       
In this light, the second proposition about the need to consider actors and 
structures when building stories, which is fully corroborated by the empirical work, 
can be developed further. The case studies made clear that taking into account 
audiences and arenas was particularly important because it widened the scope for 
interaction, offering possible contact points with a larger array of interlocutors, not 
least the ones in charge of making decisions. The use of media as arena has the same 
kind of underlying principle because it means the removal of the negotiation from a 
particular set of stories and rationalities to one with ethos and participants that are 
more likely to engage with the narrative in a positive way. Herceptin is the obvious 
example of how this can work in favour of particular stories: democracy and equality 
are much more suitable overarching narratives under which to discuss postcode lottery 
and rationing than the cost-effectiveness story that oversees NICE appraisals.   
Conversely, the virtual impossibility of removing the discussion from the 
media is a substantial problem for business operating in economic arenas. Working as 
the channel of information between corporations and the market and in itself a 
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creation of the overriding narrative of the need to protect shareholders, the financial 
media mirrors the values and ideas of the arena and, as a consequence, restricts the 
scope of stories that can be told. For the same reason (i.e. well defined overarching 
interest), the engagement with actors that do not share the same goals of investors is 
of very little help in the stock market, a stark contrast with governance arenas looking 
for a sample of legitimate views.  
In REACH, stories shared by the chemical industry with animal rights groups 
and SMEs, two actors generally wary of big business, were particularly useful. But 
narratives of self-regulation and choking costs that informed the early stages of the 
legislation, shared by pro-business politicians, did not produce the desirable effect, 
suggesting that stories in political arenas are more effective when they bring together 
actors whose interests do not routinely overlap. This relates to the idea that stories 
legitimate different things in political and economic arenas – business demands vis-à-
vis other actors’ demands in the former, and management decisions in relation to 
alternative action in the latter. The components that strengthen narratives, however, 
are similar in both: keeping the negotiation flowing through actively engaging with 
other narratives, sharing or refuting their claims, are crucial in relation to governance 
arenas and to the stock market. In Shell, the lack of a story taking into consideration 
the narratives told by other actors restrained further the corporation’s ability to restore 
some credibility, at the same time that provided ammunition for the accusations of not 
listening to investors and operating as a closed shop.    
In relation to the third proposition about crises, the difference between arenas 
is again relevant and, once more, the particularities of the financial media are mainly a 
problem for corporations. In Herceptin, focusing on postcode lottery and rationing 
through the media not only removed the issue from an inhospitable environment (i.e. 
NICE) but turned the spotlight on the government, leaving Roche and the price of 
cancer drugs out of reach of public outcry. The government, not the firm, was the 
actor forced into mediated justification. As Hewitt’s stories started to be rebutted by 
narratives told by patient charities, a minor scale crisis was created, leading to the 
populist concessions regarding the drug. Bowing to the demands, on the other hand, 
relieved the pressure from NICE. In the stock market, the process is different not least 
because the announcement of the breakdown is (or should be) made by the storyteller. 
It is not simply about having a story contested by competing narratives but actually 
admitting the problem. Moreover, given the homogeneous nature of the arena (and the 
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media),  a faux pas tends to be acknowledged as such, and punished, by most of the 
actors involved. The result is an instantaneous (and herd-like) negative response.  
Rebuilding trust when story and storyteller are discredited makes matters 
worse and requires an even stronger engagement with the narratives other actors are 
voicing thereafter. The Health Secretary made sure her interlocutors knew she was 
aware of their demands and, eventually, willing to accept them. This was lacking in 
the Shell case. Central to the problem was clearly the fact that the previous story 
about the reserves was allowed to be retold time and time again even when it was 
known to be untrue by top executives, but the lack of a narrative about the mistakes 
and of a clear engagement with the stories other actors were telling seemed to have 
played a crucial role in fuelling the crisis.  
Taken together, these findings make a contribution to the literature of business 
representation and power in contemporary capitalism by considering stories of 
business representation as part and parcel of the process that moves this project 
constantly under construction. In a nutshell, this thesis is about the interactions 
between politics and economics and the cultural foundation of this relationship. The 
combination of these ingredients adds depth to the analysis of the nature and limits of 
business power and opens an avenue for the study of episodes that, under more 
orthodox examination, could only be partially understood, or would not be seen as 
examples of business representation. REACH is a case in which a costly legislation is 
watered down by a powerful and well organised business sector, but a traditional 
analysis would offer little insight into why this massive lobbying machine took a 
significant period of time to successfully dilute part of the legislation and ultimately 
failed to achieve a complete victory against much weaker opponents that were not 
even a part of policy making processes until recently.  
Without stories, Herceptin would perhaps not be considered a case of business 
representation at all. With traditional lenses turned to power negotiations between 
officials in Whitehall and the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry, 
episodes such as Relenza were more likely to provide an illustration of the ongoing 
arm wrestling between these two actors. While this relationship is surely a crucial part 
of the picture, Herceptin amounts to what a significant part of business representation 
is about: helping a firm to make profits while appearing to perform its social duties at 
the highest level. Despite happening completely outside traditional power 
frameworks, being able to share stories with other actors had a clear effect on what 
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could be achieved by Roche, with less damage to its image than the usual threats to 
leave the country if price demands are not met.  
By showing how stories can be used as a strategic tool, this thesis also 
contributes to a growing literature on the use of narratives to influence behaviour. So 
far, this scholarship has focused intently on state narratives, particularly the impact of 
stories in policy making process and the functioning of markets, but less attention 
been paid to the use of stories by giant corporations, key actors directly involved in 
both settings. This is a gap that this work helps to bridge. Moreover, the analysis of 
the micro narratives used by a central capitalist actor indirectly contributes to the 
understanding of not only how particular disputes are won or lost but also how the 
broader narratives that inform institutional arenas influence (and are influenced by) 
these negotiations.   
There are, conversely, clear limitations to this work. The bigger, discussed in 
detail in chapter III, is the use of case studies in a hope to build a general explanation 
about the process of constructing stories in complex settings. The choice was to use 
fundamentally different cases, arriving at a combination of arenas, actors and results 
united by the existence of narratives. These are, nevertheless, still snapshots of 
interactions that are to some extent contingent on the sectors and corporations chosen. 
In the same way, the examination of crisis was limited to one of the two arenas 
considered in this work, partially because of the time constraints that a 3 year PhD 
training entails. The ‘mini-crisis’ created by the breakdown of Patricia Hewitt’s 
stories does offer some interesting points about crisis in political arenas, as well as 
some insight into the manipulation of opinion in democratic structures,  but the 
pressure was not being applied on the corporation, which changes the dynamics.  
This suggests that further research can and should be pursued. The framework 
in itself can be developed by the analysis of new case studies, including episodes in 
which giant firms are involved in crises taking place in political arenas. The recent 
explosion of the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig and subsequent crisis that plunged 
British Petroleum, a company that once defined itself as beyond petroleum, for 
instance, is a potential case. Operating in ‘deep sea energy exploration’, as Frank 
Luntz (again) has rephrased offshore drilling in the US, BP was led by a CEO (Tony 
Hayward) who, in 2007, when assuming the top spot at the British corporation, told a 
story of “laser-like focus on safety and reliability”. 
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The ongoing episode, considered the largest marine oil spill in the history of 
the industry, has some of the ingredients for a firm-changing PR disaster that 
resemble Shell’s own: a CEO whose rowdy comments on the episode incensed the 
Americans and, therefore, is already in his way out; an unflattering record of more 
than 700 violations of health and safety over the last three years; and a wobbly story 
with very little answers about what has happened (Tony Hayward supposedly 
repeated the phrase ‘I do not know’ more than 60 times during a congressional 
testimony in June). These problems are overseen by a fierce dispute around offshore 
drilling between democrats (generally against it) and republicans (in favour of). This 
combination of factors can offer further insights into the process of creating stories 
that engage with very different actors while weathering a full mediated crisis.   
Another potential case would be of a corporation that has been able to reinvent 
itself amidst a political crisis. The recent financial crisis is the episode in mind and a 
bank, Goldman Sachs, the most obvious choice of case study. Goldman has managed 
to benefit from the initial subprime crisis and, after the virtual disappearance of 
investment banking in the US, turned itself into a traditional bank holding company 
posting record profits. Its representation has involved a multitude of actors, arenas and 
narratives – politicians in a public witch hunt, investors wary of banks of any kind, 
regulators punishing disclosure problems, lawmakers discussing strict regulation and 
citizens expecting the end of the bonus culture, to name just a few – that would be 
suitable for the framework developed in this thesis. 
But a conceptualisation that brings together political science work on actors 
and interests and cultural economic analyses of narratives can also function as a base 
upon which a new research agenda is built. The financial crisis and current regulatory 
efforts are a potential starting point for empirical work looking for a new kind of 
understanding of how business and government interests operate in the political and 
technical frameworks that shape markets, which are typically associated with 
narratives that explain and legitimise the purpose and achievement of finance and its 
regulation. This would be particular interesting for the analysis of both the processes 
that led to the breakdown of the final system and to the understanding of its aftermath, 
particularly the intense regulatory effort that has mobilised elite players around the 
world since 2008.  
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Annexe 1 
 
Drug Development of New Molecular Entity (NME) 
 
 
Target Selection 
 
Selection of compound for 
development 
 
 
Pre-clinical and non-clinical phase Animal and bench testing before 
administration to humans 
Start of tests which run concurrently 
with exposure to humans 
 
Phase I First Time In Man (FTIM) - the first 
study of a new compound in humans, 
usually healthy volunteers 
Phase II – Proof of concept (PoC) First Time In Man (FTIM) - the first 
study of a new compound in humans, 
usually healthy volunteers 
Phase III  Studies in a large population to 
generate safety and efficacy data for 
licence application 
License application Filing all data to regulatory bodies, 
known as Marketing Authorisation 
Application in Europe 
Phase IV Post-marketing studies, usually 
focusing on side-effects and safety 
    Source: GSK Memorandum for the Select Committee on Health 
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Annexe 2 
 
NICE Appraisal Process 
 
 
Draft of written consultation Scope for technology appraisal or 
clinical guideline 
Invitation of stakeholders to take part Start of the development of a piece of 
guidance to discuss the scope, 
approach to assembling the evidence 
base and key issues to be addressed 
Consultation of Evidence Stakeholders are given the 
opportunity to complement the 
evidence base to be analysed by the 
advisory body 
Written consultation Advisory body views on the draft 
recommendation are issued twice in 
the case of clinical deadlines and 
once during technology appraisal 
guidance. Comments of stakeholders 
are published on the website 
Appeal Stakeholders are allowed to submit 
an appeal on the grounds that the 
Institute has exceeded its powers, or 
has failed to follow its process or that 
the guidance is perverse 
Source: NICE website 
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List of Interviews 
 
 
Interview 1 – European Commission civil servant – Telephone interview, December 
2008  
 
Interview 2 – European Commission senior civil servant – Brussels, January 2009 
 
Interview 3 – European Commission civil servant – Brussels, January 2009 
 
Interview 4 – Environmental NGO senior European policy executive – Brussels, 
January 2009 
 
Interview 5 – REACH lobbying coordinator for the industry – Brussels, January 2009  
 
Interview 6 – Director of a consultancy firm working on the industry campaign – 
Brussels, January 2009 
 
Interview 7 – Environmental NGO coordinator of the advocacy campaign – 
Telephone interview, January 2009 
 
Interview 8 – Health Economics consultant and member of Scottish Medicines 
Consortium – Buxton, March 2009   
 
Interview 9 – Pharmacist and former medical writer – Manchester, March 2009 
 
Interview 10 – Chairman of a large patient group and member of NICE – Oxford, 
March 2009  
 
Interview 11 – Senior executive in charge of financial planning in a Plc – London, 
March 2007 
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Interview 12 – Senior executive in charge of investor relations in a Plc – London, 
March 2007 
 
Interview 13 – Senior executive in charge of financial analysis in a Plc – London, 
March 2007 
 
Interview 14 - Former senior executive in charge of Communications and Marketing 
at Shell – Telephone interview in October 2008 
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